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ABSTRACT 
This research considers the transfer and institutionalisation of a corporate governance 
practice to the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures of two UK listed `1\ Es. 
The practice under consideration is a risk based system of internal control (RBSIC) 
that follows the recommendations made in Internal Control: Guidance for Directors 
on the Combined Code more generally known as the Turnbull Report or guidelines. 
The Turnbull Report provides guidance for directors on how a company should 
'maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders' inlvestinent 
and the company 's assets' a recommendation of the UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance. The extent of a transfer is defined as the degree of 
institutionalisation at the recipient unit. Institutionalisation is the process by which a 
practice achieves a taken-for-granted status and becomes embedded in the recipient 
unit's management and governance processes. 
The main contributions of this research are three-fold. Specifically they focus on 
corporate governance practices below board level; the transfer of corporate 
governance practices across international borders; and the role of managerial agency 
as a key influence over institutionalisation. 
Through the combination of semi-structured interviews, documentation provided by 
the companies and secondary sources including academic papers, books and news 
services two case studies were developed - one main case study, consisting of eight 
embedded case studies - Excelsior; and a supporting case study consisting of two 
embedded case studies - Landmark. 
Three key themes emerged from this study: First, although the degree of 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC differed across cases, the overarching picture was 
one of ceremonial adoption that had been achieved without the relatively high level of 
implementation proposed by Kostova and Roth (2002). 
Secondly, the successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC resides primarily in the 
individual employees at the recipient business unit. However, the transfer is 
embedded inside a specific national context that to differing degrees, depending on 
the differences between the source of the RBSIC and the individual recipient business 
units, interacts with three practice specific sub-variables - causal ambiguity, practice 
specific absorptive capacity and motii'ation of the practice recipient. 
Thirdly, due to over reliance on the regional RBSIC team responsible for the 
institutionalisation of the practice, their role as gatekeeper, standing between the 
source of the knowledge (corporate headquarters) and the recipient (Asia-Pacific 
business units), was unexpectedly a barrier to the development and institutionalisation 
of the practice. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In an interview given to the Financial Times (12/06/06) Sam Palmisano, Chairman of 
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of IBM, described the modern company as a: 
"globally integrated enterprise, which spreads its strategies, production capacity and 
management around the world in order to be close to markets and customers, that is 
«n inherently better and more profitable tivav to organise business activities - that can 
deliver enormous economic benefits to both developed and developing nations " 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) operate in multiple countries, exposing them to 
cultural, institutional and economic heterogeneity (Zellmer-Bruhn and Gibson, 2006: 
501). The ability to effectively transfer knowledge and practices across borders is a 
key characteristic of the successful MNE (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1997; Nohria and 
Ghoshal, 1997; Gupta and Govindrajan, 2000). This is especially important if 
successful transfer is believed to be critical for the competitive advantage of the firm 
(Kostova, 1999: 321). 
More than at any time in the past the growing pressures on MNEs to fully integrate 
global operations places a greater strain on a company's ability to manage its business 
and ensure that the corporate governance standards required by its local listing 
authorities are achicved. Internal control, comprising the integrated collection of 
policies. procedures, processes, plans, strategies, functions. systems, initiatives, 
acti\ itics, and other actions undertaken by management to achieve business objectives 
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(Root, 1998: 161), «il1 play an increasingly important role as companies seek to 
understand their operating environment and maximise the opportunities available, 
thereby increasing returns to their owners. This research considers the transfer of a 
strategic organisational practice -a risk based system of internal control that follows 
the recommendations contained in the Turnbull guidelines, from now on referred to as 
the RBSIC - from two United Kingdom (UK) listed companies to their Asia-Pacific 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
The Turnbull guidelines, more formally known as Internal Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code, provide guidance for directors of companies to 
implement the principle contained in The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(1998,2003) that states: 
`The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard 
shareholders' investments and the company's assets'. (Combined Code, 1998: 
Section 1, D. 2; 2003: Section 1, C. 2) 
UK companies are required to comply with the provisions and principles of the 
Combined Code or explain why they have failed to do so. The Turnbull guidelines 
are about the adoption of a risk-based approach to establishing a system of internal 
control that should be incorporated by the company within its normal management 
and governance processes and be embedded in the operations of the company forming 
part of its culture (I Turnbull, 1999, para. 22). Companies are required to disclose in 
their annual report that they have in place an ongoing system for identifying, 
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evaluating and managing significant risks faced by the company. If such a system is 
not in place they are required to explain why this is the case. 
The value of corporate governance practices are frequently questioned during periods 
of economic expansion as companies and shareholders concentrate on wealth 
generation rather than ensuring governance mechanisms are working appropriately for 
the retention of wealth, and its use for agreed purposes (Clarke, 2004(a): 153). 
During these times companies and investors become complacent about corporate 
governance. Corporate governance mechanism are frequently regarded as 
unnecessary `red-tape' reducing a company's ability to act quickly as well as being 
costly both financially and in time spent. However, at times of economic contraction 
and, especially corporate collapse, pressure frequently builds up for a re-evaluation of 
the viability of the regulatory system. This has led to the tendency for interest in 
corporate governance issues to be cyclical (Clarke, 2004(a): 153). The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) (2000: 3) noted that during the years of high growth that 
had proceeded the 1997 Asian economic crisis investors appeared to pay "inadequate 
attc'iition to corporate governance as long as investments were profitable and the 
return on investment adequate " and "cared little about the excessive long-term risks 
that some projects were exposed to. " However, failures in corporate governance, 
resulting in tens of billions of pounds worth of losses to shareholders, commencing 
with the Asian economic crisis of 1997, followed by the high profile collapses in the 
United States that included Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Global Crossing and the 
later failures of corporate governance in Europe that included Parmalat and Shell have 
once again seen a resurgence of interest in corporate governance, especially the 
importance of managing and identifying risk effectively. This was apparent during 
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the recent contentious acquisition of Arcelor by Mittal Steel when the Financial Times 
(27/4/06) questioned the quality of Mittel's corporate governance across all of its 
subsidiaries asking whether sufficient protection for investors existed. During the 
takeover `boom' of the 1990s it is debatable whether such a question would have 
arisen. 
Corporate governance mechanisms, including the RBSIC, involve costs to companies 
and their owners. Sometimes this cost can be very high as shown by the introduction 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States following the Enron collapse. The 
value of this expenditure is often hard to quantify. Whereas it is possible to calculate 
the value of preventing a building collapse it is much more difficult to evaluate the 
benefit of changing employee behaviour. Therefore it is not surprising that some 
owners and managers believe that corporate governance places more of a burden than 
a potential gain upon a company and the `market' is the best regulator of a company 
and its managers' behaviour. They argue that the market will reward well managed 
companies and punish poor ones through the allocation of resources and that this is 
the most effective form of regulation. Although, the intellectual strength of this 
argument is easily appreciated it is perhaps more difficult to convince Enron investors 
who lost $80 billion when the company collapsed. 
An obvious theoretical model supporting such a `Darwinistic' view is the population 
ecology view promoted most strongly by (amongst others) Hannan and Freeman 
(1977; 1989). From this perspective, governance matters less than an organisation 
surviving the pressures of a demanding environment. `Weaker' organisations fail to 
survive and the demanding environment leads to their demise. In a purely 
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deterministic way, these organisations go out of business. However, the population 
ecology view and its highly deterministic paradigm are not without their critics who 
argue for a more voluntaristic perspective - most pertinently one in «hich governance 
can be seen to make a difference to organisational survival and growth (see Usher and 
Evans, 1996 for one example). The demise of an organisation may be a voluntaristic 
`strategic choice' (Child, 1972) on the part of headquarters about a subsidiary. In this 
respect, the fate of the subsidiary is less a function of the environmental determinism 
and more a voluntaristic action of governance from headquarters. This study eschews 
a paradigm of overly-deterministic environments and embraces a voluntaristic 
perspective in which governance structures and processes are argued to make a 
difference to the effectiveness and survival of all parts of the organisation. More 
recently, the collapse of firms such as Enron has been argued in large part to be a 
function of irresponsible governance rather than environmental determinism (Child 
and Rodriques, 2004: 148; Clarke, 2004(a): 158). In doing so this thesis 
acknowledges that successful risk management involves the balancing of the cost of 
risk management against the potential cost of the risk, the short-term cost against the 
long-term cost (Blackburn, 2000: 9). 
If governance is such a central feature of organisational performance and survival, 
then MNEs will strive to ensure its effective transfer throughout the organisation. 
Therefore, this research considers the transfer and institutionalisation of corporate 
governance practices to the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures of UK listed 
ti1NEs. The term transfer is used to emphasise that the movement of knowledge 
within the organisation is a distinct experience, not a gradual process of dissemination 
(Szulanski. 1996: 28). In other \Vords the transfer is an event it is not transmitted in 
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an `ad-hoc' fashion over an unspecified period of time. The extent of a transfer, 
consistent with the institutional perspective proposed by Kostova (1999: 311), is 
defined as the degree of institutionalisation at the recipient unit. 
This study looks at one key aspect of governance transfer, namely a RBSIC. 
Although, RBSICs represent a substantial part of corporate governance practices, they 
are by no means the whole story of governance. RBSIC was chosen as the vehicle for 
this study because it focuses on two contestable concepts - risk and control. These 
concepts are not only open to debate in single countries, but also their transfer is 
likely to prove (to varying degrees) difficult, since effective transfer depends upon 
common conceptions and practices across business units in different countries. 
For example, conceptions of risk vary widely (March and Shapira, 1987: 1,405), with 
numerous definitions offered ranging from Knight's (1921) description of risk as 
"objectivehi predictable variances in accounting-based performance variables "; 
Miller (1992: 312) who refers to risk as "unpredictability in corporate outcome 
variables "; Ghoshal (1987: 430) who `collapsed' risks into four broad categories - 
macroeconomic, policy risks, competitive risks and resource risks; and the all 
encompassing view of risks included in the Turnbull guidelines (Appendix, para. 1) - 
"significant internal and external operational, financial, compliance and other 
risks ". ' 
' Significant risks may, for example, include those related to market, credit, liquidity, technological, 
letal, health, safet\ and environmental, reputation, and business probity issues ( Turnbull, 1999, 
Appendix, para. 1) 
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Similarly, the notion of control across MNEs has been variously described by many 
authors (e. g. Doz and Prahalad, 1981; Child, 1984: Hedlund, 1986: Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Gupta and Govandarajan, 2000; O'Donnell, 2000; Whittington and 
Mayer, 2000). Child (1984: 136) described it as a process whereby management and 
other groups are able to initiate and regulate the conduct of activities so that their 
results accord with the goals and expectations held by management. Control can be 
through hierarchical governance (Chandler, 1962 Williamson, 1971,1975,1981) 
with an emphasis on bureaucratic mechanisms ranging to normative social control 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993,1995; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994) that stresses the 
internalisation of shared values (developing a `common world view' (Prahalad and 
Doz, 1987)) that reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour, and the need for 
monitoring and explicit rules. Most companies are likely to have control mechanisms 
that combine both of these characteristics (Child, 1984: 163; Gooderham and Ulset, 
2002). 
Of interest, therefore, in this study is to what extent these notions might be transferred 
internationally and implemented in some standardised form. Given the highly 
contextually specific underpinnings of each, it is likely that transfer will be difficult in 
a MNE which operates subsidiaries in many different countries each with its own 
cultural and philosophical context. Corporate Governance in the Asia-Pacific region, 
with the exception of Australia, was identified by the ADB (2000: 3) as one of the 
main factors behind the 1997 Asian economic crisis. More recent work by the OECD 
(2003) suggests that the current status of disclosure and transparency leaves much to 
be desired: the framework itself is improving in most countries in Asia but 
implementation remains a key challenge (Lassere and Schütte, 2005: 185). From this 
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perspective, it might be argued that there will be an inevitable bias towards non- 
acceptance. Yet this would present an overly simplistic view. Not only do managers 
have strategic choice (Child, 1972) beyond determinism, they also face the intense 
pressure towards standardisation from headquarters which will act as a forceful 
countervailing power against contextually shaped voluntarism (Leavy and Wilson. 
1994). It is this contested terrain between voluntarism and determinism that the 
current study explores. Such studies are relatively rare in the academic literature, 
providing a raison d'etre for this research. Drawing on the above conceptual 
discussion, four research questions form the focus of this study: 
1. To what extent has a risk based system of internal control that follows the 
recommendations contained in the Turnbull guidelines been institutionalised in 
the Asia-Pacific based subsidiaries and joint ventures of two UK listed 
companies? 
2. What are the main difficulties, if any, encountered during the transfer of the 
practice? 
3. If so, what are the key variables influencing the successful transfer of the practice" 
4. What are the practical implications of this research? 
This thesis consists of twelve chapters and an appendix. Following Chapter 1, the 
introduction, Chapter 2 defines corporate governance before discussing agency theory 
the principle theoretical framework that underlies the UK's Combined Code of 
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Corporate Governance. This is followed by a description of the recent development 
of UK corporate governance and an explanation of the role of the Turnbull guidelines, 
a review of the major differences in the corporate governance environment of the UK 
and the other countries included in this study, and the arguments for and against the 
convergence of national corporate governance systems. It concludes with a 
discussion on how a national corporate governance system can influence the treatment 
of risk. 
Chapter 3 develops the theoretical framework underlying this research and reviews 
the relevant literature and how it relates to the key questions under consideration. 
Chapter 4 details the scope of the research and introduces the philosophical 
underpinnings, methods, processes and data collection techniques used during this 
investigation. The remainder of the chapter describes the research process and the 
experiences of the researcher. 
Chapter 5 introduces the two main research subjects - Excelsior and Landmark and 
the ten embedded case studies developed from the data gathered at both companies. 
The chapter is divided into two parts - one for each company. Each begins with a 
brief description of the company, followed by a review of the operation of the RBSIC. 
It then goes on to describe the individual Asia-Pacific business units involved in the 
study and their respective operation of the RBSIC. 
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Chapter 6 provides a broad statement of the findings of this research, introduces the 
five factors that determine the degree of institutionalisation of the RBSIC and 
considers how they relate to the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 3. 
Chapters 7 to 11 analyse and discuss the five factors in the implementation, 
internalisation and institutionalisation of the RBSIC in the individual business units. 
Chapter 12, the conclusion, summarises the research study and discusses both its main 
findings and contribution to the study of governance. Also discussed are the 
implications for practice, limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
The appendix contains supporting documentation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
ROLE OF THE TURNBULL GUIDELINES 
2.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter will begin by defining corporate governance. It will then go on to 
discuss agency theory which is the principle theoretical framework that underlies the 
UK's Combined Code of Corporate Governance. This is followed by a description of 
the recent development of UK corporate governance, beginning with the publication 
of the Cadbury Report in 1992, which includes an explanation of the role of the 
Turnbull guidelines. The remainder of the chapter will review the major differences 
in the corporate governance environment of the UK and the other countries included 
in this study, consider the arguments for and against the convergence of national 
corporate governance systems and discuss how a national corporate governance 
system can influence the treatment of risk. 
2.1.0 Corporate Governance 
There is no single, accepted definition of corporate governance with definitions 
differing considerably from country to country. At its broadest level corporate 
governance is concerned with practices and procedures for trying to ensure that a 
company is run in such a way that it achieves its objectives (Coyle, 2004: 3). Given 
the international scope of this research it xvill adopt the definition of corporate 
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governance offered by the OECD in its updated Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
The OECD (OECD, 2004: 11 - 14) identified corporate governance as one of the key 
elements in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor 
confidence. While acknowledging there is no single model of good corporate 
governance it described corporate governance as: 
".... involving a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. " 
The Principles of Corporate Governance goes on to say that: 
"Corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context in which firms 
operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of 
competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance framework also 
depends on the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment. In addition, factors 
such as business ethics and corporate awareness of the environmental and societal 
1 The Principles are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to 
evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance 
in their countries and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, 
corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate 
governance (OECD, 2004 : 11). Since the Principles were first agreed in 1999, they have formed 
the basis for corporate governance initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries alike. 
(OECD, 2004 : 9) 
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interests of the communities in which a company operates can also have an impact on 
its reputation and its long-term success. " 
2.2.0 Agency Theory 
Agency theory underpins much of the UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
(Roberts et al, 2005: S7). The emergence of agency theory as the dominant analytical 
lens for the analysis of corporate governance is described below. 
By the early part of the twentieth century, in both the UK and USA, it was becoming 
evident that as companies became larger ownership was becoming more fragmented 
and dispersed. Up until this time many of the largest companies were both owned and 
controlled by the same person. Increasingly a company's resources were insufficient 
to finance the owner's growth objectives for the company. To grow the company the 
owner could raise additional loan capital, normally from banks, and / or raise 
additional share capital, by selling new shares on the stock market. Given there is a 
limit to how much a company can borrow before it undermines its financial stability 
companies increasingly turned to the stock market reducing the relative shareholding 
the owner held in the company. This opening up of corporate ownership to the 
general public through share ownership led to an increasing separation of ownership 
and control as the number of shareholders in a company, who did not participate in its 
management and instead delegated the running of the company to the company's 
management, steadily gre«v. 
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This led to what has become known as the `agency problem' and the development of 
agency theory in corporate governance. 2 
The twentieth century debate on corporate governance is often said to have begun 
with the work of Berle and Means (1932) who were the first to explore the structural 
and strategic implications of the growing separation of power between the executive 
management of major public companies in the USA3 and their increasingly diverse 
and remote shareholders (Cadbury, 2002: 5; Clarke, 2004 (a): 154 Condon, 2005: 
635). The principal-agent model which has played a crucial role in corporate 
governance theorising over the second half of the twentieth century is underpinned by 
agency theory. 
The principal-agent model assumes that the sole purpose of the firm is to maximise 
shareholder value (Kirkbride & Letza, 2003: 464) and is concerned with the 
relationship between the principal, the shareholder, and the agent, the manager of the 
company, where the shareholder has engaged the manager to run the company on his / 
her behalf Agency theory assumes that all social relations in economic interaction 
can be reduced to set of contracts between principals and agents. The firm is best 
described as a "nexus of contracts", both explicit and implicit between the principal 
and agent and the behaviour of the firm is "the outcome of a complex equilibrium 
process" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
It can be argued that the agency problem wwas initially identified by Adam Smith (1776) who noted 
that the directors in a joint stock company could not be expected to be as careful with other people's 
money as they were with their own (Letza et at. 2O04: -48). 
Prias (1976) shoved that a similar structure of ownership and control operated in the UK. 
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Another key assumption of agency theory is that the goals of the principal and the 
agent conflict. The agency problem arises when agents make decisions that are not 
necessarily in the best interests of the principals. It is possible that managers may act 
in an opportunist fashion where they benefit from illegal actions such as the theft of 
company funds or act in a manner that emphasises short term objectives to the 
detriment of the long term interests of shareholders allowing them to receive rewards, 
such as bonuses or profits derived from the exercising of stock options, which are 
based on the short term performance of the company. Managers may also be tempted 
to supplement their salaries by awarding themselves generous perks such as expense 
accounts that permit costly non-essential expenditure, long holidays, inflated pension 
schemes and high termination payments. In addition they could act in a fashion 
designed to fulfil their egotistical needs at the expense of shareholders interests, for 
example, by expanding the company, and increasing their perceived importance, 
instead of increasing returns to the company's shareholders. 
To ensure that shareholders and managers interests are aligned a mechanism needs to 
be put in place that will allow this to happen. Agency theory assumes that 
shareholders do not have sufficient control and influence over managerial actions 
because they are not involved with the company on a day-to day basis, this results in 
information asymmetry, as managers are better informed about the company than its 
shareholders. Shareholders can attempt to overcome this asymmetry by putting in 
place mechanisms that monitor the performance of managers. This can be costly 
especially if undertaken by individual shareholders. The overall cost to individual 
shareholders can be reduced if a system is put in place to monitor and provide 
information on the performance of managers to all shareholders. 
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Eisenhardt (1 989) proposed that agency theory is concerned with resole in` two 
problems that can occur in the principal-agent relationship. The first arises when the 
desires or the goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive 
for the principal to monitor the performance of the agent thereby making it difficult 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing; and the second arises when 
the principal and the agent have different attitudes to risk and may prefer different 
actions because of their different risk preferences. Based on assumptions about 
people (self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organisations (goal conflict 
among members) and information (a commodity that can be purchased) the focus of 
agency theory is on determining the most efficient contract to govern the principal- 
agent relationship. The choice is between a behaviour-orientated contract (e. g. 
salaries, hierarchical governance) or an outcome-orientated contract (commissions, 
bonuses, stock options, transfer of governance, market governance) (Eisenhardt, 1989 
(a): 58) 
Agency theory supposes that an effective board of directors, which is appointed by the 
shareholders, will identify with shareholders interests and be responsible for ensuring 
there is an adequate control framework for the company. This includes monitoring 
the performance of managers and putting in place the necessary mechanisms and 
contracts that will bring managers interests into line with shareholders. If they are to 
carry out their task effectively the company will need to be structured in a way that 
prop ides the board with the information that it needs to undertake its role. 4 This is 
4 Through the adoption of the Turnbull guidelines the directors of a company should be provided with 
information that will allow them to consider: 
1. The nature and extent of the risks facing the company; 
2. I'he extent and categories of risk which it regards as acceptable for the company to bear: 
3 l'he likelihood of the risks concerned materializing: 
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achieved through the corporate governance system adopted b\ the company. which in 
addition to giving the directors the power to set the company's aims and objectives, 
and how they are to be achieved, enables them to use their experience in decision 
making and control to reduce any self-interested tendencies of corporate management 
through the adoption of what they determine to be the most efficient type of contract 
(behaviour or outcome-orientated) to govern the principal-agent relationship. In 
addition it provides the directors with the authority to question financial reports and 
information provided by managers, appoint senior management and determine their 
remuneration, and recommend new directors. 
Particularly relevant to this research is the double / multiple agency problem. This 
occurs when the principal has to rely upon agents at more than one stage in the 
process between the expression of his or her interests and actions taken to realise 
those interests. The process of holding agents to account for the attainment of goals 
involves two or more sets of control relationships, reflecting the presence of agents at 
two or more main levels (Child, 2005: 360). In this research the first relationship is 
between the board of directors (representatives of the shareholders) and the MNE 
management and the second relationship is between the MNE management and the 
managers and employees of the individual Asia-Pacific business units. The double / 
multiple agency problem is present in all forms of organisation in which scale and 
complexity create a personal and often physical distance between top managers, 
-t. The company's ability to reduce the incidence and impact on the business of risks that do 
materialize; 
5. The costs of operating particular controls relative to the benefit thereby obtained in managing the 
related risks. 
(Turnbull, 1999: para. 17) 
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acting as principles, and their agents for implementation at lower levels (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2003: 341). 
2.3.0 Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom 
The development of modem UK corporate governance practice began with the 
Cadbury Report (1992) that came out of the work of The Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance, that was established in 1991 following the collapse 
of Coloroll and Polly Peck, and chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury. It reviewed the 
financial aspects of corporate governance and led to the publication of the Code of 
Best Practices. This was followed by the Greenbury Report (1995) that reviewed 
directors' remuneration while the Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance 
(established in 1995 and reporting in 1998) had a broader remit that built on Cadbury 
and Greenbury picking up on any new issues that had arisen from both 
reports (Condon, 2005: 636). 
Following the report of the Hampel Committee the first edition of the Combined Code 
was published by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Committee on Corporate 
Governance and added as an appendix to the LSE Listing Rules. The code 
superseded all previous codes for UK listed companies and was derived from 
Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and the LSE's Listing Rules (Condon, 2005: 636). 
Since the publication of the first edition of the Combined Code three other important 
reports have been published - the Turnbull Report that provides guidelines for 
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directors on how to meet the Code's provisions on internal control, the Smith Report. 
which relates to the provisions on audit committees and auditors, and the Higgs 
Report a review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. The findings 
of these reports have been incorporated into a new edition of the Combined Code 
published in 2003. 
Presently, following the lead given by the Code of Best Practice, the first corporate 
governance code of the modern era, corporate governance codes have been adopted 
by more than 50 countries (European Corporate Governance Institute 
http: //www. ecgi. org/codes/all_codes. php). 
2.3.1 Self Regulation 
There are three layers of control over a company (Hoffmann, 1998). The first layer is 
the bedrock of duties owed by directors at common law and equity. The second layer 
imposes a number specific statutory duties intended to reinforce the duties at common 
law. The third layer specifies duties under the self-regulatory codes which are 
perceived by Hoffman as intending to reinforce common law duties in areas not 
thought suitable for legislation and emanate from the deficiencies of the proceeding 
layers. The objective of the three layers of regulation is to establish a system that 
protects shareholders but does not inhibit good management and enterprise. Self- 
regulated duties as outlined in the Combined Code have become more important in 
recent years (Kirkbride and Letza, 2003: 468). 
Soon after the Committee began ww ork the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and 
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The Code of Best Practice and the two editions of the Combined Code adopted a self 
and market regulation approach. Although the Combined Code is not legally 
enforceable it has been given force through the Listing Rules of the London Stock 
Exchange that require a listed company to report how it applies the principles in the 
code and either confirm that it complies with the Code's provisions or - where it does 
not - to provide an explanation (Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2003: 1). 
This approach is known as Comply or Explain and has been in place since the Code of 
Best Practice (1992). If the reasons for failing to comply are not deemed as 
acceptable by the stock market it will be reflected in the company's stock price. 
Nonstatutory regulations - codes of practice - have a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. Advantages include avoidance of burdensome regulation, flexibility to 
deal with new issues as they arise, freedom for a company to develop its own 
organisational practices, and the ability to promote compliance, not just within the 
letter of the law6, but with the intention behind it, thus setting a higher standard with 
the onus for improvement on investors (Cadbury, 2002: 28; Monks and Minow, 2004: 
298). 
The argument for codes of practice in the field of corporate governance is that 
important aspects of governance are not easily reduced to legally enforceable laws 
and often require qualitative judgements (Cadbury, 2002: 28). e. g. All directors must 
take decisions objectivehv in the interests of the company (Combined Code, Section 1, 
A. 1, Supporting Principles). Codes can also be more effective than an equivalent law 
Maw cll Communications also collapsed. : gis a result the Committee's Report and the Code of Best 
Practice covered a wider field than the title might suggest (Cadbury, 2002: 1 1) 
6 This ww as described in Cadbury Report (1992: 1 2. para. 1.10) as encouraging companies to comply in 
spirit rather than in letter. 
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in achieving their purpose. Cadbury (2003: 28) gives the example of the Combined 
Code principle which addresses whether the posts of chairman and chief executive 
should be combined which states: 
`There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of 
the company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of 
decision. ' (Combined Code, Section 1, A. 2, Chairman and chief executive, Main 
Principle). 
If it was a legal requirement that companies should have both a chairman and a chief 
executive, the intent of the law could be bypassed by appointing a cipher in one of the 
posts. The law would have been complied with while its purpose was not met. No 
follow up by shareholders would be possible as the response would be that the board 
had met its legal obligation. However, the codes reference to `clear division of 
responsibilities' enables shareholders and other interested parties to ask precisely how 
responsibilities are divided and ask as frequently as they believe is required. 
Disadvantages of codes of practice include lack of precision and transparency, and 
uncertainty over enforcement (MCLR, 1998). This was acknowledged by Cadbury 
(1992: 1.10) who speculated that legislative and external regulation might be sought 1f 
the recommendations in the Code of Best Practice were not adopted on a wide scale. 
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2.3.2 The Turnbull Report 
The first edition of the Combined Code (1998) contained the principle that: 
`The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard 
shareholders' investments and the company's assets'. (Combined Code, 1998: 
Section 1, D. 2) 
Supported by a provision that recommends that: 
`The directors should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 
group's system of internal controls and should report to shareholders that they have 
clone so. The review should cover all material controls, including financial, 
operational and compliance controls and risk management'. (Combined Code, 1998: 
Section 1, D. 2.1)7 
However, companies were not provided with any guidance on how they should 
comply with this principle and provision. To rectify this deficiency the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) agreed with the London 
Stock Exchange that it would provide guidance for directors of companies to 
implement the principle. The Turnbull Committee, under the Chairmanship of Nigel 
Turnbull, was established by the ICAEW to undertake this work. Compliance 8 with 
I The principle D. 21 and the provision D. 2.1 both appears in the second edition of the Combined Code 
(2003) designated as Section 1. C. 2 Internal Control, Main Principle and Section 1, C. 2 Internal 
Control, Code Provision C. 2.1 respectively. 
The requirement to state in a company's annual report and accounts how they had applied the 
Principle and whether or not they had complied with its provisions. 
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the principle and provision was delayed pending the publication of the Turnbull 
guidance. The report titled Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code was published in September, 1999. It broke new ground as it \\ as the 
first investigation into corporate governance in the UK where risk was explicitly 
included and articulated (Kirkbride and Letza, 2003: 474). On the same day that the 
report was published the company secretaries and finance directors of all UK listed 
companies were sent a letter informing them that companies were required to have all 
of the elements of a risk management and internal control monitoring system in place, 
and thus to have achieved a sound system of internal control, for accounting periods 
ending on or after 23 December, 2000 (Blackburn, 2000: 2). Companies were 
required to include a narrative statement of how the company has applied Code 
principle D. 2 in their annual report. The board should, as a minimum, disclose that 
there is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluating and managing the significant 
risks faced by the company, that it has been in place for the year under review and up 
to the date of approval of the annual report and accounts, that it is regularly reviewed 
by the board and accords with the guidance in Internal Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code (Turnbull, 1999, para. 35). If this had not been 
achieved, as is the case with all Combined Code principles and provisions, the board 
were required to explain why they had not complied with the Code. 
The Turnbull guidelines are about the adoption of a risk-based approach to 
establishing a system of internal control and reviewing its effectiveness (ICAEW, 
1999: 4). Internal Control should not be seen as a burden on business but a means to 
maximise opportunities and reduce losses (KPNIG, 1999: 14). A risk based approach, 
by providing better information to decision-makers, can add value and create 
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competitive advantage, enable a company to achieve its business objectives, and 
safeguard the shareholders' investment and the company's assets. It can make a 
company more flexible and responsive to market fluctuations making it better able to 
satisfy customer's needs. It can also mark a shift away from always perceiving risk as 
a negative (Kirkbride and Letza, 2003: 476). Risk includes not only real or potential 
events which reduce the likelihood of achieving business objectives, but also, equally, 
the failure to take opportunities. Companies can gain an early mover advantage by 
adapting to new circumstances faster than their rivals, which could lead to 
competitive advantage in the medium and long term (ICAEW, 1999: 4). A risk based 
approach should supplement entrepreneurship, not replace it. Turnbull emphasises 
that the taking of risks is key to the generation of profits, and the purpose of internal 
control is to help manage and control risks not eliminate them (Turnbull, 1999, Para. 
13). It also acknowledges that risk management and internal control are linked to the 
ability of companies to fulfil their objectives and increased shareholder value is the 
reward for successful risk-taking. 
The basic aims of a sound system of internal control that encompass the policies, 
processes, tasks, behaviours and other aspects of a company are to: 
1. Facilitate its effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond 
appropriately to significant business, operational, financial, compliance and other 
risks to achieving the company's objectives. 
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2. Help ensure the quality of internal and external reporting. This requires the 
maintenance of proper records and processes that generate a flow of timer , 
relevant and reliable information from within and outside the organization. 
3. Help ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and also with 
internal policies with respect to the conduct of business. 
(Turnbull, 1999, para. 20) 
The Turnbull guidelines state that while the board is responsible for the company's 
system of internal control it is the role of management to implement board policies on 
risk and control. The board should set appropriate policies on internal control and 
seek regular assurance that will enable it to satisfy itself that the system is functioning 
effectively (Turnbull, 1999, para. 16). It does this based on the information and 
assurances provided to it by management. The company's management is 
accountable to the board for monitoring the system of internal control and providing 
assurance to the board that it has done so (Turnbull, 1999, para. 25). In fulfilling its 
responsibilities, management design, operate and monitor a suitable system of internal 
control which implements the policies adopted by the board (Turnbull, 1999, para. 
18). The system should identify and evaluate the risks faced by the company and 
apply appropriate risk control measures. Information relating to these risks, how they 
are being controlled and the effectiveness of the overall control system should filter 
up through the company, v- is senior management, for eventual consideration by the 
board. 
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The adoption of a system of internal control that follows the Turnbull 
recommendations should not be treated as a separate exercise undertaken to meet 
regulatory requirements (Turnbull, 1999, para. 9). It should be incorporated by the 
company within its normal management and governance processes and be embedded 
in the operations of the company forming part of its culture (Turnbull, 1999. para. 22). 
The guidelines state that although it is the role of management to implement board 
policies on risk all employees have some responsibility for internal control as part of 
their accountability for achieving objectives (Turnbull, 1999, para. 18 & 19). The 
likelihood of this occurring will be greatly increased through the institutionalisation of 
a Turnbull based system of internal control in a company. The guidelines also state 
that collectively, employees should have the necessary knowledge, skills, information 
and authority to establish, operate and monitor the system of internal control 
(Turnbull, 1999, para. 19). 
2.4.0 Corporate Governance Models 
Given the scope of this thesis the purpose of this section is not intended to be a 
comprehensive review of the corporate governance systems that can be found in each 
of the countries where research was undertaken but to consider the important 
differences in corporate governance that can be found in these countries compared to 
the UK. 
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2.4.1 Two Types of Corporate Governance 
The system of corporate governance in a country is determined by both internal and 
external factors. Internal factors include corporate ownership structure, the state of 
the economy, the legal system, government policies, culture and history. While 
external factors include the extent of capital inflows from abroad, the global economic 
climate and cross-border institutional investment (Solomon and Solomon, 2004: 147). 
Each system of corporate governance is unique to that country making it very difficult 
to categorise a country's corporate governance system. However, as corporate 
governance operates differently in two broadly distinct worlds (Buck and Shahrim, 
2005: 42) a broad categorisation of corporate governance systems is possible using 
the `insider/outsider' approach suggested by Short et al. (1998: 154) or the voice / 
market-exit approach proposed by Hirschman (1984: 89) and Nooteboom (1999: 
846). Most systems of corporate governance fall somewhere between these two 
approaches sharing some of each others characteristics (Solomon and Solomon, 2004: 
148). 
The outsider / market-exit approach, often referred to as the Anglo-Saxon system of 
corporate governance, emphasises the rights of one group of stakeholders in a 
company - shareholders (outsiders) - and the mechanisms to maximise their 
investment in a company. The firm is conceived as a combination of managerial 
directors operating for the benefit of shareholders, or as an instrument for the creation 
of shareholder wealth (Weimer and Pape, 1999: 1 54). Manager's decisions can he 
influenced by shareholders adopting a `market exit' approach. If shareholders are 
dissatisfied \v ith the behaviour and performance of the company's managers they 
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could decide to sell or reduce their investment in the company thereby depressing the 
company's share price penalising managers whose rewards are determined in some 
way by the company's share price e. g. through stock options. In addition a reduction 
in the share price may leave the company vulnerable to a hostile9 takeover which 
could result in substantial job losses among the company's existing managers. This 
approach, which has been adopted in the UK, depends upon high levels of 
information disclosure by listed companies and laws1° that protect minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). High levels of information allow investors to 
decide whether to buy or sell the shares of a company and provide them with the 
knowledge needed when they exercise their rights as shareholders e. g. voting at 
shareholders meetings. Protection of minority shareholders prevents expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders. 
The second approach - insider / voice - refers to the means by which any of the firm's 
stakeholders (not just shareholders) may control managers' decisions (Buck and 
Shahrim, 2005: 43). Managers are influenced mainly by the `voice' of stakeholders 
(insiders) who are highly committed to the firm, closely connected and are prepared to 
contribute formally to its governance and not by potential or actual movements in 
share prices. In this alternative, relational world of governance, different groups of 
stakeholders may dominate in individual countries (Buck and Shahnm, 2005: 41). 
They could be banks, other companies with cross-holdings in the company, 
9l akeovers are termed "hostile" when the management of the target firm opposes them (Franks and 
Mayer, 1990). 
Io Relevant legislation includes the Companies Act 1985, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(the FSNIA) and the insider dealing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. tUK and El 
competition legislation and the UK Financial Services \uthoritv's Listing, Prospectus and Disclosure 
Rules may also apply. The cornerstone of these regulations and a number of regulations governing 
substantial acquisition of a number of shares is that shareholders should be "fairly" treated (Weimer 
and Pape, 1999: 163). 
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controlling shareholders, customers and employees. This relational approach. which 
has been adopted by different degrees in the majority of the countries in this study. is 
characterised by low levels of transparency and information disclosure to outsiders 
and limited protection for minority shareholders. Given that shareholdings are 
generally concentrated in the hand of a small number of investors it is easier for a 
company to resist a hostile takeover attempt. It is also possible for managers to adopt 
a more relaxed approach to short term fluctuations in their company's stock price as it 
is less likely to play a role in their remuneration package and career advancement. 
2.4.2 Corporate Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region 
Using the broad categorises of corporate governance systems discussed above only 
Australia would be classified as adopting an outsider / market exit approach while the 
remaining companies tend to towards the insider / voice approach. 
Australia's corporate governance standards are the closest to those found in the UK. 
In March, 2003, it introduced a new code of governance called Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations. The previous code was 
derived from the Bosch Report (1995) that closely followed the UK's Cadbury Report 
(1992) (Solomon and Solomon, 2004: 162). 
Amon, the seven Asian countries in this study corporate governance standards are not 
as high' 1 and differ considerably from the UK system on a country by country basis. 
11 
:\ 2005 survey 'CG U'uutc'h 2005 ' by CLS. A Emerging Markets (CLSA), a Hong Kong 
based 
investment bank, and the Asian Corporate Jjuvernance Association (ACG. A), a non-profit investor 
pressure group, of the corporate governance standards of the 10 largest equity markets in Asia (Ix- 
Japan) ranked the countries involved in this study as follows (highest first): Singapore, Hong Kong, 
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The ADB (2000: 2) identified failures in corporate governance as one of the main 
factors behind the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Although its research «as limited to 
the five countries12 worst affected by the crisis, the ADB went on to say, while 
acknowledging that standards of corporate governance differed considerably across 
the region, that: 
"Casual observations suggest that ineffective boards of directors, weak internal 
controls, poor audits, lack of adequate disclosure and lax legal enforcement 
characterize corporate governance in many Asians countries. " (ADB 2000: 1) 
The study went on to add that weaknesses in corporate governance appeared to owe 
much to "the weak legal and regulatory framework for investor protection " (ADB 
2000: 2). On a more positive note the study concluded that the "basic regulatory 
structure for the corporate sector appears to be in place in these countries, although 
there are gaps and loopholes, and some areas need to he modernized. Poor 
compliance and enforcement appear to be the major problems. " (ADB 2000: 3) 
Weaknesses in corporate governance in Asia were also identified by Claessens et al. 
(1999) and Claessens and Fan (2002). They found certain ownership structures led to 
agency problems arising from large deviations between control and cash flow rights. 13 
This was particularly evident in family controlled companies where the separation of 
management from ownership control was rare. Claessens et al. (1999: 3) found that 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, China. Japan has not been included in the survey since 'CG Watch 2003' 
when it ww as ranked last among all the countries included in the study. 
12 Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand 
I' They also found that these agency problems are anticipated and priced by investors who when they 
value shares in a company where they have identified an agency problem apply a discount. 
Derck Condon 30 04'12/2007 
family control was commonplace in more than half of East Asian 
corporations; management of two-thirds of firms which were not widely-held was 
related to the family of the controlling shareholder and nearly all private companies 
were family run. ' 4 
In addition there was a tendency for family-business owners to establish large 
interlocking networks of subsidiaries and sister companies that include partially- 
owned, publicly-listed companies. Such structures can lead to severely inequitable 
treatment of shareholders. By conducting operations through a complex network of 
subsidiaries, controlling shareholders acquire control of operations and/or cash flows 
disproportionate to their equity stake in individual companies. The extent of this 
disproportionate control is frequently opaque to outsiders and undisclosed by insiders. 
(OECD, 2003: 11). 
A survey of the literature on corporate governance in Asia by Claessens and Fan 
(2002) identified a number of other key themes. Conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms (takeovers and boards of directors) are not strong enough to relieve 
agency problems. Firms do employ other mechanisms to mitigate their agency 
problems (such as employing reputable auditors), but even these have only limited 
effectiveness. The overall low transparency of Asian corporations relates to these 
agency problems, with the prevalence of connection-based transactions increasing 
14 As the survey excludes companies where the ownership cannot be traced this suggests the actual 
degree of family control may be substantially higher. Surveyed countries include: Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taipei and Thailand. Significant cross- 
country differences were found to exist. Corporations in Japan were generally widely-held, while 
corporations in Indonesia and Thailand were mainly family-controlled. State-control was significant in 
Indonesia, Korea. Malaysia. Singapore, and Thailand. They also find that smaller firms are more likely 
family -controlled, as are older 
firms. 
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desires among all owners and investors to protect rents, with rents often arising from 
government actions, including a large safety net provided to the financial sector. 
Resulting forms of crony capitalism, i. e. combinations of weak corporate governance 
and government interference, not only lead to poor performance and risky financing 
patterns, but also are conducive to macroeconomic crises (Claessens and Fan, 2002: 
72-73). 
Since, and partly as a result of, the 1997 Asian economic crisis corporate governance 
standards have risen appreciably in all of the countries where research was 
undertaken. At the beginning of 1997 only Hong Kong had an official code of best 
practice now all of the Asian countries involved in the research have introduced 
codes. Other reasons for an improvement in standards, that have been suggested, 
include national governments desire to attract capital, local companies need to attract 
capital to remain competitive in the international marketplace, pressure from foreign 
institutional investors and the need to bring local corporate governance standards up 
to an internationally acceptable level thereby reducing or eliminating the poor 
corporate governance discount applied by many investors to the shares of Asian 
countries where the corporate governance standards are regarded as below acceptable 
levels (Roche, 2005: 45 - 47). 
However, considerable problems continue to exist Jamie Allen, Secretary General of 
the Asian Corporate Governance Association said in 2003 '... on the positive side 
awarcness has risen, governance is firmly part of policy, reform is undc'nt'av in all 
major economies, there arc 171ä11E'1' standards (I)1 theory) and emerging shareholder 
activism. On the negutivc side, the depth of change has been shallow, governance is 
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seen as a compliance issue, not a competitive one, regulators' will vacillates, and 
significant disincentives to shareholder activism continued to exist ' (In Roche, 2O05: 
37). 
2.5.0 Convergence of National Corporate Governance Systems 
As a result of rising trade and transnational business links, the development of 
comparable business practices and standards is becoming increasingly necessary 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004: 153). However, as discussed in the previous section, 
despite decades of economic globalisation and more recently even more intense 
financial globalisation cross-national differences in corporate governance regimes, 
continue to be considerable and can be found in the power of large stockholders, the 
legal protection of minority shareholders, the extent to which relevant laws are 
enforced, the treatment of stakeholders such as labour, suppliers or the community, 
the reliance on debt financing, the structure of the board of directors, the way in 
which executives are compensated, and the frequency and treatment of mergers and 
takeovers, especially hostile ones (Guillen, 2000). 
Commonly cited pressures leading toward the need for global convergence in 
corporate governance practices are the international harmonisation of financial 
markets, increases in international trade, foreign direct and portfolio investment 
(along with the concomitant rise of powerful MNEs and institutional investors) and 
the increase in the number of foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures. Countries that 
do not follow this trend are predicted to decline in terms of global competitivencss 
(Ibbotson and Brinson, 1993; Bishop, 1904: Charkham, 199*); Useem, 1996; Loredo 
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and Suarez, 1998; OECD, 1998). Furthermore, corporate go\ ernance standardisation 
is promoted as one way of building confidence in a country's financial markets 
leading to increased investment (Solomon and Solomon, 2004: 153). 
Each country has a system of corporate governance that reflects its legal structures, 
financial systems and structures of ownership, culture and economic factors. 
However, in recent years there have been some moves toward some level of 
convergence. Countries with outsider dominated systems have made significant effort 
to reduce problems associated with agency - improving the effectiveness of non- 
executive directors, of the audit function and the relationship between investors and 
the companies they have invested in. While countries characterised by the insider- 
dominated system have focused on improving legal protection for minority 
shareholders, improving corporate accountability and encouraging the development of 
a broader shareholder base. 
In the convergence debate the key question is whether a particular national corporate 
governance system has a competitive advantage over all other systems, and if yes, 
whether other systems ought to move towards it. These are important questions as the 
choice of corporate governance system has an impact on corporate performance, 
availability and cost of capital, and the distribution of corporate value in a country. 
(Goergen et al, 2005: 245) 
Presently, there is no consensus as to the best system of corporate governance and 
whether it should be encouraged at the corporate level. The OECD (? 00-1) has 
produced a set of recommendations designed to provide guidance for legislative and 
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regulatory initiatives that can be adapted to the specific circumstances of individual 
countries and regions. The Principles represent a `baseline' for `good' corporate 
governance consisting of common elements that underlie good corporate governance 
covering such issues as equitable treatment of shareholders, shareholder 
responsibilities, transparency and disclosure in terms of corporate reporting and audit, 
the role and responsibilities of company boards of directors, and the importance of 
non-executive directors (Solomon and Solomon, 2004: 153). The OECD claims they 
are formulated to embrace the different models that exist. For example, they do not 
advocate any particular board structure (OECD, 2004: 13). However, it should be 
noted that many commentators believe that the OECD itself favours the market based 
outsider system (Dignam and Galanis, 1999). Millstein (2001) argues that diversity in 
governance practices is not inconsistent with a convergence in governance principles. 
Cultural and institutional differences may be present in particular national 
environments, but the underlying principles may allow a more fundamental 
compatibility (Clark, 2004: 12). Although, the OECD principles are useful as a 
statement of the basic virtues of accountability and transparency they are not 
particularly visionary, and not especially substantive. They acts as a reference point 
for companies who wish to amend their governance practices, however, there is no 
requirement on individual companies to take notice or even disclose how much of the 
principles they have adopted (Monks and Minow, 2004: 299). 
Guillen (2000) based on current literature identified three potential outcomes of 
convergence: First, corporate governance practices will converge on the outsider 
dominated Anglo-Saxon model. The driver behind the adoption of the approach is 
seen to be the globalisation of financial investment and money management starting 
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in the early 1980s when both investors and the recipients of investment became more 
favourably inclined to idea of overseas investment. This approach based on market 
principles assumes that most financial experts and money managers would prefer 
companies throughout the world to observe shareholder rights, maximising 
shareholder value, and be transparent in their reporting of corporate activities and 
results (Useem, 1996). Furthermore, increased overseas investment by institutional 
investors is likely to increase the pressure for comparable standardised information on 
companies. This view was supported by Hansmann and Kraakman (2003) who 
comment that the increasing acceptance of a shareholder-centred ideology of 
corporate law by international business, government and legal elites is likely to result 
in the convergence of corporate governance towards the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Second, convergence on a hybrid model that combines features from both outsider 
and insider models (Fleming, 1998; OECD, 1998) with the right mix of market 
discipline, corporate regulation, and power of corporate stakeholders (Goergen et al, 
2005: 245). The argument for a hybrid model is grounded in the belief that no single 
model is optimal and that market forces will eventually encourage firms and countries 
to select features from existing models as they strive to remain competitive (Guillen, 
2000). Gilson (2000) suggests that firms may choose to deviate from national 
corporate governance standards by opting into another corporate governance regime. 
This suggests convergence could occur at the company level rather than the national 
level. This could result from a company being listed on more than one national stock 
exchange, incorporating in another country or being acquired by a company from 
another country. A negative aspect of incorporating in another country is that the 
driver behind such a decision could be because the new location has a weaker 
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corporate governance regime than that of the country where the company present] 
resides. Although, this could result in a decrease in compliance costs due to a 
reduction in the degree to which management behaviour and performance is 
monitored it could also increase the potential of opportunist behaviour by managers to 
the detriment of other stakeholders, increase the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and stakeholders and have negative implications for the quality of 
internal control. 
The third option involves convergence on an undefined model with characteristics 
that can not be presently determined. 
Guillen (2000) goes on to identify three key arguments in the extant literature against 
the likelihood of an international convergence of corporate governance practices. 
First, corporate governance systems are tightly coupled with path dependent 
regulatory traditions in the areas of banking, labour, tax, and competition law that are 
unlikely to be modified in the near future. Supporting this argument La Porta et al 
(1998,1999) contend that diversity in corporate governance around the world is a 
reflection of attempts by stockholders to overcome poor legal investor protection. For 
example, countries with legal systems that provide relatively weak investor protection 
(e. g. Germany and France) tend to have more concentrated ownership than common- 
law countries. 
Second, corporate governance does not exist in isolation of other institutional 
features. There is a clear link between a country's institutions and the type of 
corporate governance it has adopted. Different corporate (overnance systems enable 
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firms and countries to excel at different kinds of activities in the global economy 
(Guillen, 2000). For example, the Japanese institutional ability to borrow. improve 
and integrate ideas and technologies from various sources. a key competitive 
advantage for its manufacturing companies, relies on the stability and close ties with 
other companies provided by the Keiretsu15 structure of corporate governance 
(Gerlach, 1992; Kim and Hoskisson, 1996); and in Germany the participation'6 of 
labour on the supervisory board of companies underlies the importance attached to 
workers which is reflected in the considerable investment in training and skills 
development undertaken with the objective of producing highly trained workers that 
will give a company a competitive advantage over its rivals. If a country believes its 
competitive advantage is linked to the corporate governance system that it has 
adopted it unlikely to consider changing its approach to corporate governance, 
adopting a model similar to that of competitors, that may have negative implications 
for its economic growth and the profitability of its companies. 
Third, global pressures on corporate governance practices are mediated by domestic 
politics in ways that make convergence across countries unlikely. Domestic politics 
are likely to play a key role in changes to the prevailing corporate governance model. 
Changes in corporate governance regimes normally require the support of politicians. 
The same politicians are frequently influenced by powerful interest groups. If these 
groups - shareholders, labour, other stakeholders affected by the actions of companies 
-- do not support the changes necessary to bring about corporate governance 
convergence it is less likely the changes will be supported by the politicians especially 
15 The Keiretsu svstem roughly translates to what in the West would be called `relationship investiv``' 
It is a pattern of cross-shareholdings by affiliated companies, often including customers and suppliers. 
[here is often a dominant shareholder, such as a `main' bank or a keiretsu partner (Monks and Nfinow, 
2004: 113). 
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if they are dependent on the backing of these interest groups. This is supported by La 
Porta et al (1998,1999) who argue that the globalisation of the international capital 
markets is not enough to unsettle existing ownership structures and Roe (1991) who 
claims that political constraints lead to a suboptimal system and prevent the move 
towards a more efficient system. Also of interest is the work of Buck and Tull (2000) 
that looked at how corporate governance reforms introduced in post-World War Two 
Germany and Japan by US and UK military governments were subsequently modified 
and even reversed by domestic governments later restored to power. 
Another argument against convergence was put forward by Branson (2001) who 
argues that the `one size fits all' approach of convergence is culturally and 
economically insensitive. He uses examples to show that value systems in Asia based 
on post-Confucianism and tradition are considerable barriers to the importation of the 
Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance and that the dominant forms of 
ownership in the world remain family ownership and other forms of embedded 
capitalism where the economy is perceived to be subservient to society, rather than 
the opposite (Clarke, 2004 (b): 13). 
In summary while in many ways there is a growing consensus on broad principles of 
corporate governance, significant differences in national governance regimes still 
exist and are likely to for the foreseeable future. While common themes are apparent 
on a global basis the differences reflect the market, institutional and legal 
environments of individual countries, and result in differences in both interpretation 
and implementation of corporate governance standards (Dallas, 2004: 148). This 
16 
.\ legal requirement for all company' s \\ ith over 500 employees. 
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suggests the possibility that a corporate governance practice designed in an outsider 
dominated country may not be compatible with the corporate governance regimes 
adopted by local companies based in an insider dominated country. This is 
particularly relevant to this research because local business units are expected to 
comply with a practice mandated by a parent company that operates in a primarily 
outsider dominated system of corporate governance while in the countries the practice 
is being transferred to, with the exception of Australia, the prevailing corporate 
governance regime is insider dominated. 
2.6.0 Corporate Governance and the Treatment of Risk Management in the 
Asia-Pacific Region 
An extensive search of academic journals, books, the media and the internet failed to 
yield any meaningful data regarding the treatment of risk across different corporate 
governance systems. Based on extant knowledge of the characteristics of insider and 
outsider dominated systems of corporate governance this section will attempt to 
develop an understanding of how a corporate governance system can shape company 
attitudes to risk. 
The relationship between risk management and corporate governance is not 
appreciated among the Asia-Pacific countries in this study to the extent that it is in the 
UK (Roche, 2005: 145). Although all of the countries in this study, with the 
exception of Japan, contain references to the importance of risk management in their 
corporate governance guidelines only Australia provides detailed guidance on the 
implementation of a risk management process - Principle /, Principles of Good 
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Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council. 2003). In Singapore. the country generally regarded as having 
the highest corporate governance standards of any Asian countryI I. a survey of 78 
companies found: 
"59% of the respondents said that their company has a formal process for idcntiftlng 
and managing risks while 38% said that they do not have such a system in place. 3"O 
of the respondents were not aware if such a system existed in their company. 
Less than two-thirds of the respondents said that they have a position it'ithin the 
company to oversee firm-wide risk responsibilities while 35% said that they do not 
have such a position. 
(Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Centre, 2005: 13) 
This begs the question why do companies in the Asia-Pacific region appear to pay so 
little attention to risk and risk management? 
Given that the significance of a risk to a company is a reflection of the probability and 
impact of an event happening it would suggest that one or both of these variables are 
understood differently by companies if they treat the same risk differently. To 
consider why this may be the case the remainder of this section will consider how the 
characteristics of insider and outsider dominated systems of corporate governance of 
the countries included in this study could explain attitudes to risk and risk 
management (see Table 2.1). This is not meant to be a complete list, which is beyond 
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the scope of this project. Furthermore. It is acknowledged that comments about each 
system do not necessarily apply to all of the companies in a country or all of the 
countries that have adopted a specific form of governance. The objective is to gig ea 
`flavour' of why companies in the Asia-Pacific region are likely to view risk 
differently from their Western counterparts. 
Table 2.1 
National Characteristics 
Characteristic Outsider Insider 
Dominated Dominated 
Market for corporate Well developed Under developed 
control 
Bankruptcy / Insolvency Extensive regulations that Outdated or newly 
are frequently enforced introduced and untested 
laws that are rarely 
enforced 
Financing Equity Bank loans 
Shareholder Activism Well developed Generally underdeveloped 
Ownership Structure Dispersed Concentrated, family run 
Supplier Relationship Short term, contractual Long term, cross holdings, 
participative 
Labour Relationship High levels of job Weak bargaining position. 
mobility, stronger Poor worker's right 
worker's rights 
Government Relationship Arms length Close, partners 
Legal Systems Well developed Often underdeveloped 
To consider how a country's corporate governance regime can affect a company's 
perception of risk I will use the example of a company that is a member of a Japanese 
Keiretsu. A Keiretsu, which broadly means `Association', has two distinct types: A 
vertical Keiretsu in which subcontractors and sub-subcontractors (until the fourth 
layer) service a main company e. g. auto parts companies supplying Toyota; and a 
horizontal Kciretsu, in which companies, often in different industries, arc grouped 
together, frequently with a bank at the centre. e. g. Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo 
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(Charkham, 2005: 119). Keiretsu's are characterised by patterns of cross- 
shareholdings by affiliated companies (often including customers and suppliers), 
information exchange and regular meetings between executives (Rugman and 
Collinson, 2006). There are long-term strong personal relationships among high-level 
managers in the different companies, and the same directors often serve on more than 
one board. In addition companies can underwrite each other's financing, and can gain 
more clout when lobbying for government legislation (Daniels et al., 2004: 451). This 
is not meant to be an endorsement of the Keiretsu concept there are considerable 
disadvantages of the system including inefficient allocation of resources, limiting 
foreign competition and raising costs to customers. 
A company's view of risk will be shaped by its association with other members of the 
Keiretsu. Whereas a UK based company may regularly seek new suppliers who can 
meet its cost and quality requirements discarding its previous supplier if it is unable to 
match a competitor's offer, a Japanese company is far less likely to change its 
supplier if it is a fellow member of the Keiretsu. If there are any problems relating to 
cost or quality it is likely to work with the supplier resolving any issues that may have 
arisen. For this reason a Japanese company is unlikely to approach quality and cost 
risks in the same way as a UK company. Furthermore, its long term relationship with 
its supplier also reduces the risk of any disruptions in supply. 
A Japanese company is also likely to view risks involving finance in a different way. 
If it has borrowed funds from the Keiretsu `bank' or another Keiretsu company the 
risk of the loan being `called in', should the company have financial difficulties, 
would be less likely than would be the case in the UK when a company's relationship 
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with a bank is highly unlikely to involve cross-shareholdings and the length of 
relationship between the two parties could be restricted to that one transaction. 
A company's relationship with its workforce is also likely to be different from that 
found between companies and their workers in the UK. Although the much discussed 
job for life at a company in Japan is becoming less common Japanese workers are 
likely to have a different relationship with their employer than would be the case in 
the UK. Unions in Japan are not trade based but enterprise based and tended to have a 
consensus rather than conflict based relationship with the company. Communication 
between the two parties is normally good resulting in a greater unity of purpose 
(Charkham, 2005: 113) decreasing the likelihood of disruption to a companies 
activities as a result of action undertaken by its workers. Another benefit of being a 
member of a Keiretsu is that should a company be faced with a shortage of workers 
with specific skills it is always possible to `borrow' suitably skilled workers from 
another member of the Keiretsu, thereby, reducing the risk of difficulties relating to a 
lack of skilled labour. 
Japanese companies close relationships with government, that often result in retired 
civil servants taking positions on the boards of companies who they previously had 
been involved with in a governmental capacity, has tended to reduce risks relating to 
government intervention in their business, and enabled them to work with government 
to promote policies that will benefit the company, and prevent the introduction of 
policies that would have had a detrimental affect on the business. Furthermore in 
times of financial difficulty the Japanese government has often directly and indirectly 
supported companies. 
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Should a Japanese company disappoint its investors the risk of a hostile take ov er is 
considerably less than would be the case in the UK17. Share ownership tends to be 
more concentrated frequently in the hands of companies with whom it does business 
or has a cross-shareholding. In addition should the company have strong political 
connections these are also likely to afford it some protection. Although it is 
increasing, shareholder activism is also less commonplace than it is in the UK and the 
risk of a group of shareholders (institutional or private) coming together to challenge 
management or taking legal action against it is considerably less than would be the 
case in the UK. Also the legal system does not provide the degree of support to a 
minority shareholder that would be found in the UK. Finally, a Japanese company is 
far less likely to file for bankruptcy than a UK company, its bank and the government 
are more likely to support it than would be the case in the UK, this reduces the risk 
that a company will cease trading. 
The discussion above has been limited to Japanese companies but patterns of 
relationship / network based business1 8 combined with weak bankruptcy laws and low 
levels of shareholder activism can be found, to varying degrees, in `Greater China' 19 
and countries where ethnic Chinese dominate the business community. 20 (This 
includes all of the Asia-Pacific countries included in this study with the exception of 
Australia. ) This has considerable implications for the way in which a company's 
employees assess the risks facing a business unit. Given that the majority of the 
employees of a MNE's Asia-Pacific business unit are likely to have worked for a local 
company or had considerable exposure to their business practices it is probable that 
17 The number of hostile acquisitions had increased in recent years but they are still rare. 
Often based on family ties. 
19 Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and \lacao. 
In this research Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 
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their understanding of risks and assessment of their importance is likely to be 
different from that of a UK employee of the MNE. In addition this may explain why 
less attention has been paid to the role of risk management in corporate governance in 
the Asia-Pacific region than has been the case in the UK. 
It should be noted that the above discussion does not cover all of the risks a company 
may face concentrating on those where the assessment of their significance is 
influenced by the prevailing corporate governance system. Other risks include natural 
disasters, changing conditions in the regional, national or world economy that will 
have an affect in the company's business, the risk of obsolescent technology and 
being an industry in decline. 
2.7.0 Conclusion 
Although common themes are apparent, among the corporate governance systems of 
the Asia-Pacific countries in this study and the UK, significant differences exist and 
are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Corporate governance standards in 
the Asia-Pacific countries where research was undertaken, with the exception of 
Australia, are noticeably inferior to that of the UK. Although the situation has 
improved since the 1997 Asian economic crisis with the introduction of new laws and 
codes of practice low levels of compliance and enforcement have dramatically 
reduced their effectiveness. Outside of Australia the relationship between risk 
management and corporate governance is yet to be fully appreciated. It should also 
be noted that only the UK, the source of the organisational practice being transferred, 
and Australia have adopted an outsider / market-exit approach to corporate 
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governance while the other seven recipient countries tend towards an insider / voice 
approach. This is significant because the treatment of risk is influenced by the 
prevailing corporate governance system. The effect of these different approaches to 
corporate governance on the successful transfer of knowledge relating to the Turnbull 
guidelines will be considered when discussing the findings of this research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter will develop the theoretical framework underlying this research and how 
it relates to the key questions under consideration (see Chapter 1). 
3.1.0 Institutionalisation 
This research examines the processes and characteristics of the internal transfer of an 
organisational practice between UK listed companies and their Asia-Pacific 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. Following Kostova (1999: 309) this research defines 
organisational practices as particular ways of conducting organisational functions. 
They are meaning, value and knowledge based and the extent of their transfer is a 
function of all three of these factors (Kostova, 1999: 311). This requires the adoption 
of formal rules (knowledge) relating to the practice and the infusing of the practice 
with meaning and value. The organisational practice under consideration is a risk 
based system of internal control that follows the recommendations made in Internal 
Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code more generally known as the 
Turnbull Report or guidelines. (As stated in Chapter 1 the practice will subsequently 
be referred to as a RBSIC. ) The extent of a transfer, consistent v ith the institutional 
perspective proposed by Kostova (1999: 111), is defined as the degree of 
institutionalisation, at the recipient unit. Institutionalisation is the process by which a 
practice achieves a taken-for-granted status (Kostova 1999: 3 11) and becomes 
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embedded in the recipient unit's normal management and governance processes. For 
the purposes of this research institutionalisation has two components which draw 
upon the work of Kostova (1999: 311) and Kostova & Roth (2002: 217): 
Implementation - the degree to which the recipient follows the formal rules relating to 
the Turnbull guidelines as demonstrated by certain specific external and objective 
behaviours and actions required or implied by the practice; and Internalisation - the 
state in which employees at the recipient unit obtain satisfaction with and become 
committed to a Turnbull based system of internal control, thereby, infusing it with 
meaning and value (Selznick, 1957). Only when a practice has been implemented 
formally and is also internalised by the employees can it be argued to be 
institutionalised in the recipient. 
Implementation and internalisation are likely to be positively interrelated. For 
example, higher levels of implementation will be associated with higher levels of 
internalisation which in turn will lead to a greater degree of institutionalisation. The 
more a particular practice is used in an organisation, the more likely employees will 
take it for granted and will attach a symbolic meaning and value to it (Selznick, 
1957). This is achieved when the recipient fully institutionalises the practice 
regarding it as theirs. The greater the understanding, frequency of interaction, level of 
individual investment - time, effort, learning (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 
1981) and eventual control over the practice the greater the likelihood that individuals 
will realize ownership of the practice (Pierce, Kostova & Dirks. 2001: 301 - 302) 
facilitating its institutionalisation. 
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Implementation through which a practice is introduced to the recipient is a necessary 
condition of internalisation. However, implementation does not automatically result 
in internalisation. A practice can be formally implemented and its rules strictly 
followed by employees who are unable to relate to or see any value in the practice, 
and are therefore unable to internalise the practice. 
Unsuccessful implementation does not necessarily mean that a practice will not be 
infused with value by recipient unit employees. The value may be appreciated but the 
means to unlock this value may be lacking, due to low levels of implementation, 
resulting in some degree of internalisation but not institutionalisation. However, 
complete internalisation, and therefore institutionalisation, is not possible without 
successful implementation as only through successful implementation can the full 
value of a practice be realised. 
3.1.1 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory has been widely used for studying the adoption and diffusion of 
organisational practices among organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Abrahamson, 1991; Scott. 1995). Institutions 
are governance structures based on rules, norms, values, and systems of cultural 
meaning. In economics institutions serve to minimise market transaction costs 
(North, 1999). In sociology, institutions are social structures that are sanctioned by 
the nouns and values of the society. In companies institutions create checks and 
balances, facilitate co-operation and reduce uncertainty. On the one hand, 
institutionalism refers to the processes by which societal c\pectations of appropriate 
Derek Condon 50 04'12 4007 
organisational form and behaviour come to take rule-like status in social thought and 
action (Martinez and Dacin, 1999: 78). 
On the other hand, institutionalism is concerned with examining an organisation's 
internal environment which consists of structures, systems and practices established in 
the past (Meyer and Rowan, 1977); and an external institutional environment, that it 
shares with many other organisations (Granovetter, 1985). 
Institutional perspectives argue that organisations endeavour to incorporate norms 
from their institutional environments so that they can gain legitimacy, resources, 
stability and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; D'Aunno, Sutton and Price, 1991). To survive, 
organisations must accommodate institutional expectations even if this results in 
sometimes inexplicable and inefficient organisational structures and actions. Relating 
to this research this may mean the institutionalisation of a RBSIC by a business unit 
even if there was a possibility that the net effect might be a reduction in profitability. 
Institutional pressures lead organisations to adopt similar organisational 
characteristics. This tendency towards uniformity was called isomorphism by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983,1991). They identified three major mechanisms through 
which it was achieved. Coercive isomorphism occurs when organisational patterns, 
that may be justified as `best practice' (e. g. the RBSIC) are imposed on organisations 
by a more powerful authority (e. g. upon whom the organisation is dependent for 
resources); mimetic isomorphism when organisations respond to uncertainty by 
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adopting the patterns of other, successful organisations; and normative isomorphism, 
when organisations adopt patterns considered appropriate in the environment. 
Institutions can react to institutional pressures in a number of ways. Oliver (1991: 
152) identifies five strategies available to individual organisations who are confronted 
by institutional pressures: Acquiescence - sometimes referred to as conformity, is the 
response that has received the most attention from institutional theorists (Scott, 2001: 
171). It involves the three major mechanisms - coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism - described above and may be motivated by the expectation of enhanced 
legitimacy, fear of negative sanctions, or hope of additional resources; Compromise 
balancing, placating and negotiating institutional demands. It is particularly likely to 
occur in environments containing conflicting authorities (Scott, 2001: 171); 
Avoidance - includes concealment efforts and attempts to "decouple" a differentiated 
part of the organisation (e. g. creation of a special administrative unit' that is outside of 
the normal organisational structure). Organisations may also opt to respond in a 
ceremonial manner, implementing changes in their formal structures that are not 
internalised or institutionalised. Meyer and Rowan (1977) imply this response is 
widespread; Defiance - Organisations not only resist institutional pressures to 
conform but to do so openly. Defiance is likely to occur when the norms and interests 
of the recipient organisation diverge substantially from the organisation attempting to 
impose requirements upon them (Scott, 2001: 174); and Manipulation - "the 
purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence or control the environment" 
(Oliver, 1991: 157). This may involve ways that organisations attempt to defend 
The practice was widely used by Enron Corporation as a way to conceal illegal transactions from 
shareholders and regulators. 
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themselves, improve their bargaining power (through the development of linkages to 
important sources of power) and manage views of their legitimacy. 
Concepts of institutional theory are a necessary, but not sufficient, set of theoretical 
perspectives to examine the transfer of practices in international contexts. We niust 
also consider the potential impact and influence of socio-cultural characteristics such 
as national cultures and the extent to which they can be separated out analytically 
from purely institutional perspectives. These are described in the next section. 
3.1.2 Institutionalism and Culture 
A number of scholars have used the concept of national culture to study country level 
effects (Kluckhorn & Strodbeck, 1961; Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1980; Laurent, 1983, 
Trompenaars, 1993). However, some institutional theorists have questioned the 
relevance of national culture claiming that national characteristics can change 
radically (Hobsbawm, 1994); the methodology adopted to measure culture is itself 
culture-specific (McSweeney, 2002); national cultures are simply informal institutions 
that influence other social structures (North, 1990; Hill, 1995); for organisations to be 
effective, the design of the organisation must fit with their size, technology, and 
strategy, regardless of culture (Child, 1974,1981; Hickson, Hinings, McMillan and 
Schwitter, 1991); and the cultural perspective fails to adequately explain why 
strategies of firms from culturally proximate countries are different (Peng, 2002: 52) 
Approaches to culture differ among cross-culture researchers and institutional 
theorists. Among cross-cultural researchers Hofstede ( 1991: 5) defines culture as 
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"the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the membe-so f one 
group from another ". While acknowledging that culture can manifest itself at both 
the macro (national) level and the micro (organisational) level his work has largely 
focused on the national-level and will be used at that level in this thesis. Trompenaars 
(1993: 13) defines culture as "a shared set of meanings that dictate what we pay 
attention to, how we act and what we value " that determine how people behave in an 
organisation. From a more psychological perspective, Triandis (1972) presents 
culture as the subjective perception of the human-made part of the environment. This 
includes the categorisation of social stimuli, associations, beliefs, attitudes, roles, and 
values that individuals share (Thomas, 2002: 28). 
Institutional theorists suggest that institutions include laws, regulations, norms, 
values, as well as cultures. This implies that `institution' is a broader concept than 
`culture' (Peng, 2002: 54). This approach to culture does not preclude national 
culture but typically emphasises the rules and practices at the organisation or industry 
level, and not on the national level (DiMaggio, 1997; Dacin et al. 1999). 
Institutionalist theorists with an economics or sociology background do not define 
culture directly instead they focus on institutions which include culture (Peng, 2002: 
53). DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 8) write that "... institutionalism comprises an 
interest in institutions as independent variables, and a turn towards cognitive and 
cultural explanations. " North (1990: 3), an economist, describes institutions as "the 
rules of the gare in a society or, more formalh', are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human i/rtc'ruction. While Scott (199: 13), a sociologist, defines 
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institutions as "cognitive, normative, and regulative structures' and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. " 
The above definitions suggest there is the potential for an overlap between culture and 
institutions. Institutional frameworks are made up of both formal and informal 
constraints (North, 1990). Formal constraints include political rules, judicial 
decisions and economic contracts while informal constraints include socially 
sanctioned norms of behaviour, which are embedded in culture and ideology (Scott, 
1995). 
Buck and Shahrim (2005: 44), adopting a `coevolutionary' perspective (Lewin et al, 
1999,2004) whereby culture moderates interactions between old and new institutions, 
and "new institutional arrangements evolve in ways consistent titi'ith, and reflective of, 
a nation's value system ", argue that prevailing national culture and institutions both 
have implications for governance systems. For example, relating to this research, the 
willingness of employees to confront or disagree with their managers may be 
influenced by a culture that accepts and finds desirable high levels of inequality 
among its members. In this case subordinates are more likely to expect to be told 
what to do by their managers and may be reluctant to contradict a manager even 
though they believe they have identified a risk to the business unit's objectives. Buck 
and Shahrim's hybrid, cultural/institutional perspective is consistent with Lowe 
(1988: 322) who emphasises "complex inter-determinism hetiti eeil influences of pre- 
modern values, modern values, and 
formal and informal institutional norms " 
2 These structures are developed further in section i. 6.1. 
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This thesis is particularly concerned with how national culture influences the 
cognitive and normative components of the social context within which the transt'er of 
the RBSIC from the parent to its Asia-Pacific based business unit occurs using the 
five dimensions of culture identified by Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede and Bond 
(1988) to compare the national cultures of the source and recipient countries. (See 
3.5.1.4). 
3.1.3 Institutional Change 
Institutional theory is not usually regarded as a theory of organisational change, but 
more usually an explanation of the similarity and stability of organisational 
arrangements in a given population or field of organisations (Greenwood and 
Hinnings, 1996: 1023). As Scott (2001: 181) points out change poses a problem for 
institutional theorists, many of whom view institutions as the source of stability and 
order. However, theory and research on institutions frequently focuses on change. 
Until the late 1980s the emphasis was on institutional construction and convergent 
change processes with the assumption that institutions are put in place and then exert 
their effects but are not themselves subject to further change. Since that time theorists 
and researchers have begun to examine arguments and situations involving 
institutional change that witness the deinstitutionalisation of existing forms and their 
replacement by new arrangements, which, in time undergo institutionalisation (Scott, 
2001: 18 1). Dougherty (1994), Greenwood and Hinnings (1996) and more recently 
Chizerna and Buck (2006) have suggested that institutional theory can be developed 
to provide an account of change. Chizema and Buck (2006) have considered how 
institutional theory could be used to identify circumstances that could lead to a change 
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in the corporate governance arrangements of a company, specifically, the adoption of 
executive stock options by German companies. 
Institutional change defined by Kraatz and Moore (2002) as "the abandonment of 
institutionalised practices, structures and goals and/or the adoption of institutionally 
contradictory practices, structures and goals bY an individual organisation or field of 
organizations " can lead to deinstitutionalisation which refers to the process by which 
institutions weaken and disappear. Oliver (1992) identified three general types of 
pressures towards deinstitutionalisation: Functional - perceived problems in the 
performance of an institutionalised practice; Political - shifts in interests or 
underlying power distributions that provide support for existing institutional 
arrangements; and Social - pressures associated with differentiation of groups and the 
existence of heterogeneous divergent or discordant beliefs and practices. 
Change processes are best examined by designs that incorporate multiple levels of 
analysis (Scott, 2001: 203). Institutional change can be initiated by both processes or 
factors that are either exogenous or endogenous to the institutional system under 
review. The smaller the scope of the system the more likely external factors will be 
involved (Scott, 2001: 187). Tensions arise within frameworks when the regulative, 
normative and cognitive elements supporting a practice move out of alignment. This 
can lead to the various actors interpreting rules in conflicting ways. External tensions 
are produced when multiple institutions overlap, providing diverse Schemas and 
recipes for action. Political, economic and technical shifts can render current 
institutions vulnerable to precipitous change (Scott, 2001: 203). 
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This research is looking at change from the perspective of how the institutional 
environment of a host business unit impacts the institutionalisation of an 
organisational practice transferred from business unit's parent company that is itsclf a 
reflection of the home institutional environment of the parent company. 
3.1.4 Institutionalism and the MNE 
Isomorphism suggests that organisations sharing the same environments will employ 
similar practices. Given that many elements of the institutional environment, such as 
culture and legal systems, are often specific to a nation (Rosenvveig & Singh, 1983) 
organisational practices can be expected to vary across countries. A MNE will come 
under pressure to adopt local practices, becoming isomorphic with the local 
institutional context. At the same time, an important source of competitive advantage 
for the MNE, is the utilisation of organisational capabilities worldwide (Ghoshal & 
Bartlett, 1988; Kogut, 1991; Grant, 1996 (a); Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). Thus MNEs 
will attempt to leverage practices on a worldwide basis. This will lead to tension 
between the need for global integration, on the one hand, and local adaptation, on the 
other hand (Westney, 1993; Rosenweig & Singh, 1999). 
The business unit of a MNE is not an independent entity and has to comply with 
practices mandated by the parent that are formulated in the MNE's home institutional 
context indirectly reflecting, as they are both channelled and filtered through the 
parent organisation, the home country's institutional influences (Kostova and Roth, 
2002). At the same time, it resides in a host country with its own institutional patterns 
specific to that country. Therefore, each foreign business unit is faced with two 
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distinct sets of isomorphic pressures and a need to maintain legitimacy within both the 
host country and the MNE. Kostova & Roth (2002) refer to this as institutional 
duality. Under these circumstances the relational context that links subsidiary to 
parent becomes extremely important because it influences the way such pressures 
from a home country are interpreted and perceived by a foreign subsidiary. 
There are different ways in which the institutional environment of a host country may 
affect the adoption of a practice at a foreign subsidiary. First, it may exert direct 
pressures on the subsidiary to adopt the practice, independent of initiatives of the 
parent organisation to diffuse the practice. As a result a subsidiary may adopt a 
practice to become isomorphic with other organisations from its organisational field 
in the host country. However, by being foreign in a particular host environment, 
subsidiaries are, in a way, buffered from the local institutional pressures and are not 
necessarily expected to be completely isomorphic with other local organisations, 
especially when the MNE is relatively powerful and the subsidiary is less dependent 
on the host country. (Zucker, 1987; Meyer & Zucker, 1988). In this case the direct 
effect of the local institutional environment may be somewhat constrained (Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). 
When the MNE requires the adoption of a particular practice e. g. the RBSIC, which it 
sees as technically efficient, but the subsidiary views it as inappropriate or inefficient 
for the particular host country, compliance cannot be expected (Kostova and Roth, 
2002: 216). However, organisational pressures within the MNE would require some 
degree of compliance. In this case the subsidiary might engage in what is referred to 
in institutional theory as symbolic or ceremonial adoption (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
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Another way in which the recipient country's institutional environment will affect the 
adoption of the practice is through subsidiary employees. Institutional elements enter 
institutions through people working in them (Zucker, 1977; Westney, 1993; Scott, 
1995). Employees' judgements about a new practice will be influenced by the 
cognitions and beliefs, which in turn have been shaped by the external institutional 
environment in which they operate. In the research this refers to cognitions and 
beliefs relating to systems of internal control that may have developed while working 
with local companies. Therefore it is possible for a subsidiary that is relatively 
disconnected from its host environment to be subject to institutional influences 
through its employees who are carriers of institutions (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
3.2.0 Theoretical Model 
The theoretical framework described below will be used to identify the key factors in 
variations in the implementation and internalisation of the RBSIC in the Asia-Pacific 
subsidiaries and joint ventures of two UK companies and what are the factors that 
explain these variations. 
Using Pettigrew's (1987) three broad analytical categories (Figure 3.1) Content refers 
to the specific area of transformation under consideration. In this case the system of 
internal control adopted by a UK listed company's Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint 
ventures. The transformation will be achieved through the transfer of a Turnbull 
based system of internal control that adopts a risk based approach to establishing a 
sound system of internal control, that should be embedded in the company. within its 
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normal management and governance processes. and not treated as a separate exercise 
undertaken to meet regulatory requirements (Turnbull, para. 9 and 22). 
Figure 3.1 
Broad framework for guiding the research (Pettigrew, 1987) 
Content 
The internal control 
system of UK listed 
companies' 
Asia Pacific-based 
subsidiaries and 
joint ventures 
Turnbull (1999) 
Context Process 
Social Actions, reactions 
and interactions between 
Organisational the various interested parties 
as they implement and 
Relational internalise the 
Turnbull guidelines 
Kostova (1999) 
Szulanski (1996) 
Context refers to the outer and inner context of the organisation. Outer context 
includes the economic, social, political, and sectoral environment in which the firm is 
located. Inner context refers to features of the structural, cultural and political 
environment through which ideas for change proceed (Pettigrew, 1990). The Context 
component of the analytical framework adopted for this research will use a framework 
derived primarily from the work of Kostova (1999) and Kostova and Roth (2002) to 
examine the transnational transfer of strategic organisational practices within 
multinational companies based on the notion of the contextual embeddedness of the 
process of transfer. Strategic organisational practices are defined as practices that are 
believed to be of strategic importance to the firm providing a source of competitive 
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advantage, they tend to be more complex and broad in scope and more `people rather 
than `technology' focused (Kostova, 1999: 310). A risk based system of control that 
follows the recommendations contained in the Turnbull guidelines is consistent with 
this description. 
Kostova's (1999) framework is useful in developing an understanding of the Contexts 
Within which the Transfer Occurs. Her theoretical approach blends the socio-cultural 
and the institutional perspectives described earlier. It allows the research to examine 
the role of country, organisational and individual factors in the implementation and 
internalisation of the RBSIC through the analysis of the social, organisational and 
relational contexts within which the process of transfer occurs. 
Finally, Process refers to the actions, reactions and interactions between the various 
interested parties as they seek to implement, internalise and institutionalise the RBSIC 
and how they are affected by the factors that influence the difficulty of practice 
transfer. Szulanski (1996: 28) defined organisational practices as the routine use of 
organisational knowledge. He identified four sets of factors likely to influence the 
difficulty of transferring knowledge within an organisation which he referred to as 
internal stickiness. Three of which are included in Factors that are Likely to 
Influence the Difficulty of Practice Transfer the Process component of the analytical 
framework adopted for this research. They are characteristics of the practice 
transferred, of the source of the practice, and of the practice recipient. By analysing 
these three factors it is hoped to develop an understanding of the role they play in the 
process of implementing and internalising the RBSIC at the recipient unit. The fourth 
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set of factors - context in which the transfer takes place is included in Contexts ivithin 
which the Transfer Occurs. 
3.3.0 Framework for the Analysis of the Implementation and Internalisation of 
a Turnbull Based System of Internal Control in the Asia-Pacific 
Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures of UK Listed Companies 
The RBSIC (Content), the context of the practice transfer (Context) and the role of 
internal stickiness (factors that influence the difficulty of practice transfer) in the 
practice transfer (Process) are bought together in Figure 3.2 to form the theoretical 
framework that will be used to analyse variations, and the factors that explain these 
variations, in the implementation and internalisation of a RBSIC transferred from two 
UK listed companies to their Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures. While this 
research expects that context is likely have a proportionally greater effect on 
internalisation and process is likely to exert a greater influence on implementation. 
Content, context and process are viewed as interrelated and dynamically interlinked 
over time (Walsham & Waema, 1994: 153). The ability of a subsidiary /joint venture 
to institutionalise a RBSIC will be influenced by the nature of the system itself. It 
will influence the context within which the transfer occurs and the type of factors that 
affect the difficulty of practice transfer. The context within which the transfer occurs 
will also have some bearing on the nature of the system of internal control and the 
factors that influence the difficulty of transfer. In turn, the factors affecting the 
difficulty of practice transfer will influence the design of the system of internal 
control and play a role in shaping the context within which it is embedded. 
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Figure 3.2 
Framework for the analysis of the implementation and internalisation of a Turnbull based system of 
internal control in the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures of UK listed companies 
Contexts Within Factors that are Likely to 
which the Influence the Difficulty of 
Transfer Occurs Practice Transfer Practice Transfer 
Board Decision i 
to Introduce the 
_ RBSIC 
Characteristics of the 
Social Practice 
Context Transferred 
Implementation of 
Board Instructions 
By Management 
Organisational 
Characteristics of the 
Context 
Source of 
Internalisation of the 
Practice 
RBSIC 
By Business Unit 
Employees 
Relational 
Characteristics of the 
Practice 
Context Recipient Improved 
\ Shareholder 
Returns 
3.4.0 Content - Risk Based System of Internal Control 
Risk, derived from the early Italian risicare or to dare, is an ever present aspect of the 
business world. Recent years have witnesses a growing interest in the disclosure of 
risk information by UK companies. The Turnbull guidelines aim to provide a 
conceptual framework for companies to disclose risk (Solomon et al., 2000: 448). 
Companies set themselves strategic and business objectives, then manage the risks 
that threaten the achievement of these objectives (KPMG, 1999: 14). Internal control 
is one technique to manage risk other devices include: 
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" Transfer of risk to third parties (contractually or through insurance) 
" Sharing risks 
9 Contingency planning 
" Withdrawal from unacceptably risky activities 
(KPMG, 1999: Blackburn, 2000) 
This research is concerned with the transfer of an internal control system that meets 
the recommendations included in the Turnbull guidelines. Successful internal control 
systems are likely to be both context and practice orientated. 
A RBSIC is context-orientated as it encourages the development of an organisational 
culture that promotes the identification and management of risks and practice- 
orientated through the direct application of the practices included in the Turnbull 
guidelines. These are largely bureaucratic in nature, relying on a formal system that 
involves risk identification, evaluation and reporting mechanisms mandated by senior 
management. 
Through the successful institutionalisation of a RBSIC the Board will be made aware 
of the significant risks faced by a subsidiary /joint venture and the actions taken to 
manage those risks. 
The Board is accountable to the company's shareholders and the management is 
accountable to the Board. Through the practices recommended in the Turnbull 
guidelines, the management, following the instnictions of the Board, is required to 
institute a RBSIC throughout the company that will safeguard the shareholders' 
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investment and the company's assets. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between the 
Board of Directors, management and the system of internal control 
Figure 3.3 
A Turnbull based system of internal control 
Board of 
Directors 
' Assessment ofý 
significant Risks & 
the Effectiveness 
the Internal 
Control ""System 
Management 
/Monitor &-, 
Review Risks 
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Effectiveness 
of the 
Control 
\System/ 
Apply 
Risk 
Control 
Measures 
Internal 
Control 
Policies 
Design a 
System of 
Internal 
Control 
Risk 
Identification 
Evaluation 
& Prioritisation 
"'hen the RBSIC 
operates in a subsidiary or joint venture another layer is added to the relationship (see 
Figure 3.4) with the addition of a management team, responsible for the subsidiary / 
joint venture, that is separated from the rest of the company. 3 In the case of an Asia- 
Pacific subsidiary /joint venture this separation is made greater by the geographical 
distance. Given this separation from the corporate headquarters the likelihood that the 
Further la\, e rs are also possible. e. g. regional headquarters 
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Figure 3.4 
AI urnbull based system of internal control in a subsidiary /joint venture 
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local management team will have had little or no involvement in determining the 
system of internal control, they are expected to adopt, may also increase. This in turn 
could increase the costs associated with the transfer and the ability of parent and 
subsidiary /joint venture to effectively co-ordinate the transfer (Zaheer, 1995: 343) 
making a successful transfer more unlikely. 
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3.5.0 The Contexts within which the Practice Transfer Occurs 
The process of transfer is contextually embedded, it does not occur in a social vacuum 
(Kostova, 1999). Kostova (1999) identifies three types of context: 
3.5.1 Social Context 
Social context refers to the institutional distance between the countries of the parent 
company and of the recipient unit. 
Organisational practices vary across countries and they are affected by the socio- 
cultural environments in which they have been evolved and used. This will lead to 
country-level effects on the success of practice transfer, with some countries 
providing more favourable environments for the transfer of practices and others 
presenting a number of difficulties and challenges. Differences exist in a variety of 
organisational practices that are particularly relevant to the transfer of a RBSIC. 
Leadership and distribution of power in a business unit can determine the degree that 
employees are expected to be responsible for embedding the practice throughout the 
organisation and the degree to which the responsibility for its institutionalisation is 
seen as exclusively the responsibility of senior management. Human resource 
practices ýt i11 influence the development of the skills required to institutionalise the 
system of internal control. While decision making can require a greater level of 
consensus when deciding on the nature of a system of internal control in some 
business units than xvi1l be the case in others. 
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Kostova (1997; 1999) uses the construct of country institutional profile (CIP) to 
capture the institutional characteristics of a national environment. She proposes that 
countries differ in their institutional characteristics; organisational practices reflect the 
institutional environment of the country where they have been developed and 
established; and therefore when practices are transferred across borders, they may not 
"fit" with the institutional environment of the recipient country, which, in turn, may 
be an impediment to the transfer (Kostova, 1999: 314). Kostova's (1997: 180) 
approach acknowledges the importance of culture while proposing that it might have 
some limitations when used to conceptualise national environments and their effects 
on organisations commenting that other aspects of national environments can affect 
organisational behaviour such as the economic or political system. A country's CIP is 
composed of various types of institutions and can be characterised by three "pillars" - 
regulatory, cognitive and normative (Scott, 2001: 51). (The three sub-variables of the 
social context variable of the theoretical framework). Two of these components, 
cognitive and normative are conceptually close to culture while the regulatory 
dimension is unique to the CIP (Kostova, 1999: 314). The greater the differences in 
CIP between the home and the recipient country the harder it will be to transfer 
practices. The appropriateness of this approach to study the transfer of governance 
related practices is supported by Buck and Shahrim (2005: 44) who argue that 
prevailing national culture and institutions both have implications for governance 
systems. 
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3.5.1.1 Regulatory 
The regulatory component reflects the existing laws and rules in a particular national 
environment that promote certain types of behaviours and restrict others. e. g. 
National corporate governance regulations. Nationally distinct laws and rules drive 
corporate governance practices to become more similar within countries and differ 
across countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003: 449). Different institutions of 
corporate governance produce different consequences in terms of the mode of 
decision making of firms, patterns of adjustment, and the distribution of value added 
among the various parties (Goyer, 2003: 187). Given that the presence of institutional 
complementarity significantly contributes to the resilience of domestic institutions 
(Goyer, 2003: 187) if a corporate governance practice is perceived by the employees 
at a recipient unit to be in conflict with the regulatory institutions in their country, it is 
highly unlikely they will engage in transferring and implementing it. 
3.5.1.2 Cognitive 
The cognitive component reflects the cognitive structures widely shared by the people 
in a particular country. Cognitive structures constitute the nature of reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made (Scott, 2001: 57) directly affecting individual 
behaviour. Events may have different interpretations based on the cognitive 
structures that perceivers have at their disposal (Kostova, 1999: 315). This research is 
directly concerned with the cognitive institutions relating to the shared social 
knowledge that people have regarding a RBSIC. If a s` stem of internal control is 
inconsistent with the cognitive institutions in the recipient environment, employees 
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will probably have difficulties understanding, interpreting and judging it correctly 
making it much harder to learn and institutionalise. 
If a practice is consistent with the cognitive institutions in the recipient environment it 
can reduce the recipient's fears over the adoption of a new practice and the change it 
will probably bring (Ettlie, 1986), reduce resistance levels in institutionalising the 
practice (Leonard-Barton & Deschamps, 1988) as well as reducing the possibility of 
the `not-invented-here' syndrome, where a recipient rejects an idea that was not 
derived internally (Katz & Allen, 1982), from occurring. 
3.5.1.3 Normative 
The normative component consists of the social norms, values, beliefs and 
assumptions about human nature and human behaviour that are socially shared and 
carried by individuals in a given country (Kostova, 1997,1999). Normative 
components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life" (Scott, 2001: 54). Hofstede (1991: 8) defines values as the conceptions of 
the preferable or desirable, while norms specify how things should be done. With 
respect to this research normative institutions are the beliefs, values, social norms and 
assumptions that people hold toward the RBSIC that is being transferred. If this 
practice is to be institutionalised successfully in a foreign subsidiary or joint ventures 
it has to take into account the different assumptions and value systems of the national 
culture of the subsidiary /joint venture. 
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In summary, Kostova (1999: 314) acknowledges that the cognitive and normative 
dimensions of CIP are conceptually close to culture. However, the regulatory 
dimension is unique to CIP and it can be used to capture some of the social dynamics 
resulting from the introduction of new regulatory procedures that are represented in 
this research by a Turnbull based system of internal control. 
3.5.1.4 Hofstede 
To compare the national cultures of the respective parent companies with that of their 
subsidiaries and joint ventures, and consider the implications for the transfer of 
RBSIC, this research will use the four dimensions of culture identified in Hofstede's 
Study of International Differences in Work-Related Values (1980) and a fifth 
dimension Long-Term Orientation that was added in 1988. These dimensions show 
how the underlying values of a group's culture permeate through to affect 
relationships, work and social values. Appendix 1 shows the scores across the five 
dimensions for the countries included in this research4. 
The five dimensions are: 
The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension measures how far different cultures are 
prepared to accept ambiguous situations and tolerate uncertainties about the future 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005: 167). Uncertainty avoidance does not reduce risk it 
reduccs ambiguity. This can be achieved through the introduction of a risk 
management system that identifies and quantifies risk. When a risk is known the 
Malaysia was not included in the research on Long-Term Orientation. 
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degree of uncertainty surrounding it is reduced. Therefore, it is more likely that a 
society with high uncertainty avoidance will value a RBSIC. 
The Individualism - Collectivism dimension describes the relationship between the 
individual and the group to which they belong. In collectivist cultures a high value is 
attached to loyalty to the group which in this case could be an employee's immediate 
work unit, the entire business unit and /or ethnic group. 
The third dimension is Power Distance which is defined as the extent to which the 
less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 46). 
Particularly relevant to this research is the degree to which employees feel 
comfortable approaching and/or contradicting their managers. 
The fourth dimension is Masculinity - Femininity. A society is called masculine 
whcn gender roles are clearlvv distinct, men are supposed to be assertive, tough and 
focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, 
and concerned with the quality of life (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005: 120). In a 
masculine culture the organisation is more likely to resolve conflict by letting parties 
fight it out. While in a feminine culture employees resolve conflicts by compromise 
and negotiation. Upon commencement of this research this dimension appeared to be 
the least relevant. 
The fifth dimension is Long-Term Orientation v cr'sus Short-Term Orientation. 
Hofstede describes long-term orientation as "the fostering of virtues orientated toward 
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future rewards - in particular, perseverance and thrift ". Short-term orientation refers 
to "the fostering of virtues related to the past and the present - in particular, respect 
for tradition, preservation of face, and fulfilling social obligations. " (Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2005: 21 0)5 This dimension is of interest for this research as all of the 
Asia-Pacific countries included in this research, with the exception of Australia (in 
common with the UK) and Malaysia6, were found to have a long-term orientation 
(See Appendix 1). 
Hofstede and Bond (1988: 17 -- 18) identified long-term orientated cultures as those 
where a harmonious and stable hierarchy and having a sense of shame which supports 
interrelatedness through sensitivity to social contacts is important, and where there is 
a stress of keeping ones commitments. Short-term orientated cultures are more likely 
to emphasise personal steadiness and stability and show too much respect for tradition 
and protecting ones face impeding the introduction of new ideas and risk taking. It 
should be noted that Hofstede acknowledges the importance of face in many Asian 
cultures and suggests that respondents in long-term orientated cultures at a conscious 
level wanted to de-emphasise it (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 218). 
Hofstede's approach had been subject to a number of criticisms (e. g. Cooper, 1982; 
Roberts and Boyacigiller, 1984; McSweeney, 2002). The key criticisms and 
responses by Hofstede (2002) and other commentators (Smith, 2002; Mead, 2005) are 
summarised in the following table: 
` The fifth dimension was based on \N ork undertaken by \l ichael Bond, involving 100 respondents in 
22 countries. Both the long and the short-term rated values of this dimension are found in the teachings 
of Confucius, the most influential Chinese philosopher who lived around 500 B. C.; however, the 
dimension also applies to countries without a Confucian heritage. (Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
c bsite - w\\ w. geert-hofstede. com). All of the 
Asia-Pacific countries in this research wt ith the 
exception of Malaysia (not included in the survey) and Australia demonstrated a long-term orientation. 
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Table 3.1 
Criticism's of Hofstede's Dimensions of Culture 
Criticism Response 
Hofstede assumes that national All members of a nation do not share 
territory and the limits of culture their culture to the same degree. 
correspond. Hofstede's findings represent central 
tendencies based on statistical 
averages. In addition Hofstede 
(2002) acknowledges nations are not 
the best units for studying cultures 
but usually they are the only kind of 
units available for comparison. 
All of the informants for the first four By using the same company Hofstede 
dimensions worked for a single was able to compare unusually well 
company - IBM matched samples for an unusually 
large number of countries to measure 
differences between national cultures. 
Hofstede (2001) validated his 
findings with data from completely 
different sources. 
The IBM data is over thirty years and The dimensions found are assumed to 
therefore obsolete have centuries old roots and are 
therefore likely to change very 
slowly. 
Surveys are not a suitable way of it is impractical given the large 
measuring cultural differences as they number of informants to adopt any 
have an `in-built' cultural bias. other approach. 
Hofstede's work leads to a Hofstede has repeatedly stated his 
stereotypical approach in the dimensions are not the basis for the 
interpretation of an individual's interpreting the behaviour of 
behaviour. individuals within particular cultures. 
Roberts and Boyacigiller (1984) The extent of significant correlations 
argued that measurement validity was with a wide range of independently 
the principle weakness of Hofstede's collected culture-level scores 
1980 work. provides abundant proof that 
Hofstede's dimensions are both 
reliably and validly measured (Smith, 
2002: 123). 
Five dimensions are not enough Hofstede (2002) acknowledges if 
more can found and validated then 
they will be welcome but to date they 
have not been. Furthermore, too 
many dimensions will make 
comparison more complex. 
The same behaviour can be explained Some overlap is inevitable. Further 
by more than one dimension. e. g. research should make the 
People try to look as impressive as identification of the appropriate 
possible - power distance or dimension (s) possible 
masculine / feminine. 
Not included in the Bond's research. 
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Despite the criticism's listed above and the publication of a number of more recent 
influential studies that compare cultures including Trompenaars (1993) and GLOBE 
(House et. al, 2002) Hofstede's framework is used in this research because it 
represents work undertaken in over 70 countries involving 116,000 informants, 
developed dimensions of culture that are relevant to this research, taps into deep 
cultural values and make significant comparisons between national cultures possible. 
3.5.2 Organisational Context 
Organisational context refers to the role of organisational factors in the transfer 
process. 
Transfers are organisationally embedded since they occur in a corporate context that 
can either be favourable or unfavourable regarding a particular transfer. This can lead 
to difficulties in transferring practices if the practice being transferred is incompatible 
with the organisational practices of the recipient unit (Rogers, 1980; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
Kedia and Bhagat (1988: 567 - 568) propose that difficulties can also arise if the 
organisational cultures of the two organisations involved in the transfer are 
incompatible and / or the absorptive capacity of the recipient unit is insufficient to 
implement, internalise and institutionalise the new practice due to its inability to 
understand its value and assimilate and apply it effectively in the local environment. 
They conceptualise compatibility (based on Strauss, 1982) as similarity between the 
"negotiated order" of the two organisations involved in the transfer. Strauss argued 
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that social order is negotiated and that organised activity is not possible without some 
form of continued negotiations which are contingent on the structural conditions of 
the organisation, and that they reflect patterned not random, lines of communication 
in the context of the organisation (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988: 567). Kedia and Bhagat 
argue that if the "negotiated order" in the cultures of the source and recipient 
organisations is significantly different then transfer will be difficult. 
Absorptive capacity which refers to the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, 
external information, assimilate it and apply it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128) can 
play a key role in the institutionalisation of an organisational practice. Kedia and 
Bhagat (1988: 567 - 568) were concerned with three specific aspects of absorptive 
capacity that are directly related to organisational context: First, local verses 
cosmopolitan orientation - in a cosmopolitan organisation priorities are less likely to 
reflect the immediate concerns of local managers making it easier to transfer 
knowledge (Merton, 1968). Second, technical capabilities - the existence of a 
sophisticated technical core that enables the organisation to implement and use the 
knowledge. The lack of a sophisticated technical core makes it harder for a practice 
to be implemented (Hamel, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; Dinur et al., 1998). Third, strategic management - the management skills and 
orientation necessary to benefit from the knowledge at the recipient unit. The absence 
of such skills is often apparent in environments undergoing rapid change (Neghandi, 
1971 ; Marton, 1986). The nature of the three' components will be directly influenced 
by the organisation's culture which is defined as 'a set of values it'idely shared among 
the organisational members ' (Chatman and Jehn, 1994: 5-14). 
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Absorptive capacity can also be influenced by the degree to which the individuals in 
an organisation who are involved in the practice transfer are similar in certain 
attributes, such as beliefs, education, and social status (Rogers, 1995: 18 - 19) and / or 
share the overall strategy, goals and values of the parent company (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1988: 384). When interacting individuals "share common meanings, a 
mutual sub-cultural language, and are alike in personal and social characteristics, 
the communication of new ideas is likely to have greater effects in terms of knowledge 
gain, attitude formation, and overt behaviour change " (Rogers, 1995: 19). 
Kedia and Bhagat (1988: 562) also suggested that compatibility and absorptive 
capacity will have a stronger impact on the transfer of a practice that is process and 
person-embodied than for product-embodied knowledge. Given that a system of 
internal control is process and person-embodied these factors are particularly relevant 
to this research. 
Another reason for an unfavourable organisational context could be that the transfer 
of a practice requires a business unit to unlearn some existing knowledge whose 
values and norms were regarded as more appropriate to the organisations culture. This 
is necessary to avoid developing a `core-rigidity' (March, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 
1992) that acts as a constraint to an effective transfer of knowledge (Hedberg, 1981; 
Burgleman, 1983; Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Dixon, 1994) possibly leading to the 
`not-invented-here' syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982). 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1988: 384) found that a subsidiary's ability to adopt new 
technology is positively effected by the level of intra-business unit communication. 
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This was also identified as playing an important role in the adoption of key practices 
by Murdoch (1997) and Daly et al. (2003: 161) suggesting intra-business unit 
communication is an important component of absorptive capacity. 
Kostova suggests that organisational culture can have two types of effects on the 
success of practice transfer. First, general - the success of a transfer of a strategic 
organisational practice from a parent company to a recipient unit is positively 
associated with the degree to which the unit's organisational culture is generally 
supportive of learning, change, and innovation. If learning is not considered 
important, the time for employees to learn and understand new practices may not be 
made available, sacrificed in the name of efficiency (Stewart, 1996). Secondly, 
practice specific - the success of a transfer of a strategic organisational practice from a 
parent company to a recipient unit is positively associated with the degree of 
compatibility between the values implied by the practice and the values underlying 
that unit's organisational culture. In addition to factors specific to an organisation 
these values will, in part, be derived from a business unit's national culture which has 
been considered in the social context variable. To avoid duplication the 
organisational context variable of this framework is conceptualised in terms of three 
sub-variables - absorptive capacity; general support for learning change and 
innovation; and organisational compatibility. 
3.5.3 Relational Context 
Schrader (1991) concluded that a strong positive relationship bet een recipient and 
source facilitates the transfer of knowledge. Relational Context is derived from the 
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specific relationships that exist between the parties involved in the transfer. Transfer 
failures are possible. even when both the social and the organisational contexts are 
favourable. A potential reason for such failures could be the relational context. This 
requires an understanding of the specific relationships that exist between the 
individuals at the source and recipient unit who are responsible for the transfer of the 
RBSIC and its eventual institutionalisation in the recipient. 
The transfer of a new system of internal control can be expected to lead to changes at 
the recipient unit that could affect some employees more than others. The process of 
institutionalisation could lead to changes in organisational culture, the introduction of 
new work routines and the requirement for training that in some cases could be 
relatively extensive. If it is to be successful it will require the commitment of 
substantial time and financial resources. It will also be necessary to effectively 
motivate the important decision makers and key players at the recipient unit. They 
will consist of senior managers, who are "in charge" of all transfers, whose support 
will be required if the new, corporate headquarters mandated, system of internal 
control is to be institutionalised and an "expert" group of employees who are directly 
involved in the management of the RBSIC. These two groups, referred to by Kostova 
(1999: 317) as the transfer coalition, have a key role in understanding and interpreting 
the practice and its value to the unit. Their responsibilities normally include obtaining 
employee `buy-in', determining what is communicated and how it is communicated, 
and to a large extent, control over the use of the resources allocated for the transfer. 
However, the support given to the transfer process by the transfer coalition is not, by 
itself, sufficient to ensure the ultimate success of a transfer which requires the support 
of all the employees at the recipient unit (Kostova, 1999: 319). 
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Kostova (1999: 318) proposes that the motivation of the transfer coalition to engage 
in the process of transfer is affected by the quality of the relationship with the parent 
company. This includes the past relationships between the parent company and the 
recipient unit as perceived by members of the transfer coalition at the recipient unit. 
This relationship could be affected by the nature of communication between the 
source and the recipient. As demonstrated empirically by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1988) 
knowledge flows from corporate headquarters to a subsidiary cannot occur without 
the existence of transmission channels. Differences in the value of these channels can 
be influenced by many factors including frequency, quantity, quality, informality and 
openness (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Jablin, 1979; 
Tushman, 1977) all of which can play a key role in the successful transfer of a 
practice. 
The relational context variable of this framework has four sub-variables. The three 
characteristics of the relationship context used for the model of practice adoption 
developed by Kostova and Roth (2002: 218) 7 and a fourth variable identified by 
Szulanski (1996,2003). 
7 The researcher originally planned to incorporate the t, ýv o types of relationships identified by Kostova 
(1999: 318 - 319) in the relational context construct of the theoretical framework: (1) Attitudinal which 
consisted of three attitudinal relationships - the transfer coalition's commitment to, identity with, and 
trust in the parent company; and (2) Power / dependence relationships. However, initial analysis found 
that responses to questions regarding commitment, where commitment is defined as the degree to 
which coalition memnbers are prepared to exert considerable effort on behalf of the parent company 
(Mlumx(lay et al, 1979), were unreliable as employees were unlikely to admit to lack of commitment to 
the parent. The researcher decided to remove commitment to the parent from the relationship context 
leaving the two remaining attitudinal relationships and power / dependency relationship. This is 
consistent \N ith the three characteristics of the relational context described by Kostova and Roth (2002: 
21 `). Using, these three characteristics the researcher wwas still able to develop an understanding of the 
recipient unit enmployyee's level of commitment to the parent as reflected in the responses to questions 
relating to dependence, trust and identification. 
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3.5.3.1 Dependence 
Dependence of a subsidiary is defined as the belief held by subsidiary managers that 
the subsidiary relies on, and is contingent on, the support of the parent organisation 
for providing major resources, including technology, capital and expertise (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998: Kostova and Roth, 2002: 218). Because of its role in relation to its 
headquarters the recipient unit may develop perceptions of dependence on the parent. 
This dependence confers power to the headquarters. When dependence is high, 
organisations are more likely to implement new, headquarters mandated, 
organisational practices; when it is low, they may defy the parent or manipulate the 
environment (Kostova and Roth, 2002: 219). Therefore, subsidiaries or joint ventures 
that perceive themselves to be dependent on their parent will be more likely to comply 
with mandates coming from the parent. Given this position the recipient may try to 
become internally legitimate with the parent company, so as to be seen favourably, 
increasing the likelihood of receiving the resources it deems necessary (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Becoming isomorphic with the parent by implementing 
organisational practices that have been institutionalised at the parent, such as a 
RBSIC, is one of the strategies that subsidiaries might use to gain intra-organisational 
legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 352). 
However, although dependence can affect implementation it does not affect 
institutionalisation, a transfer where the single motive is to achieve legitimacy with, 
and approval by, the parent company is unlikely to lead employees at the recipient 
unit to develop positive attitudes toward the practice leading to the internalisation 
required for institutionalisation. 
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3.5.3.2 Trust 
Drawing on Bromiley and Cumming's (1995) definition of inter-organisational trust 
Kostova (1999: 318) and Kostova and Roth (2002: 219) define trust by a foreign 
subsidiary in its parent company as a common belief within the subsidiary that the 
parent company behaves in accordance with any commitments, both explicit and 
implicit; is honest in discussions that precede such commitments; and does not take 
excessive advantage of the recipient unit. This is consistent with Casson's (1997: 
1 18) more general definition that trust is a "warranted belief that someone else will 
honour their obligations. " Higher levels of trust, associated with higher perceived 
reliability of the source, will likely reduce uncertainty regarding the value of the 
practice to the recipient unit, as well as the motives behind the transfer, positively 
influencing the likelihood of transfer success (Granovetter, 1985: 490; Szulanski, 
1996: 35; 2003: 54). Trust is needed when the relationship between source and the 
recipient prevents the recipient from having any recourse if the source behaves in a 
way that disadvantages the recipient (Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998). This is often the 
case between headquarters and its respective business units. Also higher levels of 
trust may reduce the costs of the transfer by improving communication smoothing 
negotiations (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998: 152). 
3.5.3.3 Identification 
Blum and Berta (1999) found that organisations seek to imitate the routines of other 
organisations that have a higher status (such as a parent). However, this may not be 
the case if they do not identify with the higher status organisation. Identification of a 
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foreign subsidiary or joint venture with the parent organisation is defined as the 
degree to which subsidiary employees experience a state of attachment to the parent 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002: 220). The more an individual feels part of an organisation, 
and derive part of their identity from membership of that organisation, the more likely 
they are to share its values and beliefs. The same values and beliefs should be 
embodied in the practice the company is transferring making it easier for the recipient 
to understand and support it. This will also reduce the effects of the `not-invented- 
here' syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982) as the practice will be seen to a lesser extent 
as coming from outside of the business unit. This is consistent with the findings of 
Child and Rodrigues (1996: 50) that practice transfers in international joint ventures 
are more likely to be successful when both parties hold similar social identities and 
Peteraf and Shanley (1997) whose research suggested that as the social similarity of 
parties' increases, so will their ease of communications, increasing the likelihood of a 
successful transfer (Cummings, 2003: 17). 
In addition when a business unit identifies with the parent, its employees will prefer to 
become even more similar (isomorphic) with the parent by adopting its practices. As 
a result it will be internally motivated to adopt a practice transferred from the parent, a 
motivation that will lead to both implementation and internalisation (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002: 220). 
3.5.3.4 Arduous Relationships 
Szulanski (1996: 32) found that the arduousness of the relationship between the 
source and recipient was associated with knowledge transfer difficulty. An arduous 
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(laborious and distant) relationship might create additional hardship in the transfer. A 
transfer of a practice especially when it has a high tacit content may require numerous 
individual exchanges. Hansen (1999) demonstrated that the success of the transfer of 
a complex practice, such as a RBSIC, depends on the strength of the ties between the 
source and recipient. This is revealed through the ease of communication (Arrow, 
1974) and the `intimacy' (shared appreciation of the objectives and reasons for a 
RBSIC) of the overall relationship between the source unit and the recipient unit 
(Marsden, 1990: 455). 
3.6.0 Factors that are Likely to Influence the Difficulty of Practice Transfer 
Szulanski acknowledges that, in general, all practice transfers require some degree of 
effort; however, some require more effort than others. These are characterised by 
internal stickiness (Szulanski, 1996,2003). Szulanski (1996) drawing on prior 
research suggests four sets of factors are likely to influence the difficulty of practice 
transfer, leading to internal stickiness, and identifies the following sub-variables 
within each set of factors. 
3.6.1 Characteristics of the Practice Transferred 
3.6.1.1 Causal Ambiguity 
The first sub-variable is causal anihiguity. Causal ambiguity has been identified as an 
important factor affecting knowledge transfer (Nonaka, 1994; Grant (b), 1996; 
Spender, 1996). In this study it refers to ambiguity about what the factors are that 
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influence the institutionalisation of the RBSIC and how they interact so that the 
precise reasons for success or failure of a transfer are difficult to identify. The theory 
of uncertain imitability (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984 states that a 
completely successful re-creation of a practice is impossible since there is irreducible 
uncertainty that prevents a complete understanding of how the features of a new 
context affect the outcome of an attempt to re-create knowledge (Szulanski, 2003: 
26). This could be indefinable tacit knowledge or imperfectly understood 
idiosyncratic features of the new context in which the practice is put to use that 
prevent it from working as effectively as it does in another context. Zander and 
Kogut (1995) found that explicit codified knowledge exhibited less causal ambiguity 
than less explicit knowledge. This is relevant to this research because the source of 
the knowledge claims that the knowledge being transferred relating to a RBSIC is 
both codified and explicit. 
The greater the causal ambiguity, the more difficult it is to identify difficulties in the 
transfer of a practice. Causal ambiguity slows the transfer of a practice (McEvily, 
Das & McCabe, 2000: 294). Teece (1977: 259) found that companies incur higher 
costs when transferring poorly understood technologies. Cost can be measured in 
terms of both financial and time commitment. Assuming limited resources, the 
greater the demand for these factors the greater the likelihood that a practice transfer 
will be unsuccessful. Causal ambiguity also prevents a firm from learning from its 
own experience and improving its performance over time (March and Olsen, 1975: 
Headberg, 1981, Huber, 1991) negatively impacting on the value of the experience 
gained during previous transfers of the same practice. In this case the previous 
transfer of a RBSIC from the source to other subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
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3.6.1.2 Unprovenness 
The second sub-variable is unprovenness. Individuals develop commitment to a 
practice to the extent that they see the value of the practice (Leonard-Barton, 1990 
(a)). It is easier to transfer a practice with a proven record of past usefulness. This 
suggests that it has value, making it easier to induce potential recipients to engage in 
the transfer. When a practice has not been proven and it value is unknown, potential 
recipients may be reluctant to engage in its recreation leading to increased difficulties 
with the transfer (Rogers, 1983; Lennox, 1999). This can be especially problematical 
when the new practice is regarded as controversial and / or places a high demand on a 
recipient's resources. However, there are cases when recipients are unable to see the 
value in a proven practice because they lack the prior related knowledge to appreciate 
how it can be beneficial. This is directly related to the absorptive capacity of the 
recipient (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In addition it is possible that the recipient can 
see the value of a practice but does not believe it is relevant to its circumstances 
(Feinstein, 2002). 
3.6.2 Characteristics of the Source of Practice 
3.6.2.1 Motivation 
The first sub-variable is motivation. The source's agent can assume two roles: First, 
allo\\ the recipient access to the practice through direct observation. This may lead to 
the transfer of information that is not relevant in this instance reducing the efficiency 
oI'the transfer process (Brooks, 199 5). Secondly, it can act the role of a gatekeeper 
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supplying the recipient with the knowledge regarding the practice that it deems 
appropriate. This raises the possibility that the information provided is insufficient 
for the recipient to institutionalise the practice. 
The motivation of the source of the practice to supply conceptions of the practice or to 
facilitate access to the recipient may influence the degree of difficulty of practice 
transfer (Szulanski, 2003: 27). A practice source may be reluctant to share crucial 
information for fear of losing ownership, and the leverage that ownership gives it 
inside the group, which may be reflected in status and responsibility. It may resent 
sharing its hard earned achievements and feel it is being inadequately rewarded for 
the effort that it made to create the practice originally. Also the requirement that the 
source participate in the transfer may lead to the redeployment of resources to the 
extent that it is unable to fulfil its primary function leading to a corresponding de- 
motivating affect on the source with regard to the transfer. The likelihood of a 
successful transfer will be increased if both the motivation for the institutionalisation 
of the practice is the same at both the source and the recipient (Szulanski, 1996). This 
will be easier to achieve if the source is able to provide the recipient with a 
satisfactory explanation of why the practice is to be undertaken. In the case of a 
RBSIC this would be to comply with Turnbull Guidelines and improve the 
performance of both the business unit and the entire company. 
3.6.2.2 Perceived Credibility of the Source of the Practice 
The second sub-variable is the perceived credibility of the source of the practice. If 
the source is seen as less than credible. then its knowledge may be regarded as less 
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valuable by the recipient, thereby negatively impacting the transfer process 
(Cummings, 2003: 30). If the source is seen as reliable, trust« orthy or 
knowledgeable, initiating a transfer from that source will be easier and the practice it 
transfers is less likely to be contested and opposed. This should increase the amount 
of information that is exchanged (Carley, 1991). The trust that exists between the two 
parties can lead to the development of social capital -a productive resource that 
facilitates actions between the source and the recipient (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998: 464) 
in this case increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the transfer (Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998: 472) of the RBSIC. The cost of the transfer should also be reduced 
(Currall and Judge, 1995: 151; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998: 152). A negative 
aspect of a credible source is that it may discourage the recipient from critical 
thinking due to its trust in the source (Petty and Cacioppo, 1996: 19); however, it is 
generally accepted that positive affects outweigh the negative by a considerable 
margin (Szulanski, 2003: 28). 
3.6.3 Characteristics of the Practice Recipient 
3.6.3.1 Motivation 
The first sub-variable is motivation. If the recipient is reluctant to accept a practice 
from an external source it may manifest itself in a number of ways (Zaltman, Duncan 
and Holbek, 1973). Including a deliberate policy of slow adoption which may include 
actions such as constant questioning of every stage of the transfer process, failure to 
provide sufficient resources or insufficient training of relevant staff. At it most 
extreme a recipient may refuse to participate in the transfer. Also the recipient may 
Derck Condon 89 04 `12 20O7 
implement the practice while not taking the measures necessary for internalisation 
ensuring that institutionalisation does not occur. This could lead to ceremonial 
adoption - the formal adoption of the RBSIC on the part of the recipient unit's 
employees for legitimacy reasons, without their believing in its real value to the 
organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Kostava and Roth, 2002: 220). 
The criteria used by headquarters to evaluate subsidiary performance are likely to 
influence what subsidiary / joint venture managers pay attention to and focus on in 
their operations (O'Donnell, 2000). The higher the perceived importance attached to 
transfer of a practice by headquarters, the greater the motivation at the recipient and 
the more likely a new practice will be successfully implemented (Björkman, Bamer- 
Rasmussen, and Li, 2004: 450). Therefore, if the recipient perceives that the 
institutionalisation of a RBSIC is not a priority at the source it is unlikely to be 
particularly motivated to institutionalise the practice. 
Other factors that may lead to the de-motivation of the recipient may include: The 
practice being transferred is perceived as a threat to its position either at a personal or 
organisational level; the recipient believes that a practice created outside the unit is of 
little value - what is often referred to as the `not invented here' syndrome; and the 
recipient feels the practice is a drain on resources that could be better used elsewhere. 
As stated previously the likelihood of a successful transfer will be increased if both 
the motivation for the institutionalisation of the practice is the same at both the source 
and the recipient (Szulanski, 1996). In addition Hamel (1991) observed that the 
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newness of knowledge could be a source of motivation for the recipient especially if it 
believes this new knowledge may offer `first-to-make' premiums. 
3.6.3.2 Absorptive Capacity 
The second sub-variable is absorptive capacity. A recipient unit might be unable to 
exploit a practice because it lacks the absorptive capacity to do so. Absorptive 
capacity is an example of how Contexts within which the Transfer Occurs can overlap 
with Factors that are Likely to Influence the Difficulty of Practice Transfer. Here the 
absorptive capacity variable is more closely linked with the practice being transferred 
than the organisational context. 
An organisations absorptive capacity will depend on the absorptive capacities of its 
individual members and its ability to exploit that combined capacity in relation to the 
practice being transferred (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 131). A lack of absorptive 
capacity is likely to slow the transfer and add to its costs increasing the likelihood of 
the transfer failing. This capacity is largely a function of the unit's pre-existing stock 
of knowledge (prior related knowledge) and is particularly relevant in determining its 
ability to value, assimilate and apply new practices successfully to commercial ends. 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989: 569; 1990: 128). 
Prior related knowledge is important because it shapes the way an organization 
differentiates between more and less relevant signals and also because it determines 
the organization's ability to assimilate the more valued signals (Cohen and Levinthal. 
1990). Relevant prior knowledge includes basic skills, a shared language, appropriate 
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experience, and up-to-date information on related knowledge areas (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990: 129; Galbraith, 1990: 66; Pennings and Harianto. 1992 (a): 356). 
Also of key importance is an awareness of the source of complementary expertise 
within and outside of the recipient unit (Nord and Tucker, 1987; Cohen and Levinthal. 
1990; Pennings and Harianto 1992(a), 1992(b)). An example of this would be 
members of the recipient unit knowing who can help with both the implementation 
and internalisation of the RBSIC both inside the recipient unit and at the source and 
other units within the group. 
The Turnbull guidelines allude to absorptive capacity when they state that all 
employees should have the necessary knowledge, skills, information and authority to 
establish, operate and monitor the system of internal control (Turnbull, 1999, para. 
19). 
Particularly relevant to the transfer of a specific practice Lane & Lubatkin (1998) 
found that a recipient that has a large knowledge gap between it and the source would 
be less likely to assimilate the source's knowledge. They developed the concept of 
relative absorptive capacity where it is the relative knowledge of the recipient with 
respect to the source's knowledge (i. e., the extent of the knowledge gap between the 
parties) that is important. This is also consistent with Dinur, et al. 's (1998) findings 
with respect to the need for two parties to have some alignment in terms of their 
knowledge to facilitate knowledge transfer. 
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3.6.3.3 Retentive Capacity 
The third sub-variable is retentive capacity. A transfer is only effective when the 
practice is retained and used when required (Kostova, 1999: 311). Evidence from 
research suggests this cannot be taken for granted (Glaser, et al. 1983, Rogers, 1983). 
The ability of a recipient to institutionalise the utilisation of new practice reflects its 
retentive capacity (Szulanski, 2003: 30). If this ability is lacking, initial difficulties 
during the integration of transferred practice may become an excuse for reverting 
back to the status quo. 
Retentive capacity is more likely to be developed when the transferred practice is 
used on a regular basis, losing its novelty becoming part of the recipient's standard 
operating procedures (Rogers, 1983; Zucker, 1977: 740). This is more likely if action 
is taken to discontinue the use of old practices (Glaser, Abelson and Garrison, 1983; 
Yin, 1979) in this instance the previous system of internal control, if there was one. 
The development of retentive capacity will also be influenced by the effectiveness of 
the early stages of the implementation process and the levels of on-going support 
provided by the source. Particularly important will be the degree to which the 
significance of the RBSIC and its role in the management of the MNE was explained 
to the recipient and to what extent the practice was documented allowing employees 
easy access to key information on the operation of the practice. 
In addition, commitment to the practice is likely to increase the probability that the 
recipient will retain and make use of the RBSIC (Mo\v, day,, Steers & Porter. 1979) 
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both initially and on an on-going basis and make the necessary level of investment to 
develop competence in using the practice (Leonard-Barton. 1990 (a)). 
3.6.4 Characteristics of the Context 
As characteristics of context overlaps with Contexts within which the Transfer Occurs 
for the purposes of this framework it has not been included in Factors that are Likely 
to Influence the Difficulty of Practice Transfer. 
3.6.4.1 Barren Organisational Context 
The first sub-variable is a barren organisational context. Intra-firm exchanges of 
practices are embedded in an organisational context, the characteristics of which may 
affect their gestation and evolution (Szulanski, 2003: 30). A transfer that is successful 
in one context may not be in another. An organisational context that facilitates the 
development of transfers is said to be fertile while one that does not is said to be 
barren. This strongly overlaps with the Kostova's organisational context within 
which the transfer occurs. 
3.6.4.2 Arduous Relationship 
The second sub-variable - arduous relationship has for the purposes of this research 
framework been included in relational context within which the transfer occurs. 
Derek Condon 94 04 11 201) 
3.7.0 The Likelihood of the Successful Institutionalisation of a Turnbull Based 
System of Internal Control 
Using the variables listed above a conceptual framework can be developed to predict 
the likelihood of an individual subsidiary or joint venture institutionalising a Turnbull 
based system of internal control. The position of a subsidiary or joint venture on a 
graph (Figure 3.5) with two multi-variance axis where the X-axis, contextual fit, 
refers to the fit between the RBSIC and the three variables - social, organisational and 
relational contexts within which the knowledge transfer between the MNE and the 
Figure 3.5 
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Likelihood of the Successful Institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
Ceremonial Institutionalisation 
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subsidiary / joint venture is embedded; and the Y-axis, internal stickiness, that refers 
to the variables that increase the difficulty of know ledge transfer between the `1'ß! E 
and the subsidiary / joint venture, that are directly related to the RBSIC, should 
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indicate the likelihood of a successful transfer of a Turnbull based system of internal 
control. 
The appropriate weighting for the individual variables would require further 
investigation beyond the scope of this research. 
Four patterns of adoption can be identified that reveal different levels of 
institutionalisation: 
Ceremonial Adoption - If a subsidiary / joint venture is situated where both contextual 
fit and internal stickiness are low it suggests there will be low levels of internalisation 
and relatively high levels of implementation. This has been referred to as Ceremonial 
Adoption (Kostova and Roth, 2002: 220). In this case institutionalisation will not be 
achieved. 
Institutionalisation - If a subsidiary /joint venture is situated where contextual fit is 
high and internal stickiness low it suggests there will be high levels of both 
internalisation and implementation and the RBSIC will be institutionalised. 
Subsidiaries /joint ventures are both able to implement the RBSIC while believing in 
and recognising its value to the business unit. 
Rejection - If a subsidiary /joint venture is situated where contextual 
fit is low and 
internal stickiness high it suggests there will be low levels of both internalisation and 
implementation. This suggests that institutionalisation of the practice in a subsidiary / 
joint venture will not occur as the recipient unit does not believe in or recognise the 
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value of the RBS1( and there may be insufficient capacity at the subsidiary /Joint 
venture to implement the practice even if this were not the case. 
Powerless Support - If a subsidiary /joint venture is situated where both contextual fit 
and internal stickiness are high it suggests there will be high levels of internalisation 
and low levels of implementation. The subsidiary /joint venture's employees believe 
in the value of the RBSIC but have failed to implement the practice. This may mean 
there is insufficient capability at the unit to permit its implementation. It also 
suggests that some degree of internalisation is possible without the successful 
implementation of the practice transferred. In this case institutionalisation will not be 
achieved. 
3.8.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework used in this research. It is 
grounded in a number of theoretical perspectives (e. g. socio-cultural, institutional) 
which underpin research in strategy transfer. In particular the theoretical approach is 
guided by the work of Kostova (1999) who effectively blends culturalism and 
institutionalism in examining the cross-national transfer of practices. To add greater 
analytical depth to Kostova's perspective, the current research employs Pettigrew's 
(1987) model for the analysis of strategic change. In this research change results from 
the transfer of an internal control system that follows the recommendations contained 
in the Turnbull guidelines. The transfer is considered from the perspective of the 
practice being transferred (Content), the context (Context) within which the transfer 
occurs in and factors that are likely to influence the difficulty of the practice transfer 
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(Process). This framework provided the theoretical and conceptual grounding for the 
research undertaken in the UK and Asia-Pacific region that is described in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY and METHODS 
4.0.0 Introduction 
The first part of this chapter will detail the scope of the research and introduce the 
philosophical underpinnings, methods, processes and data collection techniques used 
during this investigation. The remainder of the chapter will describe the research 
process and the experiences of the researcher. 
4.1.0 Scope of Research 
The principle method of data collection was semi-structured interviews with senior 
management based in the Asia-Pacific region. Using the interviews combined with 
documentation provided by the companies two case studies' have been developed - 
one main case study, comprising of eight embedded case studies (Yin, 2003: 39-46) - 
Excelsior and a supporting case studies consisting of two embedded case studies - 
Landmark. Further data were provided by interviews with directors, corporate 
governance officers and managers based in the UK and Asia-Pacific region, who were 
not directly connected with the two companies. These interviews were used to gain 
extra information in what are politically sensitive areas of research. In addition, 
secondary sources including academic papers, books and news services ýý ere used as 
archived material to enrich the data and its context. They also served to validate 
partially the main interviews with key informants. 
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4.2.0 Choice of Research Methodology 
Research methods, whether qualitative or quantitative, cannot be chosen solely in the 
abstract, because the choice and adequacy of a method embodies a variety of 
assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge and the methods through which this 
knowledge can be obtained, as well as a set of root assumptions about the nature of 
the phenomena to be investigated (Morgan & Smircich, 1980: 491). This section will 
consider the characteristics of the current research and discuss how these help guide 
the choice of research methods employed for this study. 
4.2.1 The Theoretical Orientation of the Study 
The two paradigms, positivism and social constructivism, represent two opposing 
approaches to the study of social science phenomena. Positivist approaches to the 
social sciences claim the label `scientific' and are mostly (but not exclusively) 
associated with quantitative approaches to data collection and analysis. Positivists 
assume phenomena can be studied as objective facts, measured as discrete variables, 
and any relationships between these variables can be established as generalizable 
scientific laws (Smith, 1998: 77). Social constructionism has developed during the 
last fifty years largely as a reaction to the application of positivism to social sciences 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 29). It is largely associated with qualitative approaches 
to research and is one of a group of philosophical perspectives that Habermas (1970) 
referred to as interpretive methods. It is based on the ontological assumption that 
For reasons of confidentiality the names of the companies involved in the study cannot be revealed. 
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reality is subjective, socially constructed and determined by people rather than by 
objective and external forces. 
The positivist view with its ontological position that reality is external and objective 
combined with an epistemological assumption that knowledge is only of significance 
if it is based on observations of this external reality is inappropriate for the purposes 
of this research. Management actions in subsidiaries and joint ventures are not always 
observable in an objective way, while social processes are rarely reducible to absolute 
laws. The emphasis of this research is on identifying, understanding and explaining 
to what extent the RBSIC has been institutionalised in the Asia-Pacific based 
subsidiaries and joint ventures of UK listed companies, and what are the factors that 
explain the degree of institutionalisation, rather than developing universal laws to 
explain the relative success or failure of the transfer of the practice in general. Unlike 
the standard positivist approach this research will not be emphasising the importance 
of reducing the units of analysis to their smallest terms but will be more concerned 
with analysing the `whole' situation. It will be focusing on a relatively small number 
of subsidiaries and joint ventures and will not be using samples that are large enough 
for inferences to be made about the wider population by demonstrating causality or 
association through statistical analysis. 
For the purposes of this research the social constructionist view, with its interpretivist 
approach, is also unsuitable. Its epistemological position that the task of the social 
scientist should be to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that people 
place upon their experience, focusing on how individual organisation members 
construct meaning (Blau &' Schoenherr, 1971), does not allow for the consideration of 
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the role of what may be termed objective and external factors such as the operating 
environment faced by the subsidiaries and joint ventures. This research is based on 
the premise that subsidiaries and joint ventures are also influenced by an external 
objective environment that has observable consequences for their operations. In this 
sense, the research examines both agency and structure. 
Agency could be seen as a constituent element of how managers made sense of and 
spoke about phenomena. They spoke in terms of 'making sense' of the practice and its 
transfer implying that the socially constructed nature of the phenomenon could not be 
ignored. However, at the same time, they spoke of external events and factors (such 
as local corporate governance rules and standards) as objective phenomena which also 
impacted upon their actions and decisions. This `objective' structure also had to taken 
into account. Such a combination of agency and structure presents researchers with a 
problem, since neither positivist nor social constructionist approaches are wholly 
adequate either in reflecting theoretical orientation or relevant data. As Whittington 
(1989: 77) argues, "the plural and contradictory nature of the social structures 
embodied within the firm preclude unambiguous determination and allows sufficient 
autonomy for actors to choose which powers to use and how". Hence we can argue 
that relationships between agency and structure are likely to be fluid and probably 
mutually constitutive. 
This confronts the researcher with something of a dilemma in the choice of research 
methods, given that the capture of both agency and structure is essential. Social 
structures provide the resources and context , vithin which actors can exercise choices 
hct\\ cen alternatives which arc presented to them. Both structure and agency must be 
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captured by the researcher. As Bryman and Bell (2003: 468-470) argue. one of the 
ways in which this dilemma can be resolved (to an extent) is through the use of 
critical realism proposed and described by Bhaskar (1975). He argues that reality 
exists in three overlapping domains (see Figure 4.1) - empirical (experiences or 
observed events), actual (events whether observed or not) and real (underlying 
tendencies or mechanisms which may in a given situation give rise to events or may 
lie dormant, being cancelled out by other forces). Therefore, we should not reduce all 
events to those that are observed, and we should not reduce enduring causal 
mechanisms to events (Mingers, 2000). From the critical realists' perspective, reality 
exists independently of humans and is stratified. At the same time, social structures 
do not exist independently of the activities they govern or of the agents' conceptions 
of what they are doing, and are localised in both space and time. 
Figure 4.1 
Bhaskar's Three Overlapping Domains of Reality in the Critical Realist Ontology (Source: Partington, D. 2000) 
REAL ACTUAL 
DOMAIN DOMAIN 
Tendencies whether Events 
exercised or whether 
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EMPIRICAL 
DOMAIN 
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events . 
Such a critical realist perspective allows the assumption that contexts"stimuli, 
meanings/cognitive processes and responses/behaviours can be treated as objective 
element in the study, whilst other elements may be accessible only through the 
subjective accounts of managers and other organisational actors. Finally. other 
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elements may only be uncovered through researcher speculation over casual 
tendencies, demanding further enquiry and verification (Partington, 2000: 98). 
Given the orientation of the present study, critical realism seems a sensible and 
defensible choice of research orientation. For example, the research could identify 
relatively objective elements such as organisational structures, training, formal risk 
identification procedures and subsidiary /joint venture perfonnance, as well as the 
nature and frequency of interactions between subsidiary and joint venture 
stakeholders (including employees, managers, parents, and the regulatory authorities). 
Other contextual elements included the political, legal, economic, cultural and 
historical environment within which the subsidiaries and joint ventures operate. 
At the same time, managers in subsidiaries and joint ventures make choices (over for 
example how far to adopt procedures and codes of practice which emanate from 
Headquarters) and capturing both the nature and the characteristics of these choices 
lies beyond the purview of `objective'study. The need is also to capture meaning, 
interpretations and actions of individual managers in the subsidiaries in making, as 
Whittington (1989) argued, autonomous choices between seemingly objective 
alternatives presented to them. Codes and practices may seem at first sight to be 
`objective' but their interpretation and implementation in various contexts (such as 
subsidiaries) are as much influenced by socially constructed perspectives as they are 
by rules, codes and `objective' measures. A critical realist perspective would seem to 
capture both the objective and the subjective by accepting neither a constructionist nor 
an objective ontology, arguing instead that the seemingly objective world of 
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organizations and their managers is influenced and changed through the practice of 
daily interpretation and life (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 468). 
4.2.2 Research Methodology 
Given the underlying ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this research, 
the qualitative research process, where the researcher, who speaks from a particular 
class, gender, racial, cultural, and ethnic community perspective, approaches the 
subject of investigation with a set of ideas, which lead to a theoretical framework, 
which in turn generates a set of questions that are analysed in specific ways (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000: 18), is the most appropriate for this investigation. 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the researcher in the world. It 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000: 3). Qualitative research places an emphasis on the qualities of 
entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined and 
measured. The particular strength of qualitative research, for both researchers and 
practitioners, is its ability to focus on actual practice in context, looking at how 
organisations are routinely enacted (Silverman, 1998: 3) this is particularly suitable 
for the research being undertaken. Qualitative methods can give a deeper 
understanding of the underlying processes taking place inside an organisation (King, 
1996: 174) whereas purely quantitative research may neglect the social and cultural 
construction of the variables studied (Silverman, 1998: 4). 
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The processes and mechanisms being researched in this investigation occur in a 
specific context that will vary from business unit to business unit as the contexts 
within which the transfer occurs and the factors that influence the difficulty of transfer 
differ. By using qualitative methods and research strategies, primarily semi- 
structured interviews, textual analysis and case studies (sections 4.5.0 - 4.6.10). this 
research is able to capture some of the richness and depth of frequently complex 
organisational structures generating insights into the factors that have influenced the 
degree to which the RBSIC has been institutionalised. 
4.3.0 Research Access 
The biggest problem likely to confront a researcher analysing issues relating to 
corporate governance is that of access. Unsurprisingly, companies are very reluctant 
to share any information relating to their corporate governance practices beyond the 
limited statements made in their annual reports. This section will consider some of 
the potential issues that are most likely to result in difficulty in gaining access to UK 
companies' Asia-Pacific based subsidiaries and international joint ventures when 
researching into the institutionalisation of a RBSIC. Where appropriate reference will 
be made to the actual difficulties faced by the researcher. A detailed description of 
the access difficulties that arose during this research is contained in section 4.6.2. 
Derek Condon 106 0412/2007 
4.3.1 Initial Approach 
A researcher's initial approach to a company or individual to request research access 
will play a key role in the likelihood of receiving a positive response. This is 
particularly important in a sensitive area such as corporate governance where the 
decision to permit access to a company will be taken at the highest levels of the 
organisation. An unsolicited letter explaining the project and requesting access sent 
to an individual, or in the case of a company, the Chief Executive or Chief Financial 
Officer is unlikely to be favourably received and may not even get a response. The 
researcher is more likely to be successful if an introduction is made through an 
intermediary who is known to the company's senior management and can vouch for 
the integrity of the researcher. Finding someone who can act in this role is one of the 
challenges faced by the researcher when commencing a new project, possible avenues 
include university colleagues (students and faculty) who may have appropriate 
connections, professional relationships developed previously either on other research 
projects or at a time when the researcher was involved in a different career, and 
personal contacts. In this project the researcher was able to use a former work 
colleague to make introductions for him. 
4.3.2 Access and Corporate Sensitivity 
Given the high profile attached to corporate governance following the collapse of 
Enron in 2001, and the subsequent failures of other large companies, the topic has 
become increasingly high profile and sensitive in nature. This has made companies 
increasingly reluctant to provide access to researchers who may uncover information 
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that could be potentially embarrassing. Those companies that are prepared to grant 
access are more likely to require researchers to sign confidentiality agreements that 
bar the use of certain information they may regard as too sensitive for publication. 
They may also insist that it is not possible to identify the company from any 
documents (academic papers, books, etc. ) that may be published relating to the 
research. This may limit the value of the company as a research subject unless the 
confidentiality agreement is carefully drafted enabling both parties to achieve their 
objectives. 
4.3.3 The Stance of the Researcher toward the Subject of the Research 
UK listed companies are required by the Combined Code to include in their annual 
report a statement that the board has conducted a review of the effectiveness of the 
company's system of internal control. The Turnbull guidelines were designed to 
provide companies with recommendations on how to design and implement such a 
system. The statement normally gives a brief summary of how the system of internal 
control operates and includes a paragraph similar to the examples shown below: 
There is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluating and managing the significant 
risks faced by the Group. This process has been in place throughout the year under 
rcvietii' and up to the date of approval of the Annual Report and Financial Statements 
and accords with the Turnbull guidance. The effectiveness of the process is reviewed 
annualll, by the Audit Committee which then reports to the Board. 
Sainsbury PLC` . Annual 
Report and Financial Statement, 2004: 11 
2 J. Sainsbury PLC and Smith & \epheýýw PLC are not among the companies used in this study 
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In 2003, an independent assessment was carried out of the risk management 
framework established bi the Group. This confirmed that the risk management si'stc'n 
in place complied with the guidance in the Turnbull Report, a guidance report issued 
by The Institute of Chartered Accounts in England and Wales to assist companies 
listed on the official list of the London Stock Exchange to implement the requirements 
of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 
Smith & Nephew' Annual Report & Accounts, 2003: 49 
By investigating the extent of institutionalisation of the Turnbull guidelines the 
researcher may be seen by the company as challenging the validity of the statement 
that appears in their annual report with regard to internal control. Companies may 
become concerned that should it become public knowledge that a researcher's 
findings are not consistent with the annual report that they may have to justify their 
position to the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
4.3.4 Operating Procedures 
Companies may see their system of internal control as a source of competitive 
advantage and may not be prepared to allow a researcher access to the system fearing 
that other companies may be able to copy their approach should the researcher reveal 
too much about its workings. The researcher failed to gain access to one of his target 
companies for this reason (see section 4.6.2). 
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4.3.5 Access to Senior Personnel 
Research into corporate governance frequently requires access to a company's senior 
management. Senior staff normally have very busy schedules commensurate with 
their level of responsibility. This can lead to problems in scheduling meetings even 
when a general agreement to permit access has been reached. In this investigation the 
researcher frequently found that executives were unwilling to commit themselves to 
interviews more than two weeks in advance and when interviews were scheduled 
further ahead they would often be rearranged sometimes at short notice. This added 
both to the logistical and financial burden faced by the researcher who was often 
travelling long distances to meet with the interviewee. 
4.3.6 Overseas Research 
When a large part of a research project is undertaken overseas, in the subsidiaries and 
joint ventures of a company, a number of difficulties can arise. First, although 
permission for research has been granted by the company's headquarters based 
management the approval of senior management at the regional and local level is also 
normally required. This may be time consuming and require a considerable amount 
of explanation as to the purpose of the research to assuage any fears local 
management may have about the affect it could have on the their own position and the 
business unit in general. Once access has been granted difficulties may arise 
scheduling interviews with appointments becoming harder to arrange especially if 
they are more than a few weeks in the future (see section -1.3.5) 
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Secondly, overseas research with the travel and accommodation costs it involves can 
be costly and most researchers are operating within a limited budget. This can cause 
problems when the researcher is trying to arrange his or her schedule in the most cost 
effective manner and companies are unable to work within the same schedule. This 
can lead to the researcher, who is normally in a very weak bargaining position, having 
to compromise resulting in either or both additional costs and meetings with different 
people than originally planned. 
Thirdly, generally the researcher will only be able to spend a certain amount of time 
in the region due to both cost and time constraints. Also while in the region the 
researcher will need to arrange accommodation and access to necessary facilities - 
office space, Email, research facilities. This can often be arranged, at least in part, 
through a local university. However, the researcher needs to be aware for much of the 
time they will be operating a long distance from their home base and may need to rely 
to a greater extent than normal on their own resources. 
Fourthly, language and cultural differences can also lead to difficulties. It may be 
necessary to arrange for an interpreter to be present at interviews and the nature of 
interviews may need to be adapted to fit with the local culture. In some countries to 
commence the interview immediately without first spending some time talking about 
yourself and finding out about the person being interviewed would be regarded as 
rude and insensitive. 
In this research difficulties included the possibility of the project being cancelled 
following, internal disagreement at the regional headquarters level as to whether the 
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research should be permitted. This was a result of poor internal communication that 
failed to make all of the interested parties aware of the planned research. This was 
only resolved after the successful intervention of UK based headquarters staff. The 
scheduling of interviews also proved difficult with executives unwilling to commit 
themselves more than a few days in advance adding considerably to the researchers 
travel expenses. Also, although the researcher did not encounter any language 
difficulties different cultural attitudes to the research primarily associated with `trust 
issues' required longer interviews where considerable effort was made to allay any 
concerns the interviewee may have regarding the purpose of the research. 
4.3.7 Lack of Understanding 
Although the researcher often believes their area of research to be of interest, and 
would expect the company to be knowledgeable about the subject, this is not always 
the case. Corporate governance is a poorly understood area in many companies often 
seen as the responsibility of the company secretariat, finance department or internal 
audit, and even then a very specific section of those departments. This can lead to 
misunderstandings about the planned research or the subject itself by the people who 
control access. An example of this was provided by the Finance Director of a 
company approached to provide research access. He sent the researcher a personal 
letter saying: 
4s you will appreciate Turnbull is driven by risk identification and materiality. Here 
at ***** our. I SE: -l N businesses, which are purely selling companies, don't come on 
to our Turnhirll r-atlar . ýcrc'c'n 
because of their size. Japan accounts for- 6, ') of ýýrrr- 
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sales, and the remaining ASEAN businesses only ? '' ,. Our Turnbull risks and 
responsibilities are virtually, all centred on our principal development and 
manufacturing sites in the US and the UK, and our UK Head Office. 
Thus I really don't think it would be worth your and our while, to pursue your 
research through ***** 
This letter demonstrated a lack of understanding of the Turnbull process itself given 
that Japan and the ASEAN region represented sales of £94.3 million3 in fiscal year 
2003. An amount that is surely material to the company. 
4.4.0 Data Gathering 
The principle data collection method used in this research was a semi-structured 
interview. In this section the reasons for using this approach to data gathering will be 
discussed. Consideration will also be given to the sources of data used to support the 
semi-structured interviews. 
4.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Kvale (1996: 5) defines a semi-structured interview as: 
an intervieiv whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of the 
interviewt t' with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena. " 
Most recent annual report 
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It can provide the `time-constrained' researcher with a more immediate way to 
develop an understanding of what is happening than would be the case if he or she 
were to simply observe behaviour (Robson, 2002: 272). 
A semi-structured interview is neither an open conversation where there is a risk that 
the interviewee will only discuss issues of personal interest nor a highly structured 
questionnaire administered by the interviewer where the same questions are asked of 
all the interviewees, and there is a possibility that the interviewer will impose their 
own reference frame upon the discussion (Blaxter et al, 2001: 171). Structured 
interviews may also lack the flexibility necessary to allow the views of the 
interviewee to be explored while open conversations lack the structure necessary for 
comparability. 
By using the semi-formal guided approach adopted in semi-structured interviews, 
where the interview is conducted according to an interview guide that focuses on 
certain themes that may include suggested questions, the researcher has some control 
over the direction of the interview (introducing an element of bias), ensuring a level 
of consistency over all of the interviews, while encouraging the interviewee to discuss 
a topic freely and bring forward issues they find important, providing a more vivid 
account of their personal experiences (Burgess, 1982: 107, Kvale, 1996: 34). 
The purpose of the semi-structured interview in this research was to elicit a 
description and understanding of the central themes experienced by the subjects 
relating to the transfer of a RBSIC allowing the interviewer to describe and 
understand the central themes at both a factual and meaning level. The subject 
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describes as precisely as possible what they experience and feel, and how then act. 
The focus is on nuanced descriptions that depict the qualitative diversity, the many 
differences and varieties of a phenomenon, rather than ending up «ith fixed 
categorizations (Kvale, 1996: 32). On the basis of extensive and rich descriptions of 
specific situations from the interviewees the interviewer will be able to arrive at 
meanings on another level. The aim of the interview is not to end up with 
unequivocal and quantifiable meanings on the theme in focus. What matters is to 
describe precisely the possible ambiguous and contradictory meanings expressed by 
the interviewee reflecting contradictions in the world the subject lives in (Kvale, 
1996: 34). 
As is the case with all research methods a number of limitations have been identified 
in using semi-structured interviews. They include the possibility that a lack of 
standardisation can raise concerns about reliability. The risk that the questions reflect 
the biases of the interviewer to the extent that the data gained is flawed. The short 
exposure to the interviewee prevents the researcher from gaining a full understanding 
of their views leading to answers that can be of questionable validity. It is the 
responsibility of the interviewer to reduce the likelihood that these problems will 
occur. 
For the purposes of this research it was agreed with all parties that interviews would 
not be tape recorded as it was felt that taping would be regarded as intrusive (Robson, 
2002: 289) and most participants would be more inhibited in their opinions when 
being recorded (Walsham & Sahay, 1999: 43), this was most likely to occur in the 
lower trust Asian societies where there was insufficient time to develop relationships 
Derek Condon I 15 ()4 12 `2007 
with the interviewees (Fukuyama, 1995, Thorelli, 1986) and where suspicion 
regarding the research process was likely to be greater. Also it was suggested that 
senior management at the companies were uncomfortable with the existence of taped 
records of the meetings. 
During all of the interviews the researcher made detailed notes, in all cases, these 
were written up with in 24 hours of the interview. In addition field notes were 
produced covering the researcher's experiences and data gathered in each subsidiary 
or joint venture. 
4.4.2 Other Data Sources 
Other sources of data that are available to complement and support the semi- 
structured interviews used in this research include field notes written after every 
company visit; company documents - procedures manuals, board papers, ethical 
codes, risk assessment documents, financial reports and internal memos; corporate 
governance documents - produced by the relevant regulatory body and other external 
sources; academic publications - books and papers; and texts produced by news 
services and the mass media. 
The data gained from analysis of these documents provide a method of triangulating 
and cross-checking some of the interview data, supporting or questioning its validity. 
However, it should be noted that there is always a possibility of bias in documentary 
data. Company documents may reflect the agenda of the author highlighting strengths 
while underplaying, weaknesses. Corporate governance documents are pronc to 
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promote the benefits of the procedures they are recommending while understating the 
disadvantages and academic papers and books are likely to reflect the position of their 
author. 
4.5.0 Case Studies 
The data gathered in the semi-structured interviews combined with textual analysis 
was used to develop one main case study, containing eight embedded case studies and 
one smaller supporting cases containing two embedded cases. In this section the 
reasons for using the approach will be discussed. 
For the purposes of this research a case study is defined as: 
A strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
context are not clear. (Robson, 2002: 178; Yin, 2003: 13) 
A case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). It is used to consider 
contextual conditions - believing that they might be highly pertinent to the 
phenomenon of study (Yin, 2003: 13). It is not a method; it is a choice of what is to 
be studied that can use a variety of methods, either singularly or together (Stake, 
2000: 435). It is empirical as it relies on the collection of data about what is going, on 
in a particular case. Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as 
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archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations. The evidence may be 
qualitative, quantitative, or both (Eisenhardt, 1989: 535). 
A case is focused on a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin. 
2003), it is a specific, unique, bounded and integrated system with working parts 
(Stake, 2000: 436). When developing a case particular attention will be paid to the 
nature of the case, the case's historical background, the physical setting, other 
contexts (e. g economic, political, and aesthetic), and the informants through whom 
the case can be known (Stake, 2000: 438). A case is not independent of interpretive 
paradigm or methods of inquiry. Seen from different worldviews and in different 
situations, the `same' case is different (Stake, 2000: 449). 
Yin (2003: 3) distinguishes between three types of uses for case study research - 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Kjellen and Soderman (1980: 30 - 36) refer 
to two other types of uses - theory generation and initiating change. This study, in 
line with Gummesson (2000: 86), believes it hard to consider these uses in isolation. 
Exploratory studies as well as descriptions can be theory generating, descriptions may 
be explanatory, and so forth (Gummesson, 2000: 86). Therefore, a more holistic 
approach has been adopted where detailed observations by the researcher make it 
possible to study the phenomenon from different aspects, examining them in relation 
to one another while viewing the practice within its total environment. 
As previously stated this research is centred on one main case Excelsior. The 
justification for researching a single case is usually made in terms of richer, deeper, 
thicker, more holistic descriptions of a particular situation that reveal a new 
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phenomenon, test particular concepts or frameworks or provide explanations of 
particular events (Easton, 2003: 11). However, this approach is questioned by many 
academic researchers who are supportive of the study of case studies only if there is a 
clear expectation of generalizability to other cases (Denzin, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Herriott & Firestone, 1983; Yin, 2003). They promote the belief that intrinsic 
case studies4 are not as important as instrumental case studies, from which 
generalisations can be derived. 
Yin (2003: 39 - 46) identifies four types of case study design, the underlying 
dimensions being single v. multiple cases and unitary unit of analysis v. multiple units 
of analysis. This research uses the approach he calls a single-case (embedded) design 
this refers to a single case where attention is given to more than one unit of analysis. 
The sub-units or embedded cases can often add significant opportunities for extensive 
analysis and comparison, enhancing the insights into a single case (Yin, 2003: 46). In 
the case of Excelsior, one organisation is being studied but eight subunits (embedded 
cases) are being analysed - Asia-Pacific Headquarters, Australia, Japan, People's 
Republic of China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. They are clearly 
identifiable units of analysis within the case boundary and can be regarded as eight 
case studies within an overall case study (Eason, 2003: 12). 
A case study report can be written up in many ways (Robson, 2002: 511). Following 
Langley (1999) in this project the researcher is obliged to combine historical data 
' The intrinsic case stuck, is undertaken when a researcher has a desire to gain a better understanding of 
a particular case. The case itself is of interest. (Stake, 1995,2000) 
`. \ case is an in. sn-ume»tnl ca. vc studs- when research is undertaken because of the need for general 
understanding gained through insight provided by the study of a particular case. The case is examined 
mainly to provide insight into an issue or redraw a generalisation. The case is of secondar\ interest, it 
plays a supporti\ e role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else. (. Stake, 1995,2000) 
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collected through the analysis of documents and retrospective inter% ic\t s with current 
data collected in real time. While the first type of data is sparse and synthetic, 
focusing on memorable moments and broad trends, the second is richer and finer 
grained (Leonard-Barton, 1990 (b)). Pettigrew's longitudinal contextual case study, 
which complements his model for the analysis of change (see 3.2.0) providing the 
opportunity to examine continuous processes in context where processes are defined a 
sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over 
time (Pettigrew, 1997: 338), was not appropriate for this study given the short period 
of time between the introduction of the RBSIC and the data gathering phase. The 
term `case study', therefore, in the current research does not imply any longitudinal 
dimension. Partly, this is because of the short period between the introduction of the 
RBSIC and the data collection. More importantly, it should be noted that the axes of 
Pettigrew's triangle (content, context and process) are utilised in this research as key 
labels under which characteristics of the transfer process may be described. There is 
no attempt to try and examine the development and inter-relation of the constructs 
over time (as in a `pure' longitudinal study). The cases are descriptive of operations 
and the current state of play in the sample organisations. Nevertheless, the questions 
asked in the semi-structured interviews and the analysis of the data corresponds to the 
three constructs of content, context and process. Therefore, in this study each case 
study commences with a brief description of the company followed by a review of the 
operation of the RBSIC in the company. It then goes on to describe each of the Asia- 
Pacific business units involved in the study including a discussion on the operation of 
the RBSIC in the organisation and the degree to managers involved vl ith the practice 
believe it is institutionalised in the operations of the business unit. 
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4.6.0 Research Process 
This section will consider the research process undertaken during this investigation 
commencing with an acknowledgement of my personal interest in the subject, moving 
on to data gathering and analysis. 
4.6.1 Personal Interest and Research Relevance 
My personal interest in this research topic comes from my previous experience of 
working in a UK listed company's Asia-Pacific and North American based joint 
ventures and subsidiaries. During this time I held a number of senior positions, 
including managing director, which gave me the opportunity to observe the 
difficulties faced by the parent company when trying to transfer an organisational 
practice relating to internal control to a subsidiary /joint venture. This was 
particularly apparent in the Asia-Pacific region. Since this time the importance of 
internal control as part of the corporate governance agenda has grown considerably 
following a number of high profile corporate scandals commencing with Enron in 
2001. Inside the Asia-Pacific region the importance of corporate governance had 
already been highlighted when it was identified as one of main causes of 1997 Asian 
economic crisis (ADB, 2000). To date very little research has been undertaken with 
regard to the transfer of corporate governance practices by UK listed companies to 
their Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures. Given the growing importance of 
the region and the growing debate on internal control in listed companies I believe 
this is a topic worthy of further research. 
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4.6.2 Access 
Following the identification of the key research questions (see Chapter 1), in June 
2002, the first task faced by the researcher was to organise access to the headquarters 
and Asia-Pacific based subsidiaries and joint ventures of a sufficient number of 
appropriate UK listed companies. 
After a search of the annual reports of over one hundred UK listed companies twenty 
were identified as suitable research subjects. This was based on the size of the 
business they had in the Asia-Pacific region and whether their operations in the region 
were structured as subsidiaries and joint ventures. Letters requesting access and 
outlining the research process were sent either to the Chief Executive Officer / 
Managing Director or Chief Financial Officer / Finance Director of each company 
depending who was deemed the most appropriate. Of the twenty all declined to 
participate in the study. 
In July, 2003, following the failure of the initial access strategy a new approach was 
tried. An introduction was made on behalf of the researcher by an intermediary who 
was known to the company's senior management and could vouch for the integrity of 
the researcher. Four companies were approached in this fashion. 
The first introduction made through Warwick Business School put the researcher in 
contact with the Marketing Director of a major UK company; he passed the details on 
to the company's Finance Director who asked the Head of Group Audit to contact the 
researcher. This led to a meeting in September 2003 at the company's corporate 
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headquarters. What followed was an embarrassing experience for both sides. Upon 
the completion of the usual pleasantries, where shared interests were identified6, the 
Head of Group Audit, accompanied by one of his managers, explained that he was not 
sure of the reason for the researchers visit as they had lost the relevant documentation. 
When it was explained to him, he responded that given the confidential nature of the 
subject and the company's belief that their system of internal control played a key role 
in their competitive strength, he was sure the Board would not support the project and 
the company would be unable to provide any assistance to the researcher. 
The other three introductions to Excelsior, Landmark and Peninsula? were made 
through a former work associate of the researcher who serves on a number of boards 
in a non-executive capacity. Arrangements were made to contact the Finance 
Directors of all three companies with the objective of explaining the aims of the 
study, how it could benefit the companies that participate in it and getting permission 
to undertake research at their UK headquarters and Asia-Pacific businesses. 
4.6.2.1 Excelsior 
The researcher had a lengthy telephone conversation with the Finance Director of 
Excelsior at the end of July, 2003. During this conversation he agreed to provide the 
researcher with access to both headquarters and Asia-Pacific personnel. although in 
the case of Asia-Pacific the agreement of the regional Chief Executive would also be 
required. He also stated his expectation that the findings of the research would 
° Both the researcher and the Group Audit Manager supported the same football team and had seats 
relatively close together. 
For reasons of confidentiality the real names of the companies cannot be revealed. 
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provide Excelsior with valuable data. It was agreed that the next step was for the 
researcher to meet the Head of Group Audit who was responsible for the RBSIC 
throughout the company and would be the researcher's main point of contact with 
kxcelsior. Following an exchange of Emails between the researcher and Head of 
Group Audit a meeting was arranged at the beginning of September, 2003. 
4.6.2.2 Landmark 
The researcher met with the Finance Director of Landmark during September, 2003, 
he agreed to grant the researcher access and provide a list of names of the relevant 
personnel in the UK he should meet with. Included in this list was the Director of 
International Market Development who would arrange access to Landmark's 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong joint ventures. The first meeting at the Landmark 
corporate headquarters was scheduled for mid-October, 2003 with the Group Director 
of Risk Management and the Group Manager of Risk Management who would 
explain how the Turnbull guidelines were followed in Landmark. 
4.6.2.3 Peninsula 
The meeting with the Finance Director of Peninsula took longer to arrange, than was 
the case with the previous two companies, taking place in mid-November, 2003. At 
the meeting it was agreed the researcher could undertake research in Peninsula's 
Japanese subsidiary. A meeting was also arranged for December, 2003, with the 
Head of Group Audit, who would explain how the compa»` followed the Turnbull 
recommendations and ho\N they operated in Japan from the headquarters perspecti\ e. 
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4.6.3 Access Summary 
Despite considerable difficulties all three companies were suitable research subjects 
because all they had a UK stock market listing, operated business units in the Asia- 
Pacific region and although at different stages in the implementation of the RBSIC 
had clearly stated their commitment to the practice and their intention for it to become 
institutionalised throughout the organisation. 
Gummesson (2000: 25) described gaining access as the researcher's number one 
problem. This was clearly the case in this research both in terms of gaining access 
and also meeting with the appropriate informants who could provide the depth and 
quality of data required. In line with the experience of Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 
72) the researcher found that initial requests for access by an unsolicited letter were 
unsuccessful and personal introductions were needed for access requests to be 
considered. However, the researcher saw little to support Easterby-Smith et al's 
(2002: 71) suggestion that there was a growing acceptance of the value of in-company 
research projects - possibly because a growing number of middle managers have been 
to business schools themselves. 
The researcher was fortunate that his initial point of contact at the companies that 
agreed to his request for access were all main board executive directors with a 
sufficient level of authority to be able to grant access without the need to refer the 
decision to higher management levels. Although, in two cases, Landmark and 
Peninsula, the researcher was told that the main board in both companies had been 
made aware of his research. This differs from the experience of many researchers 
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whose initial point of contact is a manager with insufficient autonomy to authorise the 
research, who has to be convinced of its value, so that she or he in turn can `sell' the 
proposal to senior management who will ultimate grant or refuse access (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 2002; Gummesson, 2000). 
Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 72) state that access is more likely to be granted if the 
project does not appear to be politically sensitive, the researcher and his or her 
institution has a good reputation and time and resources requested are minimal. This 
is supported by Robson (2002: 378) who highlights the difficulties researchers can 
incur when analysing politically sensitive issues and by Blaxter et al. (2001: 155) who 
recommend researchers keep the initial requests for time and resources to the 
minimum. 
This research only met one of the three criteria listed above the reputation of the 
researcher was vouched for by his former work colleague and the excellent reputation 
of the institution - Warwick Business School - was also well known to all of the 
companies. The other two criteria were clearly not met. The research involved a 
highly politically sensitive topic and the researcher felt it was inappropriate, as well as 
impractical, to mislead the companies as to the substantial level of resources and time 
the project would require from them. 
Finally, the researcher made clear to the companies the benefits that could be gained 
from allowing the research to take place and agreed to provide the individual 
companies with a report detailing his findings. By demonstrating the clear value of 
the project to the companies involved the researcher was fulfilling another key 
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requirement for as access identified by many academics including Blaxter et al. ? OOl; 
Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Gummesson, 2000; and Robson 2002. 
4.6.4 Confidentiality 
For all three companies arrangements were made for confidentiality agreements to be 
put in place that guaranteed the anonymity of the companies and the individuals 
interviewed. These were signed by both parties before data gathering commenced. It 
was also agreed that the data gathered could be used in any future papers the 
researcher may publish. Given the nature of this research, the inability of the 
researcher to name the companies and individuals involved, or describe in detail the 
operations of the companies, will have no detrimental impact on the research findings. 
4.6.5 National University of Singapore 
While access was being agreed with Excelsior, Landmark and Peninsula the 
researcher visited Singapore to make arrangements with the National University of 
Singapore (NUS) to be based at the university as a Visiting Scholar for the first six 
months of 2004. This would provide the researcher with office space, computing and 
research facilities. Singapore's location and outstanding air links also simplified the 
task of travelling around the region. Arrangements were also made to provide the 
researcher with university accommodation. 
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4.6.6 Initial UK Based Data Gathering 
The initial meetings at the three companies were to serve as pilot interviews where the 
feasibility of the research project could be tested, question refined and arrangements 
made for visiting their Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
4.6.6.1 Excelsior 
During a meeting held in September, 2003 the Head of Group Audit identified 
business units the researcher could visit in the Asia-Pacific region. It was also agreed 
that the Head of Group Audit would contact the Chief Executive of the Asia-Pacific 
region to obtain his permission for the research to be undertaken. This was given in 
October. 
The Head of Group Audit explained the role of the RBSIC in Excelsior and how it 
had been introduced throughout the Asia-Pacific region. He also gave the researcher 
a number of relevant documents relating to the RBSIC and the company's ethical 
policy (Appendix 2). 
Another meeting took place the following month with the Group Audit Manager 
responsible for the RBSIC outside of the UK. During this meeting the researcher and 
the Group Audit Manager discussed the practice and the main issues relating to the 
transfer of the RBSIC to the company's Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
The researcher was also given copies of documents that are produced for Excelsior's 
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main board identifying the principal risks faced by the company that have been 
identified as a result of undertaking the RBSIC throughout the company. 
The Group Audit Manager also agreed to contact the General Manager for Risk for 
the Asia-Pacific region, who is based in Excelsior's regional headquarters in 
Australia, and would be making the arrangements for the researcher to visit the 
company's business units in the region. Once this introduction was made it was 
agreed the researcher would decide with the Asia-Pacific General Manager for Risk 
which business units should be visited and the timetable for the visits. 
During December the researcher had a lengthy telephone conversation with the Asia- 
Pacific General Manager for Risk during which the researcher was told that the 
Finance Director had given instructions that everything should be done to assist the 
researcher with the project. It was agreed that a timetable for the visits would be 
decided in January, 2004, once the researcher had arrived in Singapore. 
4.6.6.2 Landmark 
During the October - December period the researcher had four meetings at the 
Landmark headquarters with five senior members of staff (see Table 4.1 for the list of 
people interviewed). During these meetings the RBSIC in Landmark was explained 
and supporting documentation was given to the researcher. The researcher also met 
the directors responsible for establishing the joint ventures in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
gaining an understanding of the rationale for their creation. 
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The researcher also met with the Director of International Market Development who 
was responsible for the RBSIC in the Taiwanese joint venture. He suggested the 
researcher visit the Taiwan and Hong Kong offices in March, 2004. This would be 
confirmed nearer the time. 
4.6.6.3 Peninsula 
The researcher met with the Head of Group Audit in December during the meeting the 
researcher was given a thorough overview of how the RBSIC had been implemented 
in the UK and Asia-Pacific region. He was also provided with a copy of the company 
procedures manual that included a section relating to Turnbull and internal control. It 
was also agreed that the researcher would visit the Peninsula Tokyo office either in 
January or February, 2004. This would be confirmed in early January. 
Table 4.1 
Initial UK Based Interviews 
Company Role 
Excelsior Head of Group Audit 
Excelsior Group Audit Manager (Responsible for International 
Implementation of the RBSIC) 
Landmark Business Development Director (Group) 
Landmark Director of International Market Development (Group) 
Landmark Director of Risk Management (Group) 
Landmark Finance Director (Divisional) 
Landmark Manager Risk Management (Group) JI 
Peninsula Finance Director (Group) 
Peninsula Head of Group Audit 
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4.6.7 Theoretical Framework and Interview Themes 
By January, 2004 a theoretical framework had been designed that would provide the 
basis for the research (see Chapter 3). This involved the development of a conceptual 
and theoretical understanding of the phenomena to be investigated. A thematic 
understanding of the topic was required to provide a basis for the design of fifty-two 
questions (Appendix 3) that were developed around the central themes of the 
theoretical framework (Kvale, 1996: 95) to answer the four questions underlying the 
research (see Chapter 1). They were used by the researcher as an interview guide and 
unseen by the interviewees providing the basis of the semi-structured interviews that 
were used during the Asia-Pacific data gathering phase of the project. It was not the 
objective of the researcher to ask all of these questions but to use them where 
appropriate (Robson, 2002: 270) with the objective of achieving a degree of 
consistency in the interviews. As previously stated should the interviewees wish to 
discuss a topic that was relevant to the research but not covered in the questions they 
were encouraged to do so. 
4.6.8 Asia-Pacific Based Data Gathering 
Three weeks before his departure to Singapore NUS contacted the researcher to 
inform hing that the offer of accommodation made the previous September had been 
withdrawn. Apparently, the researcher did not qualify to stay in NUS accommodation 
and the offer had been an `administrative error'. This meant that the researcher 
arrived in Singapore without a place to live. After ten days in a hotel he ww as able to 
rent a room near the university. However. the cost was twice that originally agreed 
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adding to the pressure on an already limited budget. This provides a good example of 
the type of problems that a researcher can encounter when working in an unfamiliar 
environment a long distance from home base (see 4.3.6) 
Once the researcher had established himself at NUS he contacted Excelsior, 
Landmark and Peninsula, his experiences with each company, while in the Asia- 
Pacific region, are described below. 
4.6.8.1 Peninsula 
The first company visit planned by the researcher was to have been to Peninsula's 
Tokyo office in either January or February. Contact was made with the Head of 
Group Audit in early January when it was agreed the visit would take place during the 
second week of February. However, in late January the Head of Group Audit 
contacted the researcher to tell him that the Finance Director for the region, who was 
based in Tokyo, had left the company and as the Financial Controller had already 
resigned a decision had been taken by headquarters to stop all non-essential visits to 
the office. This included the planned visit by the researcher. Given the difficulty of 
recruiting suitable personnel for the positions (Japanese with fluent English and an 
understanding of Western preferably British accounting procedures) it would not be 
possible for the researcher to visit the company until the later part of 2004. This was 
later extended to 2005 beyond the time limit for the project. 
This was a serious, but manageable loss, as long as the other two sets of company 
visits pror«ded as planned. Also the data provided during the two meetings at 
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Peninsula's corporate headquarters provided a considerable amount of relevant 
information. 
4.6.8.2 Excelsior 
The planned data collection at the subsidiaries and joint ventures of Excelsior also 
encountered a serious unexpected problem that could have led to the abandonment of 
the entire research project. 
Following the researchers' arrival in Singapore he contacted the Excelsior General 
Manager for Risk and agreed he would visit the Excelsior Asia-Pacific regional 
headquarters in Australia and then fly on to their Japanese office in March. While in 
Australia, when he would meet with the General Manager for Risk for the first time, 
the remainder of the subsidiary /joint venture visits would be organised. 
At the end of January the researcher received a late night phone call from Head of 
Group Audit. He told the researcher that the Asia-Pacific headquarters was 
expressing some concern as to the amount of the region's time the research would 
take up. This was rather unsettling for the researcher as he had already provided a 
detailed schedule of his research plans, listing the amount of time he would require 
with Excelsior personnel, and this had been agreed by the regional Chief Executive. 
The Head of Group Audit asked the researcher to send him further details of his 
research plans (including documents sent to the General Manager of Risk) so that he 
can discuss the matter with the Asia-Pacific office. The researcher replied in a very 
detailed Email (Appendix 4) that was designed to allay any concerns that may arise. 
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The Email included proposed travel plans and a more detailed explanation the 
commitment the researcher was hoping to get from Excelsior. 
The Head of Group Audit warned the researcher that there was a real possibility that 
his planned research, despite previous assurances, may not be able to proceed. This 
would have given the researcher no option other than to discontinue his PhD given 
that Excelsior was to be the most important component of his research. Not only 
would this have meant the loss of 16 months work it would also have had 
considerable financial implications due to the costs already incurred by the researcher 
in travelling to Singapore, signing a lease for five months accommodation and paying 
the fees to be a Visiting Scholar at NUS. 
One week later the Head of Group Audit telephoned the researcher to tell him it had 
been agreed that he could go ahead with his research as long as the General Manager 
for Risk was prepared to co-ordinate the Excelsior Asia-Pacific part of the project. 
Also no member of staff would be obliged to find the time to meet with the researcher 
if they did not wish to do so. The Head of Group Audit did not foresee either of these 
conditions being a problem. The researcher was told the main reason for the 
objection to the research was that, although it had been agreed by the regional Chief 
Executive, other key executives at the regional headquarters had not been made aware 
of the planned work and where unhappy that assumptions had been made without 
them being consulted. 
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Although these new conditions suggested a reduced level of co-operation from 
Excelsior once data gathering was underway the researcher was able to obtain the 
necessary information and found Excelsior staff to be generally very helpful. 
The next day the General Manager for Risk contacted the researcher to say the project 
had his full support. It was agreed the researcher would visit Australia followed by 
Japan during early March. This would be followed by a visit to Hong Kong and the 
Peoples Republic of China in April, and Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in May. 
The meetings went ahead without any difficulties, with the single exception of 
Singapore, where the General Manager needed considerable reassurance from both 
the General Manager for Risk and the Managing Director of the Thailand office (who 
had been previously interviewed) that their were no potentially damaging outcomes 
that could result from the researcher's visit. Eventually she agreed to meet the 
researcher and after an initial period of uncertainty became one of the most 
forthcoming interviewees of the entire project. In total 17 interviews were undertaken 
with 20 people with each interview lasting an average of 85 minutes. The full list of 
personnel interviewed is included in Table 4.2. 
During late April the researcher received an Email from the Excelsior Director of 
Business Risk Management, to whom the Head of Group Audit reports, asking to 
meet with him. It was agreed that a date would be set when the researcher returned to 
the UK in July. At the meeting, which would be held at Excelsior's world 
headquarters, the researcher would make a presentation based on his initial findings 
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and be able to question the Director of Business Risk Management about his 
expectations with regard to the operation of the RBSIC in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Table 4.2 
Asia-Pacific Based Interviews 
Company Role Nationality Business Unit Host 
Country 
Excelsior CEO Asia-Pacific Indian Reg. HQ Australia 
Excelsior Regional Finance 
Director 
Australian Reg. HQ Australia 
Excelsior General Manager Risk Australian Reg. HQ & 
Subsidiary 
Australia 
Excelsior Business Continuity 
Manager 
Singaporean Reg. HQ & 
Subsidiary 
Australia 
Excelsior Finance Director Australian Subsidiary Australia 
Excelsior Managing Director British Subsidiary Japan 
Excelsior Finance Director Japanese Subsidiary Japan 
Excelsior Operations Director Japanese Subsidiary Japan 
Excelsior Legal Manager Japanese Subsidiary Japan 
Excelsior General Manager Finance 
(Greater China) 
HK Chinese Subsidiary China 
Excelsior Finance Manager (China) HK Chinese Subsidiary China 
Excelsior General Manager HK Chinese Joint Venture Hong Kong 
Excelsior Accountant HK Chinese Joint Venture Hong Kong 
Excelsior Managing Director Thai Subsidiary Thailand 
Excelsior Senior Finance Director Thai Subsidiary Thailand 
Excelsior Managing Director British Subsidiary Malaysia 
Excelsior Finance Manager Malaysian Subsidiary Malaysia 
Excelsior General Manager Singaporean Subsidiary Singapore 
Excelsior Finance Manager Singaporean Subsidiary Singapore 
Excelsior Administration Manager Singaporean Subsidiary Singapore 
Landmark Joint Managing Director 
(Landmark) 
British Joint Venture Taiwan 
Landmark Joint Managing Director 
(Marco Polo) 
Taiwanese Joint Venture Taiwan 
Landmark Marketing Manager British Joint Venture Taiwan 
Landmark Marketing Manager British Joint Venture Taiwan 
Landmark Managing Director British Joint Venture Hong Kong 
Landmark Quality Assurance 
Manager 
British Joint Venture Hong Kong 
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4.6.8.3 Landmark 
Unlike the researcher's experience with Peninsula and Excelsior data gathering with 
Landmark went ahead with very little difficulty. In March the researcher interviewed 
separately the four most senior executives of the company's Taiwanese joint venture - 
three expatriates from Landmark and one Taiwanese from the Taiwanese partner - for 
an average of 90 minutes per interview. The researcher was also given a tour of the 
companies operations including administration, warehousing, distribution and sales 
where he was shown examples of key internal control issues. 
In May the researcher met with the Managing Director of the company's newly 
created Hong Kong joint venture and one of his senior managers. Both were 
expatriates from Landmark. Each manager was interviewed separately with the 
interviews lasting two hours forty five minutes and one hour respectively. 
In addition to the data gathered through interviews many of the interviewees provided 
the researcher with valuable documentary data. In addition to individual interview 
scripts the researcher also produced a field note on each subsidiary /joint venture 
visited. 
4.6.9 Concluding UK Data Gathering 
Following the researchers return to the UK in late June, 2004, two presentations were 
made to Excelsior and one to Landmark (see Table 4.3). The objective of these 
presentations was to provide the companies with initial feedback on the research and 
to enable the researcher to gather more information from the headquarters perspective 
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relating to topics that had been discussed in the Asia-Pacific region. This provided 
the researcher with the opportunity to discover any differences in the perceptions of 
the two groups with regard to specific tasks, outcomes and general attitudes. 
Table 4.3 
Concluding UK Meetings 
Company Role 
Excelsior Group Director of Business Risk Management 
Excelsior Head of Group Audit 
Excelsior Group Audit Manager (Responsible for International 
Implementation of RBSIC) 
Excelsior Group Audit Manager (Responsible for UK Implementation of 
RBSIC) 
Landmark Director of International Market Development (Group) 
Landmark Director of International Operations (Group) 
The researcher also had a meeting with the Excelsior Group Audit Manager 
responsible for the UK implementation of RBSIC with the objective of comparing his 
experiences with those of the interviewees in the Asia-Pacific region. 
4.6.10 Other Data Sources 
The researcher undertook three further interviews; first, with the European Head of 
Corporate Governance for a leading United States international bank and secondly 
with the Finance Director of the Thai division of a UK company. The interviews 
pi ov ided valuable supporting data on the experiences of two companies when 
corporate governance procedures were transferred from the parent company (where 
they were originally developed) to its overseas subsidiary. Finally, the researcher met 
with Nioel Turnbull, Chairman of the Internal Control Working Party of the Institute Z, I 
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of Chartered Accounts in England and Wales, who were responsible for publishing 
Guidance on Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code, to 
discuss the role of the Turnbull guidelines, what changes may occur and to what 
extent they can become embedded in a company. 
Further data was provided by academic papers and books that analysed the transfer of 
specific parent company practices to their overseas operations, newspapers and news 
services. 
4.7.0 Data Analysis and Reporting 
This section will consider the approach used to analyse the data gathered in the UK 
and Asia-Pacific region. 
4.7.1 Data Analysis 
In this project, as is typical with qualitative research (Ritchie & Spencer, 1993: 178), 
the data collected is mainly text based, consisting of interview notes, field notes and 
other written documents. The researcher has combined historical data collected 
through the analysis of documents and retrospective interviews with current data 
collected in real time. The data for the 10 Asia-Pacific based embedded case studies 
consists of 759 responses given in 19 semi-structured interviews, data from four 
unstructured interviews and data gathered from a large number of documentary 
sources. Further data, including some that was not directly related to the embedded 
case studies, was provided from 15 interviews that took place in the UK and Thailand. 
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The management of such a large database can pose considerable challenges. The 
sheer volume of data to be organised can lead to what Pettigrew (1990: 281) described 
as "death by data asphyxiation" 
Initial data management involved the entering of the 759 responses to the semi- 
structured interviews undertaken in the Asia-Pacific region into a spreadsheet. This 
involved a systematic process of organising responses on a question by question basis. 
For each question the responses were grouped by company and business unit. This 
coding system also allowed for the systematic coding of data. Similar approaches that 
use tabular displays to manage and present qualitative data, without destroying the 
meaning of the data through intensive coding have been outlined by Miles & 
Huberman (1984). 
Data from the four unstructured interviews relating to the embedded case studies was 
included in the individual case study write-ups. The remaining fifteen interviews and 
other sources of data were analysed separately and the results were overlaid on the 
findings of the analysis and discussion chapters. 
The researcher's next task was to write a chapter introducing the two case studies. 
Each case begins with a brief description of the company this is followed by a review 
of the operation of the RBSIC in the company. The remainder of the case describes 
each of the Asia-Pacific business units that make up the embedded case studies 
including data relating to non-practice specific learning, change and innovation, 
certain aspects of its relationship 8 with headquarters9 and the operation of the RBSIC 
8 Primarily degree of dependence and headquarters understanding of the local operating environment 
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in the business unit. Following the approach described by Eisenhardt (1989: 540) the 
researcher's initial aim was to become familiar with each case as a stand alone entity. 
These write-ups are purely descriptive, but they are central to the generation of insight 
(Gersick, 1988: Pettigrew, 1988) because they helped the researcher cope early in the 
analysis process with the large volume of data that had been obtained (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 540). 
A cross case analysis of the data combined in the previously mentioned spreadsheet 
and overlaid with data collected at the Excelsior and Landmark corporate 
headquarters, the two meetings at Peninsula's corporate headquarters and individual 
interviews with people not directly connected with the case studies was then 
undertaken with the objective of discovering any patterns and emergent issues 
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1993: 179 - 180). This approach allowed the researcher to look 
for within-group and inter-group similarities and differences, and led to the 
identification of five key factors in the implementation, internalisation and 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC in individual business units. Following a broad 
statement of the findings of this research and how they relate to the theoretical 
framework underlying this research, the five factors are analysed and discussed in 
separate chapters. 
This approach is very much a reflection of the data gathered. Upon commencement 
of the project the researcher was hoping to gather data on the transfer of the RBSIC in 
three companies' Asia-Pacific operations. For the reasons explained above this did 
'' Corporate headquarters for both Landmark and Excelsior Asia-Pacific headquarters and corporate and 
re` Tonal headquarters for the other Excelsior business units. 
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not prove possible. Howes er, high quality data was gathered from Excelsior and 
when this is combined with the Landmark data where the company is at an earlier 
stage in the implementation of a RBSIC than Excelsior and the data provided by 
Peninsula headquarters personnel relating to the introduction of the practice in their 
Asia-Pacific offices, plus the other sources of data - individual interviews, 
documentary, etc. - the data collection objectives of the researcher have been 
achieved. 
4.8.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methodology and methods used in this research. It has 
highlighted the challenges that were faced by the researcher in gaining access to 
companies to undertake research of a highly confidential nature where only senior 
executives could be interviewed. The difficulties were compounded by the large 
geographical spread of the project - eight national locations. Given these difficulties 
it is not surprising that to date very little research has been produced on the transfer of 
corporate governance practices internally by companies across international borders. 
The next chapter will introduce the two case studies - Excelsior and Landmark - and 
review the operation of the RBSIC in their respective business units. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE COMPANIES 
5.0.0 Introduction 
Drawing on data gathered through interviews and company documents this chapter 
will introduce the ten embedded case studies developed from the two main research 
subjects. The largest portion of the data comes from the research undertaken at 
Excelsior which provided eight embedded case studies - Asia-Pacific headquarters, 
national subsidiaries in Australia, Japan, Peoples Republic of China, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore and a joint venture in Hong Kong. The remaining two 
embedded case studies are developed from data gathered at Landmark's Taiwan and 
Hong Kong joint ventures. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts - one for each company. Each part begins 
with a brief description of the company which for confidentiality reasons is limited to 
information regarding stock market listing, revenues, the broad business sector within 
which it operates and recent strategic developments. This is followed by a review of 
the operation of the RBSIC in the company. It then goes on to describe each of the 
Asia-Pacific business units involved in the study commencing with a description of 
the data sources, followed by a section that describes the business unit and the data 
relating to non-practice specific learning, change and innovation and certain aspects 
of its relationship' with headquarters2. The next section considers the operation of the 
Primarily degree of dependence and headquarters understanding of the local operating environment 
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RBSIC in the business unit incorporating data from the managers most involved with 
practice including the degree to which they believed it to be embedded in the 
operations of their individual organisation and the extent to which its performance 
was monitored. 
5.1.0 Excelsior 
5.1.1 The Company 
Excelsior's primary stock market listing is on the London Stock Exchange in addition 
it is also listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is therefore required to follow 
both UK and US corporate governance codes and regulations. The company has a 
turnover in excess of £6 billion, operates in the consumer goods sector and has a 
substantial global presence with production and marketing operations in over 100 
countries employing over 50,000 people. The company's operations expanded 
considerable in 2003 with the acquisition of a United States based MNE that also 
operates in the consumer goods sector offering a line of products that complement 
Excelsior's existing business. 
Traditionally business units were given targets and their Chief Executives / Managing 
Directors set about achieving them. The business units were often self-sufficient and 
highly autonomous, principally serving the country where they were based, normally 
having few links with other parts of the company3. Excelsior is now in the process of 
2 Corporate headquarters for both Landmark and Excelsior Asia-Pacific headquarters and corporate and 
regional headquarters for the other Excelsior business units. 
Business units given this degree strategic freedom and national autonomy are described as 
1111(%timition(Jl companies by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998: 16). 
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moving to what it describes as a `more horizontal transnational structure'. The 
number of factories producing the same product will be substantially reduced and in 
some cases this will result in one plant becoming the sole supplier for the entire 
company or geographic region (e. g. Asia-Pacific). The company's manufacturing 
plants will be owned by and report to the global supply chain while national 
subsidiaries and joint ventures will generally retain control over the local marketing 
function selling the products produced, both locally and abroad, by the supply chain'. 
5.1.2 Risk-Based System of Internal Control 
Excelsior's RBSIC was introduced to the company's Asia-Pacific business units in 
20025. In conjunction with the launch the previous Group Director of Business Risk 
Management (retired in 2003) and the Head of Group Audit (still in post) made a 
number of presentations to senior staff throughout the region explaining the RBSIC 
and the deadlines for the various stages of implementation (see Appendix 5 for a 
summary of the presentation). This was followed by a visit to each business unit by a 
member of the Group Audit Department who explained the practice to the individuals 
tasked with undertaking it. 
Although risks are owned by individual business units, the Group Audit Department 
is responsible for monitoring and embedding the RBSIC. This means that Group 
Audit has overall responsibility for the RBSIC, while each business unit is expected to 
document and identify its own risks. 
' Companies that build cost advantages through centralised global scale operations in this manner are 
referred to by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998: 17) as Jobal companies 
The system was introduced in the UK in 2001. 
Derek Condon 145 04'12'2007 
From the perspective of Excelsior the introduction of the RBSIC was seen as a move 
to a `new paradigm' where risk management was broadly focused and process driven, 
integrated within the company's operations, and undertaken in a proactive and 
continuous manner. This `new' approach to risk management was designed to be 
more integrated into the operations of the company as opposed to the more 
fragmented approach previously adopted and to be seen as a positive rather than 
negative process6. Its aim was to provide a structured approach to help identify all 
sources of business risk that would result in a complete risk database for the entire 
company. 
Excelsior believes the RBSIC will add value both to the group and individual business 
units by increasing their understanding of risk, thereby, enabling them to effectively 
calculate the trade off between risk and reward when making strategic decisions 
designed to increase overall returns. It will also enable the company to comply with 
the recommendations of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998; 2003) 
A user's guide to the RBSIC is available to all employees7 via the company's intranet 
system this includes: 
1. Purpose of the RBSIC 
2. What is a risk? 
3. RBSIC structure (nature of the database) 
4. Library documents (documents underlying the RBSIC) 
5. Classifying a risk 
6 Source: Excelsior internal document 
7 None of the personnel interviewed in the Asia-Pacific region were a\\are of the existence of the t'ser 
Guide 
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6. Materiality (when is a risk material? ) 
7. How to document a risk 
8. Views and reports available from the database 
9. Access and authorisation 
In addition all employees are given two booklets that explain the company's purpose 
and values, and its business principles. These two documents set the standards for the 
company's ethical policies and encourage employees to report anything they believe 
breaches these policies. 
Business units are assigned responsibility for assessing risks through a self- 
assessment process. This work is generally owned by the business unit's Finance 
Department. However, they can approach Group Audit for advice. The role of Group 
Audit is intended to be that of training, education, sharing of best practices8 and 
challenging local reviews. The exceptions are new business units (e. g. acquisitions) 
or problem business units that lack the necessary expertise (e. g. due to the departure 
of key personnel). In these cases a team is sent to the business unit from Group Audit 
to help them produce their first risk assessment and populate the database. 
Each business unit identifies individual risks, the nature of the risk is described, its 
potential impact and likelihood of it occurring is estimated, decisions are taken as to 
8 Presently the company does not have any plans to bring together the managers responsible for 
producing the RBSIC, so that they could share best practice and their experiences of the RBSIC, the 
Group Audit Manager responsible for the international implementation of the RBSIC said that other 
than an initial visit frone Group Audit and the ongoing advice the\ offered, no additional training was 
provided at the corporate level and he doubted the resources would be made available that would allow 
such an event to happen even if there was a demand for such training. 
Derck Condon 147 N 12,2007 
the most appropriate method of managing the risk9 and the person who is accountable 
for the risk named. Finally, the risk is ranked in terms of importance. This 
information is then entered into a central database. The individual risk reports are 
used to annually produce a very large report for the whole company. This `bottom- 
up' generated data is then used to identify key groups of risks. `Top-down' risks 
identified at the group level that may not be known by the business unit e. g. the 
possibility that it may be closed down are then added to the database. Finally, it is 
collated into a report that "aims to describe the risks perceived throughout the 
business..... based upon an objective review of the self-assessment risk analyses 
submitted by business units and group functions "10 that lists the top risks (by broad 
categories) and is sent to the Group Board for their consideration. The risks are 
reviewed quarterly by the Chief Executive's Committee. 11 
5.1.2.1 Performance 
Group Audit regards the performance of most international business units in relation 
to the RBSIC as disappointing. For the year 2003 Group Audit was required to 
repeatedly follow-up requests for data with its primary role reduced to that of policing 
the system. 
By the submission date (end August) Group Audit had the following responses from 
international business units: 
9 This may include regular monitoring, im estment of additional resources, transfer to third parties via 
insurance or hedging arrangements and contingency planning (Source: Excelsior internal documents) 
10 Source: Excelsior internal document 
1 The committee reports directly to the main board and is responsible for the day-to-day management 
of Excelsior's operations and the implementation of strategy and includes leaders of each of the 
company's geographical regions and functions and is chaired by the chief executive officer. (Source: 
Excelsior Annual Report) 
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Action Business Units 
No Response 10% 
Incomplete work 40% 
Not approved12 30% 
Correct 20% 
Although, all of the data was eventually gathered in time for the main board review 
20% of the submissions were not correct one month before the meeting. 
The Group Audit Manager responsible for the international implementation of the 
RBSIC was certain that Excelsior had complied with the Turnbull guidelines; 
however, he thought Excelsior was not getting the full benefit of the practice as it was 
failing in its objective of adding value to the company. 
5.1.3 Asia-Pacific Regional Headquarters 
5.1.3.1 Data Sources 
Data for this section was provided by the Asia-Pacific General Manager for Risk and 
the Business Continuity Manager Asia-Pacific Region who are based in Australia and 
have had day-to-day responsibility for the RBSIC in the Asia-Pacific region since its 
introduction in 2002. Further data was provided by the Asia-Pacific Regional Finance 
Director to whom the General Manager for Risk reports who is also based in 
2 Approval of the risks to be included in the RBSIC is required from the local board, effectively this 
means 'signed-off by the local Chief Executive / Managing Director. 
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Australia. The Regional Finance Director and the General Manager for Risk are both 
Australian and have worked for the company for over five years. The Business 
Continuity Manager was born in Singapore where he initially worked for Excelsior 
before taking up his present duties in 2002. Additional data was also gathered 
through the examination of company documents. 
5.1.3.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior has been operating in the Asia-Pacific region for nearly one hundred years. 
Its Asia-Pacific regional headquarters is based in Australia as are the most senior 
regional managers including the Chief Executive Officer. In 2002 the business was 
substantially expanded following Excelsior's acquisition of an American MNE with 
substantial interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2004 the region contributed over 
10% of the company's overall profit and accounted for over 15% of total turnover. It 
employed more than 12,000 people in over 20 locations throughout the region which 
stretches from Pakistan to New Zealand. ' 3 
The business was seen as generally supportive of learning, change and innovation 
with what the General Manager for Risk described as "can-do approach " that can be 
found throughout the region. However, there was a concern about the number of new 
group initiatives the region had been asked to implement over the last five years. 
highlighted by the Regional Finance Director who believed the region was suffering 
from "an initiatives overload ". This had led to a greater requirement for nest 
13 The company does not provide data for national business units. 
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programmes to demonstrate their value than in the past especially when they were 
driven from outside of the business unit. 
Some concern was expressed about the degree to which corporate headquarters 
understood the differences in the Asia-Pacific operating environment and their o« n. 
An example was given of a recent unsuccessful attempt to implement an information 
technology system that failed because the UK based designers had not understood 
certain characteristics of the local organisation that were unique to Australia. This 
was seen as particularly relevant, because, although the region was not dependent on 
corporate headquarters accept for the allocation of resources (e. g acquisitions), the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by the region, in line with Excelsior's new strategy, was 
seen as declining as the company steadily became more centralised. This strategy 
would require a greater appreciation of the Asia-Pacific operating environment by 
corporate headquarters if more decisions concerning its business units were to be 
taken outside of the region. However, regarding the RBSIC the General Manager for 
Risk believed that Group Internal Audit did understand the differences and "in the 
UK the people that need to understand do " 
5.1.3.3 RBSIC 
The General Manager for Risk has day-to day responsibility for the RBSIC at both the 
national level (Australia) and throughout the region and, with his deputy the Business 
Continuity Manager who was hired specifically to work on the RBSIC, make up the 
regional RBSIC team. The RBSIC is only one of a number of activities for which the 
General Manager for Risk has responsibility his other tasks include crisis / incident 
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management, contingency planning, risk management and insurance. His job title 
(previously General Manager Risk & Insurance) was recently changed to emphasise 
the importance of risk. Until the introduction of the RBSIC he had not had any 
experience of operating a risk-based system of internal control or any other type of 
system of internal control. Although he describes the RBSIC as the bedrock of the 
risk management process much of his time is taken up with his other duties. On one 
of the days when the researcher was visiting Excelsior's regional headquarters the 
General Manager for Risk was required to spend a considerable amount of time 
finding out if Excelsior's insurance provider would cover a heavily pregnant member 
of staff to fly from New Zealand to Australia. 
Despite other calls on his time the General Manager for Risk is the key player 
regarding the RBSIC for the region; he is very enthusiastic, clearly enjoys his work 
and is held in high regard by those people he interacts with who admire him for his 
hard work and approachability. He has adopted a 'hands - on' approach to his job, 
constantly travelling throughout the region. He and his deputy are seen as the 
principle resource for the RBSIC by local business units. Whenever they have any 
questions relating to the practice or require assistance from outside of their business 
unit they will contact him or his deputy asking for support. The General Manager for 
Risk and his deputy also provide the business units with the only documentation they 
have relating to the practice -a generic list of possible risks; a two page explanation 
of how risks and the likelihood of them occurring should be quantified (high, medium 
and low); and a template that should be completed once the risk has been identified 
and quantified that includes additional data detailing who is accountable for the risk 
and what measures have been taken to control it. All three documents are provided 
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throughout the region via Lotus Notes (a messaging and collaboration personal 
computer based tool used throughout the company). 14 
Once the individual business units have identified their risks and decided upon the 
measures taken to control them the completed templates are sent to the Business 
Continuity Manager, who has responsibility for the Asia-Pacific RBSIC database, he 
collates the RBSIC data and enters it into the main database that includes all of the 
risks for the entire region. 
The General Manager for Risk generally adopted a confident tone when discussing 
the RBSIC while acknowledging "We add a little more to it, identifying it, hat we need 
to do next to handle risk. " He remarked that the Asia-Pacific region was the most 
advanced region in the company in terms of embedding the RBSIC. 15 However, he 
did not provide any evidence to support this claim or demonstrate any awareness of 
the degree to which the practice had been embedded throughout the rest of the 
company. 
Regarding the role of the RBSIC in the identification of business opportunities he 
remarked: "At its most simple, just walking around a site, looking for risks broadens 
knoit ledge und understanding enabling 1 oir to identify opportunities. " He then went 
on to add that he did not believe that the RBSIC had played an important role to date 
in the identification of opportunities. He viewed the objective of the RBSIC as "a 
1i'aii to crccrte a culture of risk identification. 
1a Both the General Manager for Risk and his deputy insisted there were no other sources of 
documentation about the system available to them. This view was also held h,, all of the business units 
visited. 
15 This was vigorously denied by the I xcelsior Group Director of Risk Management. 
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Commenting further he acknowledged that the RBSIC had only been embedded at the 
top levels of the organisation and for it to reach further down the hierarchy of 
individual business units more training and exposure to the practice would be 
necessary. He was supported by the Regional Finance Director who described the 
region as being "half way there" adding that for the foreseeable future the practice 
would only be embedded at the higher levels of the organisation. 
The General Manager for Risk felt the most difficult part of implementing the RBSIC 
had been: "Getting people to find the time to do the task and think more out of the 
box. " This view was supported by the Regional Finance Director who also thought 
that the `alien' nature of the RBSIC to some of the cultures in the region was a source 
of difficulties. 
Further questioning of the interviewees provided more data to suggest that the 
General Manager for Risk's initial confidence in the degree to which the RBSIC was 
institutionalised may have been misplaced. He stated that "Business units expects 
ei'eriibodi' to be risk managers and they need to be given more skills to identify risks. 
This can be done through their existing work groups. " Although this is recommended 
in the Turnbull guidelines (Para. 19) it was seen as unrealistic by the Regional 
Finance Director. Furthermore the General Manager for Risk own comments did not 
suggest this had yet been achieved when he admitted that many members of staff saw 
the RBSIC as a bureaucratic task. This was supported by the Regional Finance 
Director who said the RBSIC was regarded by most employees, who were aware of 
the practice, as "bureaucratic but ivith positive outcomes. " 
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There was an absence of `checks and balances' to ensure that the RBSIC was working 
effectively. The General Manager of Risk believed by placing an emphasis "on good 
data, that is delivered on time with real mitigation measures " and reviewing the 
practice and the risks identified annually he was able to ensure the RBSIC was 
working effectively. This rather simplistic approach did not appear to allow for the 
possibility that risks may not be identified, a concern of the Regional Finance 
Director. In a characteristically blunt fashion the Regional Finance Director remarked 
that he did not know what was done to ensure the RBSIC was working effectively 
suggesting that he left it to the General Manager for Risk to ensure this was the case. 
The data also revealed that the practice was not seen as an ongoing task. The General 
Manager for Risk and his deputy acknowledged that although it was ongoing for 
them, it was not at the forefront of activities for other staff, who only notice risk if it is 
very apparent and therefore saw it as a periodic exercise. This was supported by the 
attitude of the Regional Director for Finance who contrary to the approach promoted 
in the RBSIC believed it should only be undertaken "when required ". He was not 
forthcoming by what he meant by "when required". The failure of the practice to 
become ongoing means that it is not achieving one of the key requirements of the 
Turnbull guidelines that require the adoption of a system of internal control that 
should be incorporated by the company within its normal management and 
governance processes and be embedded in the operations of the company forming part 
of its culture (Turnbull, 1999, para. 22) and not be treated as a separate exercise 
undertaken to meet regulatory requirements (Turnbull, 1999, para. 9). 
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On a more positive note the General Manager for Risk did add that when new risks 
arose that were important to a businesses unit they were identified quickly and action 
was taken to mitigate them. 
5.1.4 Australia 
5.1.4.1 Data Sources 
In addition to the Asia-Pacific General Manager for Risk and the Business Continuity 
Manager Asia-Pacific Region (described in 5.1.3.1) data for this section was provided 
by the Finance Director (Australia) who is an Australian and has worked for the 
company for more than five years. Additional data was also gathered through the 
examination of company documents. 
5.1.4.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior's Asia-Pacific presence began in Australia nearly one hundred years ago. 
Its Australian operations are by a substantial margin the largest producers of revenue 
and income in the region with manufacturing and marketing business units throughout 
the country. 
The Finance Director did not believe the business unit was as supportive of change 
and innovation to the same extent as the General Manager for Risk (see 5.1.3.2) 
coninieI1ting: "Ideas tend to he filtered out 'with only the relevant ones being 
adoptcil. I/'they arc directivvc's fi"omn headquarters they have to he adopted but not 
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necessarily with enthusiasm. " He also differed from the General Manger for Risk 
regarding the number of new initiatives the business unit was asked to implement 
commenting that in general "... we tend to devise our own practices. 11 
Despite recent changes in corporate strategy (see 5.1.1) the business unit continued to 
view itself as relatively independent from corporate headquarters with the General 
Manager for Risk describing the business unit as "... part of a worldwide 
organisation. However, operationally it is operated autonomously with no reporting 
lines to the UK. On a day-to-day basis there is a lot of communication between the 
two. It is not at all dependent on the UK but works with it. However, corporate 
headquarters does provide standards. " The Finance Director added: "The business 
unit is less independent than it was 10 years ago, although there is still a fair way to 
go before it become it becomes completely integrated into the company, although the 
process is underway..... the business unit is self-sufficient with headquarters more 
dependent on it, to gain an understanding of what is happening in the region, than it 
is on headquarters. " 
Once again there was some concern regarding the extent to which corporate 
headquarters understood the difference between their operating environment and that 
found locally with the Finance Director commenting that corporate headquarters 
"... feel systems should be the same eveniwhere. "16 
He also used the example of the recent failed implementation of the information technology system 
mentioned previously by the General Manager for Risk. 
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5.1.4.3 RB SIC 
The General Manager for Risk and his deputy the Business Continuity Manager are 
responsible for the day-to-day administration of the RBSIC in Australia with the 
General Manager for Risk reporting to Finance Director (Australia) who has overall 
responsibility for the RBSIC locally. In common with the General Manager for Risk 
and the Business Continuity Manager he did not have any experience of operating a 
risk-based system of internal control. 
Although the General Manager for Risk admitted to making minor modifications to 
the RBSIC, he adopted a rather confident tone when discussing the degree to which 
the RBSIC had been embedded in Australia while admitting that it was only 
embedded at the senior levels of the organisation. While the Finance Director said the 
biggest problem institutionalising the RBSIC was getting employees to "treat it as a 
priority and `getting people onboard'. " 
He went on to acknowledged that most members of staff were "... vaguely aware " 
that they had an individual responsibility for risk management and "... think it is a 
good thing ". Before going on to say that "... many people will see it as the 
responsibility of the Finance Department and it is unrealistic for even' member of the 
business unit to have a responsibility for risk management. The RBSIC is restricted to 
upper- management and their direct reports. " 
The Finance Director had a different approach to the General Manager for Risk to 
ensure the RBSIC was working effectively. He believed this required "Constanit 
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review and the involvement of internal audit. " Addin1 that risks were reviewed 
annually and the responsibility for monitoring and making sure the system was 
working effectively belonged to the Finance Director (himself) and Risk Manager 
(General Manager for Risk). The Finance Director, in line with the General Manager 
for Risk commented that he had not found the RBSIC to be of use in the identification 
of business opportunities. 
The Finance Director supported the General Manager for Risk regarding the degree to 
which the RBSIC was ongoing acknowledging that the "... periodic nature of the 
practice makes embedding difficult. " Overall he described the practice as 
"... becoming more important but it is not embedded let. Its profile needs to be raised 
both generally and at the senior management level. There needs to be more 
communication as to the reasons for it and more training. There may also be a need 
for additional recruitment. " 
In line with the comments made by the General Manager for Risk the Finance 
Director felt that the RBSIC was reactive in nature identifying risk quickly when it 
involves something major. However, on a more negative note he commented that 
more minor issues "tend to hang around for a while ". 
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5.1.5 Japan 
5.1.5.1 Data Sources 
Data for this section was provided by the Managing Director (Japan) who is a highly 
experienced expatriate manager, born in Britain, who has worked in a number of 
international locations for Excelsior, the Finance Director (Japan) and Operations 
Director (Japan), both of whom are Japanese and have worked for Excelsior for more 
than 10 years and can now be described as at the later stages of the career, and the 
Legal Manager who is Japanese and has recently joined the company from an 
American MNE. 
5.1.5.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior first established operations in Japan over 20 years ago. Recently, the size of 
the business has expanded considerably following Excelsior's acquisition of an 
American owned company whose Japanese presence was much larger than 
Excelsior's existing business. Its business consists of both manufacturing and 
marketing units. 
The Legal Manager believed the business was very supportive of learning, change and 
innovation and "there was a strong desire in the company to learn from both internal 
and external sources ". He went on to say the number of practices implemented by 
the company had increased significantly as a result of the expansion of the business 
through acquisition This required the acquired company to bring its practices into 
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line with the rest of the company. These changes were regarded as essential and 
although they necessitated a considerable commitment of resources were supported bý 
management. 
Regarding the relative independence of the Japanese business the Legal Manager 
pointed out that although the business was not dependent on corporate headquarters 
for its day-to-day operations it needed clear direction when it works with the rest of 
the group. e. g. UK, USA and Australia. This was particularly important given that 
the business was still in a state of transition as a result of the acquisition and still had 
an organisational culture more in line with its previous American owner. 
When asked did he feel that corporate headquarters understood the differences 
between the Japanese operating environment and that found in the UK the Legal 
Manager replied: "There are many things Excelsior's UK people need to find out if 
they are to develop a greater understanding of the business. Especially, the 
implications of having a very different product portfolio to the rest of the group and 
the relative lack of protection provided by the legal system. " He then went on to give 
an example of a successful product that had been launched by Excelsior in Japan and 
had then been copied by a Korean company and introduced into the Japanese market 
with an almost identical name and packaging. Unlike the UK this is legal in Japan. 
5.1.5.3 RBSIC 
The Legal Manager was responsible for the day-to-dav management of the RBSIC. 
He reported to the business unit's Finance Director. Although he had prior experience 
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of risk identification and management systems his experience had been at an 
American company using systems based on their national standards and not used in a 
corporate governance role. As a recent arrival at the company he had not been 
involved with the RBSIC during the annual risk review- process the previous year. 
The Finance and Operations Directors both of whom had been involved with the risk 
identification for the RBSIC the previous year commented that the RBSIC was not 
very different from the previous system they had used; 17 however, it was more 
sensitive. 
Both the Finance Director and the Legal Manager agreed that the RBSIC was 
embedded only at the top levels of the business with the Legal Manager adding that 
most members of staff are unaware of the practice. He added that he believed that the 
operation of the RBSIC differed from the formal description and the situation would 
be improved if he could get better access to the data provided by other business units 
enabling him to learn from their experiences. Furthermore, he thought the system 
needs to be more proactive, better communicated including guidelines explaining how 
it can be spread deeper into the organisation with much better training throughout the 
business. While acknowledging the potential of the RBSIC to identify business 
opportunities he had not yet found it to be the case or tried to use the practice in this 
manner. 
Regarding the implementation and institutionalisation of the RBSIC the Legal 
Manager commented "the culture gap is the greatest problem followed by the lack 
\Vhen referring to the previous system the Finance and Operations Directors meant the system used 
in the annual business planning process. This was not a risk based system of internal control designed 
to be part of the company-'s ongoing operations. 
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materials that can he used to educate the business " as demonstrated by the limited 
information and documents that he had received about the practice, 
The Legal Manager did not believe the RBSIC was regarded by employees as an 
ongoing practice and tended to get forgotten outside of the annual data gathering 
process. Although he did not regard it as a bureaucratic task he acknowledged this 
may not be the case throughout the business unit. He was unsure if the periodic 
nature of the practice made it difficult to embed as he had not been working at the 
company long enough; however, he expected this was the case. He was certain that 
the majority of employees did not see themselves as risk managers. 
When the practice was originally introduced to the business unit its performance and 
the risks identified were monitored on a quarterly basis. This was now done annually 
as the business did not have sufficient resources for quarterly checks. 
The Legal manager was a supporter of the RBSIC describing it as an "essential tool 
in the modern business environment " but did not believe it was functioning properly 
as the risk identification process did not go far enough down the organisation's 
hierarchy increasing the likelihood that risks would not be identified. He concluded 
saying: "The whole practice still needs to be properly implemented. " 
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5.1.6 People's Republic of China 
5.1.6.1 Data Sources 
The data for this section was provided by the General Manager Finance (Greater 
China) and the Finance Manager (China). Both are Hong Kong born Chinese. The 
General Manager Finance had only recently joined Excelsior. He had formerly been 
employed by a leading American consumer goods company. The Finance Manager 
had been with Excelsior for eight years joining the company in Hong Kong where he 
had previously worked for Excelsior's Hong Kong based joint venture partner. He 
transferred to Beijing in 2003. 
5.1.6.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior commenced operations in China in 1994 when it established a joint venture 
with a local company. In 2001 it acquired its partner's share of the business creating 
a one hundred percent owned foreign entity. Since then it has grown through the 
acquisition of a local company and through the merger of its activities with the 
Chinese subsidiary of an American MNE recently purchased by Excelsior. The 
business has its headquarters in Beijing where it also operates a plant; it has two other 
plants elsewhere in the country. Beijing is also the sub-regional headquarters for 
Excelsior's Greater China operations. 
The Finance Manager commented that the level of support given by the business to 
learning, change and innovation "depends on nianugcnrent effort ". The local senior 
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management are very adaptable but this is not the case lower down the company. The 
approach to new ideas is no different if they are internally or externally generated. 
The General Manager Finance added: "Excelsior 's orientation is to do things the 
cheapest way and if possible stick with existing approaches .... if the culture 
doesn 't 
change it won 't be able to change the business ". The business unit had not been 
asked to implement many new practices recently and those that had been introduced 
were generally related to financial reporting. 
The Finance Manager described the business as becoming more autonomous as it 
grew; however, it is still dependent on the regional headquarters for finance and 
computer systems. 
Both of the managers felt that that corporate headquarters had difficulty in 
understanding the differences between the local operating environment and their own. 
The Finance Manager was gentler in his criticism giving corporate headquarters credit 
for understanding some of the difficulties faced by the company in China while 
complaining that they did not appreciate the lower quality of second-line managers 
(especially compared to Hong Kong & Singapore) that made it much harder for senior 
managers to delegate responsibility. The General Manager Finance was much more 
strident complaining: "They have no idea what the business is like. Too much 
contact is in the formn of `specific issue related' Emails. There is a lack of real 
unclc'rstanding. Remote location management in China is vent' risky there is a need 
for structure. There is a definite need for more visits frone regional headquarters so 
that managers at the regional level can gain a real understanding of the business. " 
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5.1.6.3 RBSIC 
Since his 2003 transfer to Beijing the Finance Manager has had day-to-day 
responsibility for the RBSIC in China. Previously he had been responsible for the 
RBSIC when he was based in Hong Kong. Both the General Manager Finance and 
Finance Manager had previous experience of working with systems of internal 
control. The system used by the Finance Manager had been based exclusively on 
financial indicators with other risks considered but not in a formal or comprehensive 
manner. While the General Manager Finance said that the previous systems he had 
worked with were linked with the audit role. At his previous companies he was given 
a set of principles on which their control culture was based. This dominated the way 
the company was run. They were constantly reinforced "until the staff was 
brainwashed " 
The Finance Manager was very confident when asked about the degree to which the 
RBSIC was embedded in the business saying: "It is not perfect but there is not a long 
ivav to go ". He added that the formal description of how the RBSIC was supposed to 
function was flexible enough ".... to give volt the freedom to do what is appropriate " 
While the General Manager Finance was most concerned about the general lack of 
knowledge of the practice and the need to provide as much guidance as possible. 
This was supported by the Finance Manager who acknowledged that awareness of the 
practice wtiwas probably limited to senior management and most employees do not 
regard themselves as risk managers. 
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The Finance Manager regarded the RBSIC as periodic. '`it is seen as a very specific 
separate task in itself", rather than ongoing. He acknowledged that awareness needed 
to be raised to improve the level of internal debate about risk management and 
mitigation. Although he did not regard the RBSIC as a bureaucratic task he 
acknowledged this may not be the case throughout the business unit. Both the 
General Manager Finance and Finance Manager of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary 
acknowledged the potential for the RBSIC to identify business opportunities but had 
not used it in that way. The Finance Manager of Excelsior's China subsidiary 
commented that they tended to identify and mitigate risks and did not think `outside 
the box'. He acknowledged that this approach can "stifle innovation ". 
Although nothing was done to ensure the RBSIC was working effectively, other than 
a yearly review of the system, independently of the RBSIC specific risks are reported 
to the Managing Director and discussed at the bi-weekly meeting of senior 
management where they are noted and revisited during the year. 
5.1.7 Hong Kong 
5.1.7.1 Data Sources 
The data for this case was provided by the General Manager (Hong Kong) and the 
Accountant (Hong Kong). Both managers are Hong Kong born Chinese and have 
worked for the company for less than three years. Additional data was gathered 
through the examination of business unit documents. 
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An informal lunch meeting was also held where the researcher was introduced to a 
number of the other staff working in Hong Kong providing a forum for a discussion 
about the RBSIC. 
5.1.7.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior operates in Hong Kong through a joint venture with a local company - 
Mandarin18 - that has been in place for eight years, ownership is split 70: 30 
respectively. The joint venture covers Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. It does not 
have any manufacturing interests importing all of the product it sells. 
Both managers acknowledged that the business's trading operation status made it 
dependent on the rest of Excelsior for product. ' 9 However, the marketing and sales 
functions are not subject to external control and operate independently. The joint 
venture partner handles warehousing and distribution. The business reports to the 
Greater China sub-region headquarters in Beijing which the General Manager visits 
on a monthly basis. 
Both managers described the business as very supportive of learning, change and 
innovation. The General Manager felt that this was due in part to the short time most 
of the staff had spent with Excelsior wvhich in nearly all cases was between two and 
three years. The business had not been asked to implement any new practices 
recently. The General Manager thought this was "due to the current volatile nature 
of the region " 
18 For confidentiality reason it is not possible to give the company's real name. 
19 Fhe largest proportion of their product is sourced from Australia. followed by Malaysia. 
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The managers disagreed on the extent to ww hich corporate headquarters understood the 
differences in the local operating environment and that of the UK. The General 
Manager thought it was not an issue due in part to the large number of British 
expatriate managers who have worked in the office. While the Accountant felt that 
corporate headquarters was not really aware of the differences that exist between the 
operating environments. However, she did not regard this as a problem saying 
".... the differences as just differences in working style " 
5.1.7.3 RBSIC 
The Accountant is responsible for the RBSIC; this task was previously undertaken by 
the Finance Manager (China) who moved to Beijing in 2003. Both managers had 
very little experience of working with systems of internal control. The General 
Manager remarked that this was normally the responsibility of the Finance Manager 
adding that the RBSIC was far more developed than any internal control systems that 
had operated in any of the other companies where he had previously worked. While 
the Accountant said she had previously worked for locally owned companies "who 
slid not bother ii ith such systems " and she did not have any knowledge of internal 
control systems that contained non-financial controls. 
Both managers agreed that the RBSIC should be embedded throughout the business, 
and that it was a high priority to achieve this, but it will take time. At the 
management level the practice is understood while at the junior level they lack 
detail"". Most people are aware of the RBSIC though not how it works. The risk 
20 This \N as supported during conversations the researcher had with junior members of staff 
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identification process involves senior staff only. The General Manager believed the 
most difficult part in implementing the RBSIC was related to cultural difficulties 
while the Accountant felt the biggest problem was the "absence of technical 
training. " The Accountant was rather embarrassed to admit that she had not been 
given a formal description of the practice and was therefore uncertain of the degree to 
which the practice followed the recommended approach. While the General Manager 
remarked: "We are definitely trying to follow the practice but we have to allow for 
localisation.... we don't know yet how appropriate the practice is. " Regarding the 
potential of the RBSIC to identify business opportunities he said: "To be honest it is 
often the reverse, an opportunity is identified and then you check the risks ". In his 
experience when you are considering a business opportunity you look at the return on 
investment and tend to forget about the risk. 
Both of the managers regarded the RBSIC as ongoing with the General Manager 
saying: "It is an ongoing practice; the follow-up column 'ensures this. " While the 
Accountant described the RBSIC rather contradictorily as ongoing "despite its 
periodic nature " 
Although nothing was formally done to ensure that the RBSIC was working 
effectively the General Manager said that previously identified risks were checked 
with the person who has been given responsibility for a risk "even' two or three 
mouths ". The Accountant said the frequency of reviewing risks was different for 
each risk. 
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5.1.8 Thailand 
5.1.8.1 Data Sources 
The data for this case was provided by the Managing Director (Thailand) and the 
Senior Finance Director (Thailand). Both were born in Thailand. The Managing 
Director was previously with the American MNE acquired by Excelsior having joined 
them two years earlier from another American MNE. The Senior Finance Director 
was also previously with the acquired American MNE, having joined them three years 
earlier from another American MNE. 
5.1.8.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior's Thai business, based in Bangkok, was part of its 2002 acquisition of an 
American MNE, it is Excelsior's largest business in South East Asia and is the South 
East Asia sub-regional headquarters. The business commenced operations shortly 
after the conclusion of the Second World War. It does not have a sales force but 
works with a distributor who is dedicated to Excelsior. It is in the process of spending 
£ 1.2 mil lion on upgrading facilities where risks had been identified during the 
previous year's RBSIC. e. g. The main plant did not have a sprinkler system one is 
now being installed. 
The Managing Director felt that the business needed to be more supportive of 
learning, change and innovation. He went on to explain that it had been adversely 
affected by the uncertainty surrounding its future in the two years before its 
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acquisition by Excelsior. This had made many employees risk averse. He did not feel 
the business could be described as a `learning organisation' but was moving slowly 
towards becoming one. On a cautious note he said: "There is a need to be careful 
because discipline relating to qualittiy is key, change increases unknowns and risks. 
The business needs to keep rigid controls but be more flexible in its attitude to 
change. " 
The Senior Finance Director disagreed with the Managing Director he felt the 
business was very supportive of change and innovation and went on to give a number 
of examples of how the business had had to change to fit in with Excelsior. He added 
the business was encouraged by both corporate and regional headquarters to be 
innovative but the most important person in learning, change and innovation was the 
local Managing Director. 
Both the Managing Director and Senior Finance Director said they had been asked to 
implement a lot of new practices recently as a result of the acquisition. But they did 
not believe this has led to a downgrading of the importance of the RBSIC. 
The two managers described something of `mixed picture' with regard the degree of 
independence enjoyed by the business. The Managing Director described the Thai 
operations as "nerv much part of an organisation ". He went on to say that managers 
tend to have two bosses - local and functional e. g. supply chain. However, there is 
not a lot of control from headquarters on a day-to-day basis. The operation is large 
enough to be relatively free from interference and is self-sustaining. The Senior 
Finance Director added there is a requirement to follow Excelsior standards; however, 
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locally the business is `free to do its own thing" while relying on Excelsior for 
commercial strategy. 
The Managing Director and Senior Finance Director felt it was too early (following 
the acquisition) to gauge the level of understanding of the Thai business by corporate 
headquarters. The Managing Director cheerfully commented that compared to his 
previous experience, where the parent company had very little understanding of the 
local operating environment and adopted an inflexible approach that expected the 
local business to use procedures developed for the US market, Excelsior was "more 
flexible ". 
5.1.8.3 RBSIC 
The Senior Finance Director is responsible for the day-to day management of the 
RBSIC. Both managers had previous experience of working with systems of internal 
control. The Managing Director said the RBSIC was "a definite improvement " on the 
previous system which was not formal and was restricted to a section in a recurring 
report. Also it was not as widespread with regard to the issues it considered. 
Furthermore, its effectiveness was hindered by the requirement for part of the 
business to report directly to the United States while the remainder of the business 
reported to the local management. Now everybody reports to the Managing Director 
leading to more sharing of information. The Senior Finance Director added the 
previous system emphasised financial control and did not really consider non- 
financial issues. 
Derek Condon 13 04, ' 12. X007 
Both of the managers of the Thailand subsidiary were unsure if the business complied 
with the formal description of the RBSIC with the Senior Finance Director 
commenting that he had expected more direction on implementing the practice from 
regional headquarters. 
Both managers felt that through an understanding of risk it was easier to identify 
opportunities enabling the business to be managed more effectively. The Managing 
Director gave the example of how concerns over the risk of a gasoline price increase 
had led to the introduction of better management of usage and purchasing practices. 
The business unit's aim was to embed the practice in the top three, maybe four, layers 
of the company. Presently, only the top two layers of management are involved in the 
risk identification process. In the factory it is generally the top three. The Managing 
Director felt that it would be very challenging to institutionalise it throughout the 
organisation. While the Senior Finance Director believed that in time the RBSIC 
could be embedded throughout the company while admitting he was not exactly sure 
what this would entail especially with regard to the frequency of regular reviews that 
would be required21. The Managing Director acknowledged that the level of 
awareness of the RBSIC especially among junior staff was not as high as it should be. 
While the Senior Finance Director commented that employees "appreciate" the 
RBSIC once they have some understanding of the practice, however, developing that 
understanding is a problem. 
It should be noted that the attitude of the Senior Finance Director at times seemed to suggest that he 
saýý the RBSIC as little more than a part if the internal audit process. 
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Both of the managers believed culture would be a source of difficulties when 
implementing the RBSIC but not in the institutionalisation of the practice. The 
Finance Director said this was because once initial implementation difficulties, due to 
culture based resistance, had been overcome the business unit's organisational culture 
would be strong enough for the RBSIC to be institutionalised. 
The Managing Director regarded the RBSIC as ongoing, generally through informal 
discussion. However, he went on to say: "But other things are more 
important.... immediate concerns tend to dominate... . as the 
RBSIC is not seen as 
directly affecting the P&L it is not that urgent. " While the Senior Finance Director 
rather contradictorily said: "It is ongoing and should not be seen as periodic. 
However, it is difficult to embed outside of the formal annual revieil'. " 
Both managers acknowledged there were no clear milestones to ensure that the 
RBSIC was working effectively. The Senior Finance Director commented: 
"Probably, more needs to be done. " At present the system and its output are 
reviewed annually. 
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5.1.9 Malaysia 
5.1.9.1 Data Sources 
The data for this section was provided by the Finance Manager (Malaysia & 
Singapore) 22 who is based in Kuala Lumpur. He has held this position since 2001 and 
has worked for Excelsior throughout the region for the last 10 years. He is Malaysian. 
Further information was provided during a short telephone conversation with the 
Managing Director (Malaysia) who is British and been in the role for less than a year. 
5.1.9.2 The Business Unit 
The Malaysian business has been established for 30 years and has been manufacturing 
for the last 20 years. Most of the senior management team are new to the business 
including the Managing Director and the Head of Sales. There is also some 
restructuring going on at the supply chain level. Excelsior's Singaporean subsidiary 
reports to managers based in the Malaysian business unit. 
The business unit was regarded as receptive to learning, change and innovation. The 
Finance Manager believed this was because the business had gone through many 
changes in recent years normally not through choice. At the most senior level it has 
had six Managing Directors in the last ten years. This had led to a business that was 
quite adaptable. He went on to say that the he believed the business was equally 
receptive to ideas whether they are generated from inside or outside the organisation. 
22 The Finance Manager in Singapore has a dual reporting line to the General Manager (Singapore) and 
the Finance Manager (Malaysia & Sin`gapore). 
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With regard to being asked to implement new practices the Finance Manager said: 
".... there had been lots of small things and not many major changes. " 
Although overall strategy is determined by regional and corporate headquarters on a 
day-to-day basis the business unit has a high level of autonomy. This was described 
by the Finance Manager as: "as long as the operation meets its targets there is very 
little interference. " 
The Finance Manager had very little contact with the UK and was unaware of their 
level of knowledge about the operation. However, he was confident that the business 
was understood by Asia-Pacific headquarters largely due to the long serving 
expatriates, who had previously been based in Malaysia and were still in the region, 
and the regular visitors to the business from regional headquarters. 
5.1.9.3 RBSIC 
The Finance Manager is responsible for the RBSIC in Malaysia. He had no previous 
experience of using a risk based system of internal control. Before the introduction of 
the RBSIC the business did not have a risk management system and the identification 
and mitigation of risks did not follow a structured approach, it was undertaken using 
what he described as a `tacit' approach. Although he did not care to elaborate greatly 
on what he meant by `tacit' he inferred that it was interchangeable with experience 
and instinct. He was very confident that the formal description of the practice 
contained in the three short documents issued by the regional RBSIC team was 
sufficient for his needs and he followed them exactly. While ackno« lodging that the 
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RBSIC could lead to cost savings. as yet, nothing has been identified that ýt ill add 
value to the business. Presently, he was concentrating on the negative side of risk and 
how it could be mitigated. 
The RBSIC was only embedded in the business at the senior management level and 
the Finance Manager thought it would be very difficult to embed at lower levels as 
these employees do not think about risk "it is not their job ". Although, he believed 
that most employees are aware of the RBSIC, especially in the factory, he did not feel 
enough had been done to relate the RBSIC to the local business's requirements and 
that the practice is still seen very much as function specific frequently linked to the 
group insurance function. Personally, he regarded the RBSIC as a "compliance 
task ". He went on to say that although risk management is discussed in the monthly 
management meeting it is done so in a relatively informal manner and the risk 
identification process is only undertaken at the senior level. He added the periodic 
nature of the RBSIC and getting employees to treat the practice as a priority made 
embedding the practice more difficult. He went on to say: "Sometimes a risk is 
regularll, reviewed, mann are not. Ongoing operational risks are more likely to be 
rci', eit'ed than strategic risks. " 
There were no formal procedures to review whether the RBSIC was working 
effectively only informal discussions. Previously identified risks were reviewed on an 
annual basis. The Finance Manager concluded the interview by describing the RBSIC 
as "bettel' tjl(Ill nothing. " 
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5.1.10 Singapore 
5.1.10.1 Data Sources 
The data for this case was provided by the General Manager (Singapore), the Finance 
Manager (Singapore)23 and the Administration Manager (Singapore). All three are 
Singaporean. The General Manager has been with the business since its inception in 
1989. The Finance Manager and the Administration Manager joined the company in 
1998 and 1995 respectively. 
5.1.10.2 The Business Unit 
The Singapore business was established in June 1989 and is by far the smallest of the 
three South East Asian businesses. It is a marketing and distribution operation with 
no production facilities. Eighty percent of its product comes from Australia. It has a 
very flat operating structure with three departments - marketing and distribution, 
finance and administration, and logistics. 24 
The managers all agreed that the business unit was supportive of learning, change and 
innovation and was equally open to ideas from inside and outside the organisation. 
Innovation was regarded as a "must " as the business is only a sales and marketing 
operation in a country with a small population. This has led it to adopt a strategy 
where, because it is too small to develop its own products, it identifies Excelsior 
products from around the world and then has them repackaged to suit the local 
23 The Finance Manager (Singapore) has a dual reporting line to the General Manager (Singapore) and 
the Finance Manager (Malaysia & Singapore). 
24 It has its own vehicle fleet that delivers directly to clients within 48 hrs of an order being placed. 
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market. However, it was remarked that due to resource constraints sometimes the 
business was unable to be as innovative as it would like to be. On a similar note all 
three managers commented that in the last year there have been lots of ne« practices. 
Most of which were seen as having value. However, often they do not have time to 
manage them properly due to lack of resources. 
The General Manager described the subsidiary as "lent, independent ", despite being 
dependent on the rest of the group for product, adding that sometimes they feel "a bit 
cut-off" from the rest of the organisation. This view was supported by the 
Administration Manager who said: "We area small business that tends to get 
forgotten. Sometimes information takes a long time to `Ater-down ' to us " 
There was a general belief that both the corporate and regional headquarters did not 
understand the Singaporean operating environment. The General Manager gave the 
following example to support her argument: "The company sends people to 
Singapore with Western values who cannot appreciate the differences. e. g. One 
expatriate was sent to the office and was unhappy about how long a customer was 
taking to make payment on his last delivery and ordered that he should not receive 
anymore product until payment had been made. He did not appreciate the seasonal 
differences in purchasing patterns, at certain times of the year it is normal for 
payment to be delayed. " 
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5.1.10.3 RBSIC 
The Finance Manager, who is responsible for the RBSIC, in common with the other 
two managers had very little previous experience of formal internal control systems 
and no experience of risk-based systems of internal control, described the previous 
system of internal control as an informal system that only looked at financial 
indicators. 
She felt unable to comment if the practice operated as intended because none of the 
risks identified had ever occurred. While the General Manager commented: "We ti-i, 
to stick close to the practice but have to make some changes ". She added the practice 
needs to be "tailored" to the local environment allowing for its culture. All the 
managers commented that they had not found the RBSIC to be of any value in the 
identification of business opportunities. The General Manager described the RBSIC 
as a practice that allows you to put a plan in place should something happen. In 
common with the other two managers she believed the process of identifying risk 
does enable a manager to review a business and develop a deeper understanding of 
how it functions but did not assist in the identification of opportunities. 
The Finance Manager did not expect the RBSIC to become embedded throughout the 
business in the near term, to-date it had only been undertaken by senior management 
and there were no plans to go beyond that. The General Manager added that the 
RBSIC needs to be more formalised and better understood before it would be possible 
to embed the practice. In addition more time and resources were needed if the 
practice NN-ere to he institutionalised. When asked how employees in general regarded 
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the RBSIC' the General Manager said: "People are at irre they are accountable for 
their behaviour. " While the Finance Manager said: "They only think about it during 
the annual review period. " While the General Manger acknowledging the value of 
the practice admitted that she and her team regarded the practice as largely an annual 
bureaucratic task. 
The General Manager was keen to emphasis that risk management is a normal part of 
business and goes on all the time saying. "Of course risk is always considered 
whenever taking a business decision. e. g. When deciding how much shelf space to 
have or making volume predictions " adding the RBSIC output was sometimes used 
in this role. However, she and the other two managers regarded the RBSIC as a 
periodic task, that is done once a year, when the previous years work is updated. The 
RBSIC was not reviewed to see if it was working effectively. 
5.2.0 Landmark 
5.2.1 The Company 
Landmark is listed on the London Stock and is therefore required to follow UK 
corporate governance codes and regulations. The company operates in the consumer 
goods sector and has a turnover in excess of £1 billion. It employs over 14,000 
people. Over 90% of its revenues are derived in the UK with less than 1% coming 
from the Asia-Pacific region.,, 
2S - Me company does not provide data for individual joint ventures. 
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5.2.2 Risk-Based System of Internal Control 
Landmark's RBSIC was introduced on the IS` July, 2000. 
Risks are identified through the adoption of a `bottom-up' and `top-down' process 
where business units identify their strategic goals and objectives and then look at the 
risks to achieving these goals and objectives. As part of the practice business units 
are told to pay particular attention to the risk of not taking valuable opportunities. 
The RBSIC is carried out every quarter, as well as being undertaken on an ongoing 
basis when new business opportunities are identified or there are changes in the 
operating environment. 
To determine the potential effects of a risk a standard scoring mechanism is used 
across the group that assigns values of 0-4 to two variables. First, Risk impact 
which refers to the cost to the business should the risk occur. This is normally 
measured in monetary terms but media impact and physical safety are also 
considered. Second, Risk Likelihood an assessment of how likely a risk is to occur. 
This is undertaken initially on a gross risk basis (risk before controls are applied). 
Once a risk is scored it is plotted on a matrix (see Fig. 5.1). The area that attracts the 
most attention is Significant Risk. Once these have been identified controls are 
applied creating what are known as net risks. Businesses own their risks but when a 
significant risk is identified the controls are considered centrally. If the net risk is still 
seen as unacceptable to the business further measures may be applied to mitigate the 
risk including transferring it to a third part\ e. g. Outsourcing or buying insurance. 
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Figure 5.1 
Business Risks Matrix 
4 
Impact 
0 
Likelihood 
4 
Originally the board was only concerned with significant risks but increasingly they 
are asking about other risks. Risks with a low likelihood / high impact require 
contingency planning while those with high likelihood / low impact normally require 
supervisory, management and organisational controls. 
Significant risks are analysed by the Risk Committee which is comprised of nine 
senior executives26 and chaired by the Chief Operating Officer. Each committee 
member specialises in a specific area of the business. The Committee meets quarterly 
with a minimum of five members present and has the responsibility to review the 
RBSIC on behalf of the board. 
When a significant risk is identified the business unit is asked to carry out a self- 
certification exercise to confirm whether the controls they have in place are the same 
as the ones they had previously documented. 
o Operational and subsidiary directors 
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The practice is continuous. This is done by appointing risk facilitators in each part of 
the business that have ownership of the risk. The individuals undertaking this task do 
it voluntarily and are good communicators. The also have the facility to approach the 
Risk Management Department with their concerns without their line manager being 
aware this has happened. (There is also a completely confidential `hot line' for any 
employee who wishes to report a risk that they feel is not be adequately mitigated. ) 
All of the risks are recorded and entered into a risk data base. This was designed by 
Landmark and enables risks to be looked at in many ways. e. g. location, size, type. 
Risks of a similar type e. g. IT problems that are highlighted by a number of business 
units are presented to the board as a single risk. The Risk Register is open for any 
director to view should they wish. 
Landmark has a website detailing the RBSIC. The site, which is available to all UK 
employees via the company intranet, is designed to "heighten awareness of risk issues 
and to communicate fulh' all aspects of the Group 's risk process. ' There are also 
workshops held throughout the UK to further explain the practice and what is 
expected of employees. 
To date the Director of Risk Management does not believe there have been many 
problems with individuals identifying risk although he did admit: "That some people 
in the organisation feel that risk is a bad thing and to acknowledge its existence mai 
not be advantageous. However, this is not the case with most employees. " 
27 Landmark 2003 Annual Report 
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The Risk Committee reports to the board on inadequately controlled risks and action 
taken two to three times a year. They also report occurrences and near occurrences. 
The Internal Audit Department conduct compliance audits on the controls that the 
Group relies upon the most to mitigate significant risks. This is undertaken ww hen the 
gross risk score is very different from the net risk score to confirm the effectiveness of 
the controls adopted. 
5.2.3 Taiwan 
5.2.3.1 Data Sources 
The data for this section was provided by the Landmark Director of International 
Market Development, Joint Managing Director (Landmark), Joint Managing Director 
(Marco Polo28), Marketing Manager (Landmark) and the Operations Manager 
(Landmark). The Landmark Director of International Market Development is British 
based in the UK and has been with company for more than five years. The Joint 
Managing Director (Landmark) has been employed by Landmark for a number of 
years and has extensive international experience including the Asia-Pacific region. 
The Joint Managing Director (Marco Polo) is Taiwanese and has had a long career 
with Marco Polo based mainly in Taiwan with some time spent in the United States. 
The Marketing Manager (Landmark), along with his Taiwanese equivalent, is 
responsible for sales and the Operations Manager (Landmark), along with his 
equivalent, is responsible for distribution and storage, information technology and the 
'' Marco Polo is Landmark's joint venture partner in Taiwan for confidentiality reasons its real name 
cannot be revealed. 
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company's call centre. Both managers were seconded from Landmark operations in 
the UK.. All three Landmark managers are British and have been with the joint 
venture since its inception. 
5.2.3.2 The Business Unit 
Excelsior's Taiwanese based joint venture with Marco Polo commended operations in 
2001. When after an extensive review of the risks involved when entering the 
Taiwanese29 market Landmark decided to adopt a joint venture strategy. Both of the 
partners have a 50% share in company. It has a board consisting of four directors; 
two from each partner, in the case of deadlock Landmark has the casting vote. 
Marco Polo, is a local conglomerate that began as a trading company over 25 years 
ago and now has offices in a number of countries. It is a quoted company with 
majority ownership in the hands of one individual who, with his family members, 
dominates the company. Its relationship with Landmark started when it began the 
joint venture. Landmark chose Marco Polo as their partner after an extensive search30 
based on their retail and property experience, common ideas for business 
development, financial strength and experience of international joint ventures. 
Initially Landmark sent seven expatriate managers to Taiwan, this number has been 
reduced to three. Each expatriate manager has a Taiwanese equivalent (or shadow) 
29 Landmark entered lfaiw an as a low-risk way of testing both the potential for rolling out the nex, ý 
formats internationally, and its business model for expansion in the Far East. While at the same time 
allowing it to de,, elop skills and knowledge of working in Asia. (Source: Landmark 2003 Annual 
Report) 
30 Landmark met with over 20 potential partners (Source: Director of International Market 
Development) 
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they are responsible for the three key areas of Managing Director, marketing and 
operations. 
All three British managers and the Managing Director (Marco Polo) felt that the joint 
venture was supportive of change, learning and innovation. The Managing Director 
(Landmark) described adopting new techniques as "... seen as something to take pride 
in. " The Managing Director (Marco Polo) added that: "Marco Polo is vertiy open to 
foreign ideas, most of the senior management are Western educated and / or have 
spent some time working in the West. " 
Generally new practices are tailored to local employee and customer requirements and 
developed in Taiwan with new practices mandated by corporate headquarters tending 
not to involve operational issues being more related to product changes and new 
marketing strategies. 
The Managing Director (Landmark), supported by the other two British managers, 
said that although the business was dependent on Landmark for cash injections and 
70% of their product it was very independent "and this is not necessarily right ". He 
speaks to the Director of International Market Development daily and the Business 
Development Director twice a week other than that his communication with corporate 
headquarters is very limited. 
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There was a general feeling among the British managers that, despite the large 
number of senior personnel who came to visit the business 31. Landmark corporate 
headquarters had difficulty in understanding the local operating environment. The 
Managing Director (Landmark) was the most outspoken in his comments saying: 
"They haven 't got a clue outside of the International Department. Landmark is not 
learning or benefiting from its Taiwanese experience. I was just sent to Taipei and 
told to get on with it. " 
To illustrate his point the Managing Director (Landmark) gave the example of 
problems caused by corporate headquarters forgetting to make a cash injection into 
the joint venture, taking 10 days before the payment was finally made. This was 
because only one person in the Finance Department knew anything about the joint 
venture and he was on holiday, unreachable and had left no instructions. This led to 
considerable embarrassment for the Landmark staff at the joint venture, substantial 
inconvenience and lengthy discussions with the government department responsible 
for joint ventures who wanted to know where the money was. 
A further example was provided by the Operations Manager who was concerned 
about the lack of understanding of certain local practices such as the custom of using 
the Lunar Calendar to identify good days to buy a product and that when the 
newspapers announce it is a good day to make a purchase sales rise. 
The Marketing Manager was concerned that none of the non-executive board members have visited 
the company and felt it would be helpful it more people came to see the operation. 
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5.2.3.3 RBSIC 
The RBSIC for Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture is undertaken, using a `top- 
down' approach, by a risk facilitator (based in the International Department in the 
UK). In addition a Risk Committee member has been given responsibility for the 
joint venture. Each quarter changes in previously recognized risks and new risks are 
identified (in discussions with locally based senior management) and the information 
is transmitted to the Risk Management Department. The need for the RBSIC to be 
fully implemented in the joint venture, with risk identification and mitigation 
undertaken in Taiwan, is acknowledged by Landmark's senior management who 
asked the researcher to provide them with a report of his findings and make 
recommendations on how this should be achieved. 32 
The Landmark Director of International Market Development remarked that Marco 
Polo regard the RBSIC as very much a UK requirement and at times are "quite 
bemused " by the whole practice. Given the generally `poor level " of corporate 
governance in Taiwan he did not find this surprising. However, he felt the more 
Marco Polo saw of the practice the more they appear to be "appreciating" the benefits 
that arise from it. 
Existing locally based risk management controls emphasise the operational aspects of 
the business and in particular health and safety issues. The Operations Manager who 
has direct responsibility for most of these parts of the business described the health 
and safety environment in Taiwan as "tiot at all close to the UK standard ". He had 
32 The researcher was not paid for this work and no contribution was made towards associated 
expenses. 
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introduced first-aid training and fire drills in the distribution and storage departments 
where previously there were no fire drills just occasional tests of smoke detectors. He 
added considerable attention is paid to what happens at the client site where checks 
are made on the actions of employees. Problems that had been identified included 
putting bare wires into an electrical socket to power a drill and placing tools on 
polished furniture surfaces risking scratching. 
He saw his himself operating in a `fire fighting' role, commenting that as there were 
not any `official' risk management standards for the business he regarded it as his 
responsibility to set his own standards for the parts of the business he managed. The 
Marketing Manager also acknowledged that a formal risk management process was 
not in place for the parts of the business he managed. However, the same sorts of 
checks are in place as would be used in the UK and that given the relatively small size 
of the business it is possible to operate a constant checking process and work by 
consensus. 
All three Taiwan-based British managers acknowledged the link between risk and 
opportunity. The Marketing Manager commented that the process of risk 
identification "reveals the need for change to meet customer's expectations ". While 
the Operations Manager said the identification of risks "provides You with an 
opportunity to improve what yon do, it enables you to look outside the box, and 
Consider more thorn just dal -to-dav events ". The Director of International Market 
Development commented simply that risk management did not have a role to play in 
the identification of opportunities which he regarded as part of the strategic planning 
function. 
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When asked if they believed the RBSIC would eventually be embedded in the 
business the Managing Director (Landmark) was the most optimistic acknowledging 
it would take time and that as he had done on other occasions, if necessary, he would 
be prepared to use external training. The Marketing and Operations Managers were 
rather more pessimistic making the comments "You do the best you can " and "It it-ill 
take a life time" respectively. 
The Managing Director (Landmark) felt that the most important factor in 
institutionalising the RBSIC would be explaining to an individual what it means to 
him and why it has to be done. He believed the practice was really about change 
management and culture should not be seen as issue commenting "it is often used as a 
smoke screen ". This view was not shared by the Landmark Director for International 
Market Development who felt the biggest impediment to the successful 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC in Taiwan was cultural and the practice would need 
to be constantly supervised or "local attitudes " would become dominant. His 
assessment was supported by the Operations Manager who felt that culture was "a 
huge problem ". The Managing Director (Marco Polo) agreed with the Managing 
Director (Landmark) and the Director for International Market Development about the 
importance of providing employees (especially those lower down the hierarchy) with 
a detailed explanation of the RBSIC saying that it was important to appreciate that the 
Marco Polo group only adopted a `business planning approach' to the management of 
the business fifteen years ago and even now it does not look more than one year 
ahead. Therefore, employees would find it difficult to relate to such a forward 
looking, non-reactive, practice. 
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5.2.4 Hong Kong 
5.2.4.1 Data Sources 
The data for this case was provided by the Managing Director and the Quality 
Assurance Manager both of whom are British. The Managing Director was 
previously Landmark's Group Procurement Director. 33 Before that he had worked in 
supply chain management for the UK subsidiary of a leading Japanese MNE. He 
expects to be in Hong Kong for three years if the project is successful. He has a 
forceful personality and gives the indication that he expects his instructions to be 
carried out and not questioned. 
The Quality Assurance Manager is responsible for the quality management and 
technical aspects of the business. He has substantial experience of the region having 
worked in a similar role for a number of other MNEs. 
5.2.4.2 The Business Unit 
The Hong Kong Joint venture was only established in mid 2003 and had not yet 
commenced full operations, however, it is expected to grow very quickly assuming a 
major role in the company's supply chain. The objective of the joint venture is to 
redefine processes and procedures for Landmark's global supply chain. It will 
'i : \t the time of the intervie'\ he still held this post in addition toi his Hung Kong responsibilities but 
was in the process of moving permanently to Hong Kong to concentrate exclusi\ elf on his role as 
\tanauin, 
-, 
Director of the joint venture. 
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become Landmark's sole supplier of product from China34. Through supplier 
sourcing and management in China it is expected to generate reduced costs35, improve 
margin opportunities for the existing Landmark product portfolio, and assure the 
quality of both products and suppliers. When it becomes fully operational in 2004 it 
is expected to have around 100 staff with the vast majority36 based in China. 
Ownership of the joint venture is split 50: 50 between Landmark and the Hong Kong 
based company - Regent. 
37 It has a board consisting of six directors; three from each 
partner, in case of deadlock Landmark has the casting vote. Landmark chose Regent 
to be its partner because it had previous experience of working with the company, 
they have an existing China based infrastructure that they can use as a supply base 
and they are aware of European standards. Also it is an Anglicised company, the 
Chief Executive Officer is UK educated, and they have good connections in the UK. 
The Managing Director was very confident that the joint venture was open to learning 
and innovation but was uncertain if the unquestioning obedience of staff was desirable 
long-tenn commenting: "The thirst for knowledge from local recruits is very high, 
and theli are very open minded. Local employees are not as questioning as 
Westerners. This has advantages when it comes to commencing operations quickly 
although this may have unfortunate long-term implications. " 
34 China which has been identified as the lowest cost country for sourcing many of Landmark's core 
products and components that are currently procured within Europe (Source: Landmark 2003 Annual 
Report). 
35 Its target is to reduce Landmark's overall supplier costs by 10% 
36 Expected to reach 90% 
37 For confidentiality reasons its real name cannot be revealed. 
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He viewed the joint venture as relatively independent of corporate headquarters 
despite Landmark being its sole customer. Every month they have some form of 
direct contact with the UK. However, the management team has not yet been to the 
UK and none of the non-exec directors have visited the business. 
When asked if Landmark corporate headquarters understood the joint venture's 
operating environment he responded: "They have no idea. Senior management and 
especially the Board and even more especially the non-executive directors have little 
understanding of the risks involved in getting a global product to market. I am 
involved in `pioneering stuff' and it is my job to educate " 
5.2.4.3 RBSIC 
At present the RBSIC does not play an important role at the joint venture. To date the 
only risk analysis undertaken relating to the business unit was carried out when the 
decision to form the joint venture was taken. The Managing Director commented on 
the potentially negative aspects of emphasising risk management suggesting it may 
make a business and its employees risk averse and less likely to consider new ideas. 
When the decision is taken to institutionalise the RBSIC it will be the responsibility of 
the Managing Director who when comparing his previous experience with systems of 
internal control with the RBSIC said: "Control is greater at Landmark but not 
dccper. The bases arc covered but little is done to promote change. In nil previous 
CO111/)[1111' C011trol was 17101-C directed but when a problem was identified action was 
takcit quick/v. " 
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5.3.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the ten embedded case studies developed from the two 
main research subjects. It has described the individual business units, their approach 
to learning, change and innovation, their relationship with their respective 
headquarters and the operation of the RBSIC in their business unit including the 
degree to which it is perceived by local managers to be embedded in their own 
organisation. 
The next chapter will summarise the overall findings of this research, identifying the 
five factors identified as playing a key role in the degree of institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC at Excelsior and Landmark and how they relate theoretical framework 
introduced in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 6 
OVERALL FINDINGS 
6.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter will commence with a broad summary of the overall findings. This will 
be followed by a discussion of the degree to which the RBSIC has been 
institutionalised in Excelsior and Landmark's Asia-pacific business units applying the 
conceptual framework introduced in section 3.7.0. It will then go on to consider the 
concepts and practices of ceremonial adoption and how it relates to the two research 
subjects. Section 6.4.0 will introduce the five factors identified as playing a key role 
in the ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC at both companies discussing their 
relationship with the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. 
6.1.0 Broad Statement of Overall Findings 
The main thrust of the findings is that, although the degree of institutionalisation of 
the RBSIC differs across cases, the overarching picture is one of ceremonial adoption. 
Firstly, none of the informants believed the RBSIC was embedded in their business 
units beyond the top layer of management. Knowledge of the practice had in nearly 
all cases been limited to senior management who in most business units were directly 
involved with the practice. The majority of managers commented on the need to 
increase awareness of the practice throughout their business unit adding that junior 
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employees were unlikely to regard risk management as part of their job. Overall, 
managers, to quote the Managing Director of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary, felt that it 
"would he very challenging" to embed the practice throughout their business unit. 
Secondly, the Excelsior General Manager for Risk and his colleague the Business 
Continuity Manager acknowledged that although the RBSIC was ongoing for them it 
was not at the forefront of activities for other staff in the region who only notice risk 
when it is very apparent and therefore regard the practice as periodic. To a number of 
managers the RBSIC was little more than an annual exercise, to provide data for the 
regional headquarters about potential risks, and for this reason tended to be regarded 
as a one-off annual task which was generally not updated during the year. For 
example, the Finance Manager of Excelsior's Chinese business unit described the 
practice as periodic and "a very specific task in itself". While the Finance Manager 
of Excelsior's Singaporean business unit commented "They (employees) only think 
about it (the RBSIC) during the annual review period 11 
Thirdly, although the Managing Director of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary said risks 
were discussed during the year, he also admitted that the practice was "not that 
ucrg c'nt " as the RBSIC "is not seen as directly affecting the P&L" and suggested that 
discussions about risks tended to be informal. 
Other managers admitted that the RBSIC was regarded a specific separate task outside 
of the normal activities of management and that it tended to be forgotten outside the 
annual data gathering process. The Excelsior Regional Director of Finance suggested 
the practice should only be used when required The low priority attached to the 
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institutionalisation of the RBSIC was clearly demonstrated by the absence of both 
regular reviews of the risks identified during the annual risk identification process and 
`checks and balances' designed to monitor whether the practice was being operated 
effectively. 
A broad overall finding therefore is that the RBSIC has failed to become part of the 
`normal' operating practices of the company - clearly shown by the failure of all but 
one business unit to systematically review the risks identified during the previous 
annual risk review process and identify new risk outside of the annual risk review. 
Reasons for this relative lack of institutionalisation in the subsidiaries can be clustered 
around three major conceptual areas, each of which has resonance with wider 
organizational theory. They are: 
1. A lack of prioritisation, treating the institutionalisation of the RBSIC as an 
operational rather than a strategic decision. 
2. Only attending to the RBSIC when it became the focus of attention. 
3. Relegation of the RBSIC to an annual reporting exercise. 
Regarding the first point, many authors have shown that a failure to prioritise strategic 
decisions is likely to greatly reduce the chances of successful implementation. 
Putting these practices into action when they are treated as operational decisions is 
likely to lead to them being poorly implemented, or not implemented at all (Hickson 
et al, 2003; Miller et al, 2004). 
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The second point almost perfectly mirrors Cyert and March's (1963) notion of 
`problemistic search' and Weick's (1995) notion of enactment which permeate wider 
organization theory. According to these perspectives, managers only pay attention to 
issues when they become a problem, or when they come into focus in the enacted 
environment. Otherwise they remain unattended, often as un-noticed issues, with 
other factors being afforded greater strategic importance (links here with point one are 
evident). 
The third point also mirrors another of Cyert and March's (1963) concepts namely 
that of `sequential attention to goals'. Here, managers only attend to issues as they 
arise and in what seems to them a logical sequence given the perceived urgency (or 
not) of the issue. In the case of the RBSIC, relegation to being important only at 
annual reporting time is an example of such a process. 
The ability of managers to practice these three principles contributes to an overall lack 
of embeddedness of the RBSIC at the subsidiary level. The result is ceremonial 
adoption. The extent to which individual business units ceremonially adopt the 
RBSIC is directly linked to their implementation and internalisation of the practice, 
which is related, to varying degrees, to the five factors identified as playing a key role 
in the ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC that will be introduced in section 6.4.0. 
The next section will discuss the degree of institutionalisation of the RBSIC at the 
business units included in this study. 
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6.2.0 Degree of Institutionalisation 
Returning to the four patterns of adoption (see Figure 6.0), introduced in the 
conceptual framework discussed in section 3.7.0, this research has found that none of 
the business units could be placed in the category of Institutionalisation in all cases 
the levels of both implementation and internalisation were insufficient. 
Figure 6.0 
Likelihood of the Successful Institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
Low 
Ceremonial Institutionalisation 
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Similarly none of the business units could be placed in the category of Rejection. In 
all cases the practice had been introduced to the individual organisations and a 
sufficient level of implementation was apparent that the practice could not be 
described as rejected by any of the business units. 
Furthermorc, the data did not suggest that any business units could be placed in the 
category of Powerless Support. None of the business units had high levels of 
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internalisation combined with low levels of implementation. Although a number of 
managers commented that they could appreciate the potential value of the RBSIC they 
lacked the necessary understanding of the practice to internalise it. This was due to a 
number of reasons including a poor explanation of the RBSIC by the source, an 
absence of prior related knowledge and the incompatibility of the values and norms 
underlying the RBSIC with those found in the recipient business unit. 
As previously stated, although the degree of institutionalisation of the RBSIC differs 
across cases, all of the business units in this study can be placed in the Ceremonial 
Adoption category. However, on reflection the description of the category needs to be 
revised from the one originally suggested in section 3.7.0. This research has found 
that ceremonial adoption is present without the relatively high level of 
implementation proposed by Kostova and Roth (2002: 220). Kostova and Roth's 
research involved the transfer of quality management practices. It can be argued that 
the implementation and results of the introduction of quality management practices 
can be more easily measured than is the case with corporate governance practices 
(Teen, 2005) and that the degree of implementation necessary for ceremonial adoption 
is higher than would be the case with a corporate governance practice, such as the 
RBSIC, whose value may only be revealed on a periodic basis, if at all. Overall, the 
data suggest that it is easier to claim that the RBSIC has been implemented than 
would be the case with some other practices, which require the introduction of 
processes with a greater visibility inside the organisation, and whose level of 
implementation can be more effectively measured. In both Excelsior and Landmark 
implementation is far from optimal but enough for them to claim that the RBSIC rules 
(through the annual provision of risk data) are complied with while following their 
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form rather than their substance. 
Given that the level of implementation required for ceremonial adoption is less than 
suggested by Kostova and Roth (2002: 20) it will be easier for companies to adopt a 
`box ticking' approach (where the corporate governance tool is decoupled from a 
transformation in the firm's corporate governance culture (Aggilera, 2005: S43)) to 
corporate governance whereby a company claims in its annual report that in 
accordance with the Turnbull guidelines it has implemented an ongoing process for 
identifying, evaluating and managing the significant risks faced by the company even 
though the guidelines have been enacted in a superficial manner (either intentionally 
or otherwise) and are less than fully effective. This `comply or explain' ethos, a 
feature of UK corporate governance, can lead to companies adopting a suboptimal 
ceremonial adoption approach to corporate governance structures and practices 
simply to avoid the threat of sanctions from failing to comply (Keasey et al., 2005: 
41), thereby, gaining legitimacy, as measured by the approval of regulatory agencies 
and investors as well as public endorsement in the business media (Staw and Epstein, 
2000: 525). 
Ceremonial adoption, in the form of box-ticking, is evident at two levels in this study 
- the individual business unit and for the company as a whole. Individual business 
units are not fully implementing or internalising a practice that in many cases they do 
not value and / or understand but are still providing the required (if suboptimal) data 
to their respective corporate headquarters, thereby suggesting that the Turnbull 
uidelines are being followed. As stated in the Hampel Report (see 2.3.0) "... box- ., 
ticking can hcscizcd on as an easier option than the diligent pursuit of corporate 
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governance objectives. " (Hampel. 1998: Section 1.14). The provision of data to 
headquarters was not a priority and was generally treated as a separate exercise 
outside of the normal management processes of individual business units with the data 
normally collected on an annual basis by employees who lacked the necessary 
resources (including knowledge) to undertake the practice effectively. After the data 
has been collated and analysed at corporate headquarters, and presented to the board 
of directors, the companies are then able to take a `boiler plate' approach to 
governance that enables them to make a statement in their annual report (See 4.3.3) 
that they are meeting the requirements of the Turnbull guidelines and the Combined 
Code even though the guidelines have not been institutionalised in the company and 
the potential value of the RBSIC has not been fully realised. The performance of the 
MNE as a whole is affected by the behaviour of individual business units. To the 
extent that they have not institutionalised the RBSIC, the company as a whole cannot 
fully institutionalise the practice. 
In the next section ceremonial adoption, how it relates to the findings of this research 
and its implications for the two companies, is discussed in greater detail. 
6.3.0 Ceremonial Adoption 
Ceremonial adoption is the formal adoption of a practice on the part of the recipient 
unit's employees for legitimacy reasons, without their believing in its real value for 
the organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
By ceremonially adopting a practice mandated by its parent a business unit 
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demonstrates that it is acting on a collectively valued purpose in a proper and 
adequate manner. The incorporation of institutionalised elements provides an account 
of its activities that protects the organisation from having its conduct questioned 
(Scott and Lyman, 1968). The organisation becomes legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 349). The incorporation of structures with high ceremonial value, including 
those reflecting the latest expert thinking, such as the RBSIC, or those with the most 
prestige, makes the position of an organisation more favourable (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 351). It demonstrates socially the fitness of the business unit. 
Ceremonial Adoption can be as a result of both internal and external pressures. 
External legitimacy pressures for ceremonial adoption exist when local business unit 
employees feel an external coercive pressure to adopt a practice. The likely 
motivation for this would be achieving legitimacy with the parent company 
(Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987). In the context of MNEs ceremonial 
adoption occurs when an international business unit formally complies with the 
request of the parent to implement a practice but does not form positive attitudes 
towards it. (This may be because of high uncertainty about a practice or a belief that 
it is not valuable (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983)). Kostova and 
Roth (2002: 220) suggest that ceremonial adoption is particularly likely in the case of 
a MNE subsidiary because there is a high probability these two conditions will occur. 
Internal legitimacy pressures for ceremonial adoption exist when legitimacy pressures 
arise from inside the local business unit. The business unit reacts to internal pressures 
to improve its reputation within the MNE in the belief that by acquiescing to the 
parent's mandate to implement a practice, it increases its reputation and internal 
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legitimacy, potentially improving its access to resources and other forms of 
organisational support that are available from the parent. This data did not provide 
any examples of this occurring at the business units included in this research. 
Because standardised organisational practices must confront technical variations and 
anomalies, the generalised rules of an institutional environment are often 
inappropriate to specific situations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 355). This means that 
ceremonial adoption can have a detrimental affect on a business unit because 
activities celebrating institutional rules, although they count as virtuous ceremonial 
expenditures, can be costly reducing the overall efficiency of the business unit (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977: 355). On the other hand a business unit that neglects ceremonial 
requirements may be unsuccessful at externally portraying its efficiency (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 356). Excelsior Chinese subsidiary provides an example of a business 
unit, as a result of external pressure, making a virtuous ceremonial expenditure, 
designed to portray it efficiency, to the detriment of the overall business. In this case 
the business unit, following its parent's instructions to implement the RBSIC, 
incurred costs in doing so but derived little value from the practice because they 
lacked the necessary knowledge to undertake the RBSIC properly. 
The uncertainty regarding the real value of the practice may increase when it is being 
transferred into a foreign institutional environment because the practice tends to 
reflect the institutional environment of the parent company where the practice was 
developed and established (Kogut, 1993). Because of this institutional duality, the 
legitimacy pressures on subsidiaries to adopt the practice are particularly strong and 
complex (Kostova & Zaheer. 1999). Subsidiaries concerned with establishing 
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legitimacy with both the external host country institutional environment and the 
internal parent company institutional environment of the MNE may find it difficult to 
reconcile these two institutional pressures. An example which encapsulates the 
tensions arising from institutional duality can be seen at Excelsior's Malaysian 
subsidiary where the Finance Manager commented that it would be very difficult to 
get employees at the lower levels of the company hierarchy to consider risk because 
"it is not their job " and they do not appreciate the value of risk management unless it 
directly affects them. 
In this study the regulatory institutional profile of the parent company, reflected in the 
corporate governance requirements of the UK Combined Code, requires and enforces 
the RBSIC, while the regulatory, cognitive and normative profiles, of the local 
business unit's national context, are generally less favourable. This combination will 
have a dual effect. It will lead a subsidiary's employees to feel uncertain about the 
efficiency of the practice because they do not have the knowledge and the cognitive 
categories they need to correctly understand and interpret it. The practice is also 
suspect because it is not consistent with their own values and beliefs regarding risk 
management and corporate governance. The view may form within the subsidiary 
that the practice is inefficient and of little value to the subsidiary, even though the 
parent organisation believes otherwise (Kostova and Roth, 2002: 220). When this 
occurs the likelihood of ceremonial adoption happening is much greater. Examples of 
this can be seen at both Excelsior's Singapore and Japanese subsidiaries: In 
Singapore the General Manager said she implemented the RBSIC because "it is myy 
job and I am rcquired to do is lint is asked of irre ". At the same time she suggested the 
approach to risk adopted by the business unit, outside of the RBSIC, was adequate for 
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its needs. In Japan the Finance Director remarked about the RBSIC: "... we do not 
care about it, it provides no additional value. Normal business practices involve the 
consideration of risk and that provides sufficient information and lvalue. " 
Another reason for ceremonial adoption could be because the business unit views the 
RBSIC simply as a fad, arising from the parent's institutional setting which is distinct 
from the local setting of the subsidiary (Kostova and Roth, 2002: 220). The data did 
not reveal this view to be prevalent in any of the business units included in this study. 
The next section will consider the factors in the ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC at 
Excelsior and Landmark's Asia-Pacific business units. 
6.4.0 Factors in the Ceremonial Adoption of the RBSIC 
The previous discussion has examined the scope of ceremonial adoption ranging from 
variation in, for example, values and attitudes at the subsidiary level, to the 
characteristics of the parent-subsidiary relationship (and a host of other factors in 
between). Now we turn to the question of scale of ceremonial adoption. Whilst all of 
the business units in the sample show strong evidence of ceremonial adoption, the 
extent to which it can be described as ceremonial (and the reasons for this) vary. 
Broadly, the data indicates that the sample organisations differ in their scale of 
adoption due to at least one of the following factors: national context, organisational 
context, the practice (RBSIC), motivation and transfer process. Each is discussed 
more fully in the following five chapters. The remainder of this chapter xvill 
introduce the five factors and how they relate to elements of the theoretical 
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framework (see Figure 6.2) introduced in Chapter 3. 
Figure 6.2 
Framework for the analysis of the implementation and internalisation of a Turnbull based system of 
internal control in the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures of IK listed companies 
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Board Decision 
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Characteristics of the Relational Practice 
Context 
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Drawing on the variables and sub-variables in the theoretical framework a model can 
be drawn to illustrate how these five factors influence the degree of 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC in the Excelsior and Landmark Asia-Pacific business 
units (See Figure 6.3). Each factor will be discussed in turn identifying the key 
theoretical framework variables and sub-variables. The discussion begins by 
considering first context (national and organisational) and then considers the 
characteristics of the transfer process itself. 
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Figure 6.3 
Key Factors in the Institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
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6.4.1 National Context 
The transfer of the RBSIC takes place inside a national context. Differences in 
national context will directly influence the likelihood of the successful 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC with some countries providing a more favourable 
environment than others. (The variables and sub-variables of the theoretical 
framework that play an important role in shaping the national context are listed below 
in Table 6.0. ) Three sub-factors were identified as having an important role in the 
development of the national context within which the transfer of the RBSIC occurs --- 
/)exceptions of risk, national culture and the regulatory environment. 
ncrcl: Condon 1-2 
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Table 6.0 
Key Theoretical I ramework Variables and Sub-variables Influencing the National Context 
Sub-Factors Theoretical Framework Theoretical Framework 
Variables Sub-Variables 
Perceptions of Risk Social Context Cognitive 
Normative 
National Culture Social Context Cognitive 
Normative 
Regulatory Environment Social Context Regulatory 
Social context was the key theoretical framework variable in the shaping of the 
national context playing a role in all of the three sub-factors. However, the 
importance of social context sub-variables varied among the sub-factors. The 
regulatory sub-variable played a key role in the regulatory environment of recipient 
countries (see 7.3.0) but was not important in the other two sub-factors. National 
corporate governance standards, with the exception of Australia, differed considerably 
with those found in the United Kingdom increasing the likelihood that the RBSIC 
would not be institutionalised (see 7.3.0). 
The cognitive sub-variable played an important role in perceptions of risk and national 
culture. It was reflected in the shared social knowledge employees had regarding risk 
(see 7.1.0) and the concept of risk management (see 7.2.1) that was negative and 
limited respectively; their differences in what was perceived as ethical and their 
attitudes to ethical policies that were a relatively new concept to many employees 
(especially Landmark) (see 7.2.2); and their attitudes to whistle blowing which 
differed considerably throughout the region at both the national and intra-business 
unit level (see 7.?. 3). 
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The normative sub-variable also played a key role in perceptions of risk and national 
culture. It tended to reinforce negative attitudes to risk and risk management as the 
practice of identifying and managing risk was normally perceived as a search for 
events that would negatively impact upon the business unit and was contrary to the 
norms of the majority of recipient business units (see 7.1.0 and 7.2.0). The likelihood 
that an ethical and whistle blowing policy would be institutionalised was also a 
reflection of the beliefs, values, social norms and assumptions of the employees of a 
business unit, which are reflected in their national culture which was in the majority 
of cases unsupportive of both policies (see 7.2.2 and 7.2.3). 
6.4.2 Organisational Context 
Organisational context refers to the role of organisational factors in the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC. Even if the national context is supportive of the 
RBSIC the organisational context may not be favourable. This can lead to difficulties 
in transferring the RBSIC. (The variables and sub-variables of the theoretical 
framework that play an important role in shaping organisational context are listed 
below in Table 6.1. ) Two sub-factors were identified as having an important role in 
the development of an organisational context that would support (or not) the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC in a business unit - support for new practices and 
organisational differences. 
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Table 6.1 
Key Theoretical Framework Variables and Sub-variables Influencing a Business Unit's 
Organisational Context 
Sub-Factors Theoretical Theoretical Framework 
Framework Variables Sub-Variables 
Support for New Practices Organisational Context General Support for 
Learning, Change and 
Innovation 
Organisational Differences Organisational Context Absorptive Capacity 
Unsurprisingly organisational context was the key theoretical framework variable in 
the development of the organisational context. Once again the importance of 
theoretical framework sub-variables varied among the sub-factors. General support 
for learning, change and innovation played a key role in the likelihood that a business 
unit would be supportive of new practices with three quarters of managers believing 
this to be the case in their business unit (see 8.1.0). 
The absorptive capacity of a business unit, including the resources made available to 
business units for the institutionalisation of the RBSIC and the quality of intra- 
business unit communications (regarded positively and seen as improving by most 
managers) played an important role in determining organisational differences and was 
itself influenced by many variables that differed among business units (see 8.2.0). 
6.4.3 The Practice (RBSIC) 
['he practice refers to the RBSIC and this section is concerned with the understanding 
individual business units and managers have about the practice and the factors that 
influence their understanding. Even if the national and corporate contexts are 
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compatible with the RBSIC should managers lack an understanding of the practice it 
is unlikely to be successfully transferred. (The variables and sub-variables of the 
theoretical framework that play an important role in the understanding of the RBSIC 
in a business unit are listed below in Table 6.2. ) Two sub-factors were identified as 
having a key role in understanding the reasons for the RBSIC - awareness of the 
purpose of the RBSIC and related knowledge. 
Two of the theoretical framework variables played a role in a business units 
understanding of the RBSIC - characteristics of the practice transferred and 
characteristics of the practice recipient. 
Table 6.2 
Key Theoretical Framework Variables and Sub-variables Influencing 
the Practice (RBSIC) 
Sub-Factors Theoretical Framework 
Variables 
Theoretical Framework Sub- 
Variables 
Awareness of the Characteristics of the Causal Ambiguity 
purpose of the Practice Transferred 
RBSIC 
Related Characteristics of the Causal Ambiguity 
Knowledge Practice Transferred 
Characteristics of the Absorptive Capacity 
Practice Recipient 
Causal ambiguity played a key role in the awareness of the purpose of the RBSIC and 
related knowledge. The level of causal ambiguity was a reflection of the ambiguity 
about the factors relating to the reasons for the RBSIC (see 9.1.0), the varying levels 
of knowledge concerning risk identification (see 9.2.0) and an absence of appropriate 
documentation (explicit codified knowledge) and training about the RBSIC. A key 
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reason for this identified by a small majority of Excelsior managers (especially more 
junior managers directly involved in the practice) and all of the Landmark managers 
was the poor flow of information about the RBSIC from the source of the knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity played an important role in the sub-factor - related knowledge. 
The absence of prior related knowledge, specific to the operation of the RBSIC, 
necessary to develop the absorptive capacity required to institutionalise the practice 
was apparent in the majority of cases (see 9.2.0). 
6.4.4 Motivation 
Motivation refers to the degree to which both the source and the recipient are 
motivated to institutionalise the RBSIC at the recipient unit. Even if the national and 
corporate contexts are compatible with the RBSIC and the understanding of the 
RBSIC among business units and their managers is high, if the source and / or the 
recipient are not motivated to institutionalise the practice, it is unlikely to be 
successfully transferred. (The variables and sub-variables of the theoretical 
framework that play an important role in determining the levels of motivation to 
institutionalise the RBSIC at the source and recipient are listed below in Table 6.3. ). 
Two sub-factors were identified as having a key role determining the level of 
motivation to institutionalise the RBSIC - the source of the RBSIC and the recipient 
business unit. 
Four of the theoretical framework variables played a role in the motivation of the 
recipient to institutionalise the RBSIC - characteristics of the source of the practice, 
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characteristics of the practice recipient, relational context and characteristics of the 
practice transferred. 
Fable 6.3 
Key Theoretical Framework Variables and Sub-variables Influencing a Business Unit's 
Levels of Motivation 
Sub-Factors Theoretical 
Framework Variables 
Theoretical Framework 
Sub-Variables 
Source of the RBSIC Characteristics of the Motivation 
Source of the Practice 
Characteristics of the Motivation 
Practice Recipient 
Recipient Business Unit Relational Context Dependency 
Characteristics of the Unprovenness 
Practice Transferred 
Characteristics of the Motivation 
Practice Recipient 
Motivation at the source of the practice to institutionalise the RBSIC was identified 
primarily as the need to meet the recommendations of the Turnbull guidelines, 
therefore, becoming legitimate with the UK Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance. However this reason (and others suggested by headquarters informants) 
had not been fully explained to local business units (see 10.1.0) reducing their 
motivation to institutionalise the practice. 
Data relating to the motivation of practice recipients showed that a consensus did not 
exist among Excelsior managers as to the degree to which headquarters managers 
w ere motivated to institutionalise the RBSIC. The Landmark managers ý\ ho were 
prepared to comment were unanimous in their belief that the practice w\ as not 
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regarded as important by their corporate headquarters (see 10.1.0). If a business 
unit's employees believed that corporate headquarters was not motivated to 
institutionalise the RBSIC it is likely, in turn, to have reduced their levels of 
motivation. 
Over three-quarters of the business unit managers did not believe their career 
advancement inside the MNE was dependent on their becoming internally legitimate 
with headquarters through the successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC. This led 
to a decrease in their levels of motivation to institutionalise the practice (see 10.2.2). 
The unprovenness of the RBSIC played an important role in the level of motivation to 
institutionalise the practice at the recipient unit. Managers were unsure of the value 
of the practice and what benefits could be gained from its institutionalisation thereby 
reducing their support for the practice (see 10.2.3). 
A number of additional reasons were given as to why individual managers were 
motivated to institutionalise the RBSIC although no clear patterns could be identified 
(see 10.2.4). 
6.4.5 Transfer Process 
Transfer process refers to actual transfer of the knowledge relating the RBSIC. Even 
if the national and corporate contexts are compatible, the understanding of the RBSIC 
among business units and their managers is high and both the source and the recipient 
are motivated to institutionalise the practice, if the transfer process is not undertaken 
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effectively, the practice is unlikely to be successfully transferred. (The variables and 
sub-variables of the theoretical framework that play an important role in determining 
the transfer process are listed below in Table 6.4. ). Three sub-factors were identified 
as having a key role in the transfer process - relationship with headquarters, role of 
the gatekeeper and knowledge retention. 
Four of the theoretical framework variables played a role in the transfer process - 
relational context, characteristics of the practice transferred, characteristics of the 
source of the practice and characteristics of the practice recipient. 
Table 6.4 
Key Theoretical Framework Variables and Sub-variables Influencing the Transfer Process 
Sub-Factors Theoretical Framework Theoretical Framework 
Variables Sub-Variables 
Relationship with Relational Context Arduous Relationship 
Headquarters 
Characteristics of the Causal Ambiguity 
Practice Transferred 
Role of the Gatekeeper Relational Context Trust 
Characteristics of the Causal Ambiguity 
Practice Transferred 
Characteristics of the Source Perceived Credibility 
of Practice 
Characteristics of the Motivation 
Practice Recipient 
Knowledge Retention Characteristics of the Retentive Capacity 
Practice Recipient 
Causal ambiguity played an important role in the relationship with headquarters and 
role of the gatekeeper sub-factors. The ambiguity about the features of the context 
into which the RBSIC was being transferred by both headquarters and the gatekeeper 
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increased the likelihood of casual ambiguity occurring making it more difficult for 
them to identify the reasons for difficulties in the practice transfer (see Chapter 5 and 
sections 1 1.1.0 and 11.2.0). 
The relationship between headquarters and the recipient unit in a number of cases 
(especially Landmark) was regarded as distant indicating the presence of an arduous 
relationship further increasing the likelihood that headquarters personnel involved in 
the transfer of the RBSIC would lack an understanding of the features of the context 
to which the RBSIC was being transferred (see 11.1.0). 
The importance of the role of the gatekeeper in the transfer process at Excelsior 
business units was supported by the perception that the regional RBSIC team were a 
credible trustworthy source of knowledge about the RBSIC thereby facilitating the 
transfer of the practice to individual business units (see 11.2.0). However, the heavy 
reliance on the regional RBSIC team, matched by the high levels of support they 
provided, had a de-motivating effect on recipient units who rather than developing 
and retaining knowledge about the RBSIC chose to rely on the regional RBSIC team 
when undertaking the practice (see 11.2.0). 
With the exception of the Asia-Pacific headquarters and Australia, an absence of 
retentive capacity relating to knowledge about RBSIC was apparent among all 
Excelsior business units, with reliance on the regional RBSIC team regarded as a 
substitute for developing the capability to retain knowledge about the practice (see 
11.3.0). 
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6.5.0 Conclusion 
The main thrust of the findings is that, although the degree of institutionalisation of 
the RBSIC differs across cases, the overarching picture is one of ceremonial adoption. 
Albeit without the relatively high level of implementation proposed by Kostov, a and 
Roth (2002: 220). None of the informants believed the RBSIC was embedded in their 
business units beyond the top layer of management. Furthermore the practice was 
generally regarded as a specific separate task outside of the normal activities of 
management, that was a low priority operational task imposed upon business units by 
their headquarters, that tended to be forgotten outside the annual data gathering 
process and was generally not updated during the year. A broad overall finding 
therefore is that the RBSIC has failed to become part of the `normal' operating 
practices of the company. 
This chapter has presented the broad findings of this research identifying the 
important variables and sub-variables in the ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC at 
Excelsior and Landmark's Asia-Pacific business units. The next five chapters, 
incorporating data collected at the Excelsior and Landmark corporate headquarters, 
the two meetings at Peninsula's corporate headquarters and individual interviews with 
people not directly connected with the two companies, will proceed on a cross-case 
basis to analyse the five factors identified in the ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC, 
with the objective of developing an understanding of the degree of institutionalism 
found in each of the embedded case studies and identifying patterns in the data about 
the implementation and internalisation of the RBSIC. 
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CHAPTER 7 
NATIONAL CONTEXT 
7.0.0 Introduction 
Both national and organisational context were found to influence the degree of 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC in the Excelsior and Landmark Asia-Pacific business 
units. This chapter will consider the role of national context. The transfer of the 
RBSIC is embedded inside a specific national context consisting of the regulatory, 
cognitive and normative institutions that constitute a country institutional profile 
(CIP) (Kostova (1999) (see 3.5.1). Differences in these three components of the 
source and recipient country's respective CIPs are likely lead to country-level effects 
on the success of practice transfer, with some countries providing more favourable 
environments for the transfer of practices and others presenting a number of 
difficulties and challenges. 
This research identified three sub-factors as having an important role in the 
development of the national context within which the transfer occurs. Each one is 
considered in a separate section in this chapter: The first -perception of risk - 
discusses the understanding of risk in local business units; the second - national 
culture - discussess the influence of national culture on the 
institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC with particular attention to its affect on ethical policies and whistle blowing; 
and the third - regulator environment - 
discusses differences in the national 
corporate o\, ernance environments of the recipient countries and how they could 
influence the institutionalisation of the RBSIC. 
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7.1.0 Perception of Risk 
The RBSIC is based on the core assumption that a business unit understands the type 
and extent of its key risks in sufficient detail to be able to identify, assess and manage 
them effectively. If individual managers perceive risk differently then the quality of 
data about the risks faced by individual business units that are communicated to 
corporate headquarters and incorporated into the company's central risk database will 
vary. In turn, this is likely to reduce the company's capacity to effectively evaluate 
risks throughout its business. (A business unit's capacity to identify risks will be 
discussed in Chapter 9). 
Attitudes to risk differed considerably among managers both from country to country 
and on an intra office basis. A number of less senior managers viewed risk from their 
own `locally rational' perspective. This was especially apparent among managers 
involved with the finance function who tended to only consider the financial aspects 
of risk. The senior managers who were responsible for the whole business unit or a 
substantial part of its operations were more likely to adopt a more comprehensive 
approach to risk. This was clearly demonstrated by the two Excelsior managers in 
China. The Finance Manager of Excelsior's China subsidiary gave the following 
example of risk: "You need to sell on credit to increase sales and profits but by doing 
so You are increasing risk. " While his manager the General Manager Finance 
described risk as: "Anything you do not plan ahead for..... when you have not factored 
in possible change. 
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A similar pattern existed among the managers interviewed at Landmark. Managers. 
below managing director level, tended to view risk from their own often limited 
perspective e. g the Operations Manager used risk and health and safety 
interchangeably. 
A possible explanation for differences in perceived responsibilities for risk could be 
the hierarchical nature of the national culture found in all of the countries in this study 
with the exception of Australia'. This may discourage managers from considering 
risk beyond their own local rationality. In addition they may be seen to be assuming 
the role of a more senior manager, therefore behaving in a manner that could be 
regarded as disrespectful by senior colleagues. 
Perceptions of risk could also be influenced by local corporate governance 
arrangements (see 2.6.0). Managers are less likely to consider a risk when their 
previous experience has not led them to consider it as being very likely to occur. For 
example, this may be because their key suppliers were companies that were part of the 
group of companies to which they belonged (possibly involving cross-shareholdings) 
or directors of their company sat on the boards of their main suppliers. This 
considerably reduced the likelihood of disruptions in supply and opportunistic 
behaviour by their suppliers. Further, examples of how local corporate governance 
arrangements can influence perception of risk can be found in Section 2.6.0. 
Although the majority of Excelsior's Asia-Pacific managers acknowledged that 
profits are in part determined by the willingness of a business to take risks, consistent 
See Hotstede's fifth dimension (section 3.5.1.4) 
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with the findings of March and Shapira (1987: 1407), who found that managers 
appear to associate risk with negative outcomes, none of the managers defined risk as 
an outcome that could be better than expected focusing only on the downside of any 
risk. Supporting the findings of Conklin (2002), for many managers risk simply 
meant the probability of losing money through negative variations in revenues, costs, 
profits, and market shares. This understanding of risk was reinforced by the 
definitions of risk2 given to Excelsior managers during presentations made throughout 
the region, when the RBSIC was originally launched in 2002, when risk was generally 
explained as the possibility of a negative occurrence that could damage the business. 
Unsurprisingly given their negative perceptions of risk and based on the principle of 
the greater the risk the greater the profit, the importance of managing risk effectively 
and balancing risk and return was acknowledged by all of the managers. The General 
Manager of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary emphasised the link between risk, and 
innovation and development, underlying the importance of these processes in the 
success of a business commenting: "No risk - no innovation. " In common with a 
number of managers the Excelsior General Manager for Risk said: "Risk is only bad if 
you do not know you have got it. " He went on to emphasis the importance of 
understanding the business's appetite for risk and acting accordingly. This was 
supported by the Singaporean management team, who probably had the most negative 
attitude to risk among all of the subsidiaries and joint ventures, with the General 
Manager describing risk as: "the word is danger.... but the bigger the risk the bigger 
the gain " while at the same time acknowledging that well managed risks can be 
beneficial to the business. 
2 These are the same definitions that appear in the RBSIC User Guide. 
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The three British managers of Landmark's Taiwanese joint \ enture also viewed risk 
negatively while acknowledging that if the business was aware of its risks and 
managed them effectively this should lead to a greater understanding of the business's 
operating environment enabling it to function more effectively. In contrast the joint 
venture's Taiwanese Managing Director (Marco Polo) felt that in general Chinese 
people tended to ignore risk believing "whatever happens is their 'destiny ' and there 
is nothing that can be done about it ". While the Managing Director of Landmark's 
Hong Kong based joint venture who regarded risk as a negative, but one that could be 
managed, felt that many of the joint venture's Chinese employees did not understand 
the importance of risk and risk management and `firm' leadership would need to be 
demonstrated by the joint venture's senior management if the importance of risk was 
to be appreciated throughout the company. 
A negative view of risk may be a reflection of the cognitive component of a country's 
CIP that reflects the shared social knowledge that people hold regarding risk leading 
them to regard risk as negative and a threat to the business. Furthermore, a manager's 
negative perception of risk may be reinforced if he / she believes through the 
identification of a risk, that could prevent the business from achieving its objectives, 
they are revealing their personal inadequacies as managers and this may be regarded 
as an indicator of their inability to manage the parts of the business for which they 
have a responsibility implying they are `not up to the job' expected of them. This 
may be supported by the normative component of a country's CIP where it is the 
norm in the recipient country to consider the practice of identifying risks as a search 
for events that will negatively impact the business and not to consider the 
identification of risk as a way to develop competitive advantage. 
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Having considered a number of possible influences on a manager's perception of risk, 
including national culture, the next section will discuss more fully the role of national 
culture in the development of the national context into which the RBSIC was 
transferred and how it relates directly to the practice. 
7.2.0 National Culture 
Earlier, it was argued that the degree of compatibility between the values implied by 
the RBSIC and the values underlying a recipient business unit's national culture 
would influence the degree of difficulty in institutionalising the RBSIC. The greater 
the incompatibility the more likely the transfer will not be institutionalised. This 
section will commence with a general discussion on national culture and the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC before moving on to discuss two specific 
components of the RBSIC - ethics and whistle blowing - and how their 
institutionalisation may be influenced by the national culture of local business units. 
7.2.1 The RBSIC and National Culture 
The Excelsior General Manager for Risk expressed the view that a RBSIC was 
consistent with the Excelsior organisational culture but there was a possibility that it 
was not suited to all of the national cultures in the region where Excelsior had 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. (This fits with the initial presumption outlined in 
Chapter 1). He added that sensitivity to a subsidiary /joint venture's national culture 
was not necessary for the practice to be successfully institutionalised as Excelsior's 
strong organisational culture could overcome any resistance based on national cultural 
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differences. A similar view was also expressed by the Thai management team who 
described national culture as the biggest impediment to the institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC while believing this could be overcome because the Thai business was a 
subsidiary of a MNE and had never been Thai owned and in the words of the Senior 
Finance Director was "not really a Thai business ". This would increase the 
probability of the company adopting standardised practices representative of a 
`shared' organisational culture as it would not be influenced by national culture to the 
same extent as a smaller, nationally based company. Thus, the RBSIC, which was 
imbued with the values of the UK based parent, would be more likely to be 
institutionalised. 
The Excelsior Singapore and Malaysian management teams dismissed the need for 
cultural sensitivity describing the approach adopted by Excelsior as "onlvv a template 
that needed to be completed". Similar views were expressed by the Head of Group 
Audit at Peninsula who described the RBSIC used in Peninsula's Asia-Pacific 
operations as an exact copy of the UK system. His immediate superior the Peninsula 
Finance Director added this was possible because the business was very simple and 
similar everywhere in the world. This approach to the RBSIC was to a degree 
contradicted by later comments. Managers in Singapore acknowledged that cultural 
attitudes to risk did affect the risk identification process and the Peninsula Head of 
Group Audit commented on the importance of `face' issues when dealing with 
Japanese staff. 
The management teams of Excelsior's Australian and Hong Kong businesses both felt 
a RBSIC complemented their- national culture. Although the Hong Kong based 
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managers did not share the vie" of the Finance Director of the Australian subsidiary 
who felt this was in part due to similarities in national cultures of the parent and 
recipient country. Both cases were similar to the extent that none of the managers 
saw the need for any other measures that would achieve harmonisation. 
Only the Legal Manager of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary, the Landmark Operations 
Manager in Taiwan, the Landmark Director of International Market Development and 
to a lesser extent the management team of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary described 
national culture as playing an important role in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
in their respective countries. Among the Excelsior managers the Chinese 
management team expressed strong reservations about the appropriateness of a 
RBSIC to the national culture with the Finance Manager commenting: "Chiniese are 
less cautious about risks. This is especially the case if voii work for a local company. 
Local companies lack sophistication and would not consider a system of risk 
management. " He then went on to say that the company should not be over concerned 
about cultural differences as it was "an MNE and it should have the same standards 
globallii". The inconsistency of these two statements is clear. 
The British Operations Manager of Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture believed the 
local culture failed to understand the importance of risk management. This view was 
supported by the Landmark headquarters based Director of International Market 
Development who saw differences in national culture as a major impediment to the 
institutionalisation of a RBSIC in the company's Taiwan based joint venture. He 
commented that it was necessary for management to constantly reinforce the 
importance of such a system so that local employees could develop an appreciation of 
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its importance and value. A similar view was held by the Marketing Manager «ho 
felt the successful institutionalisation of a RBSIC could only be achieved through 
strong management leadership describing Taiwan as a country "where what the boss 
says goes . 
The Managing Director (Marco Polo) felt that despite Taiwan's unique circumstances, 
stemming from its relationship with the PRC, that had led many Taiwanese to adopt a 
rather short term mentality, that a RBSIC could be successfully institutionalised if its 
value was clearly explained. This was supported by the Managing Director 
(Landmark) who was optimistic that cultural differences were not insurmountable as 
Taiwanese managers were keen to learn new ideas especially if they felt they could 
give them a competitive edge. 
The senior management of both of the Landmark businesses shared the common 
belief that institutionalisation difficulties related to national culture could be 
overcome by strong leadership from the business's managers, however, in both cases 
`strong leadership' appeared to mean the use of managerial power to compel people to 
act in a certain way. Managers did not seem to consider the implications of 
dissatisfaction among employees who were being expected to undertake tasks that 
were not consistent with their personal values. 
There was a disagreement about the importance of national culture and the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC between the managers of Excelsior's Japanese 
subsidiary. The British Managing Director felt a RBSIC was consistent with the 
assumptions and cultural values of Japan. This view was not shared by the Japanese 
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Finance Director and Legal Manager who said: "The new generation of Japanese 
executives do share the values found in the guidelines. However, the traditional 
approach common in maid Japanese companies would not fit with the guidelines (is 
they lack the necessary' transparency. It would be hard to accept. Companies tit'ould 
feel they were revealing their weaknesses. " 
The Legal Manager added that he believed that if the RBSIC was presented as part of 
the company's corporate culture it was more likely to be institutionalised given the 
high respect for corporate culture normally demonstrated by Japanese people. He also 
thought the likelihood of institutionalisation would be improved if certain changes, 
principally in the approach to data gathering, could be made to the `one size fits all' 
approach presently used. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and Hofstede (1980) suggested that attitudes towards 
risks may be related to aspects of culture. The beliefs, values, social norms and 
assumptions that people hold toward the RBSIC are part of national culture which is 
reflected in the normative component of a countries CIP. This is supported by Sitkin 
and Pablo, (1992: 21) who propose that through values and beliefs or its more directly 
observable manifestations (e. g risk related rituals, stories, heroes), the cultural risk 
values of an organisation are determined. 
The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension of Hofstede's Study of International 
Differences in R ork-Related Values (1980) 3 offers a possible explanation for the 
belief held by a number of managers that the RBSIC was not a particularly good `fit' 
ties 1.6.1.4 
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with their respective national cultures. Among the recipient countries in this study 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore all scored low levels of 
uncertainty avoidance; only Japan was classified as having high uncertainty 
avoidance. In Japan the overall attitude towards risk was probably the most negative 
with one of the managers drawing a comparison with the need to manage risk and 
Japan's renowned emphasis on quality. However, despite this emphasis on managing 
risk the reaction of those interviewed showed they had great difficulty with the 
transparency component of the RBSIC and the requirement to openly acknowledge 
their business's risks to a large number of people inside the company. In this case the 
desire for an effective RBSIC may be overridden by other factors. 
Although most local managers provided examples of how national culture had created 
some barriers to institutionalisation the majority played down the importance of the 
role of national culture in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC. This may be because 
data were only gathered from senior managers among whom the majority of 
informants were confident that the (headquarters mandated) organisational culture of 
their business unit was strong enough to overcome any difficulties in the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC resulting from the incompatibility of their national 
cultures and the values of the RBSIC. Their belief in their company's organisational 
culture could be explained by a number of factors including agreement with the 
objectives of the business and the expectations that their company has of their own 
behaviour, a conviction that they are a valued part of the organisation and well 
rewarded for their efforts, and confidence in the judgement and ability of the 
company's senior management (This was particular apparent from the comments of 
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the Excelsior General Manager for Risk). This may be a limitation of the research 
(see 12.7.0). 
It is also possible that belief in the relative strength of the organisational culture is not 
shared by all of the business unit's employees. This is because the culture of an 
organisation is a reflection of the values of the company which are learnt at the 
workplace, and which may (or may not) be in line with the values of individual 
employees. National cultural values are arguably far more deeply embedded having 
been instilled and institutionalised since birth. Among the business's more junior 
employees, who are less likely to be committed to the business and its organisational 
culture than its managers4, there is a greater probability that the RBSIC will be 
inconsistent with the cognitive and normative structures through which they 
understand and interpret the practice if their national culture is inconsistent with the 
values underlying the RBSIC. This suggests that senior management's belief in the 
strength of their business unit's organisational culture may be overstated. 
The next two sections will consider how two key components of the RBSIC - ethics 
and whistle blowing - are affected by the national culture of local business units. 
' Staff lower in the hierarchy are more likely to have spent less time working for the company, work 
less hours than senior managers and therefore have a lower level of exposure to the values 
underpinning its organisational culture. They is also a greater probabilit\ that NN-ill have lower 
standards of education reducing the possibility that they will advance to management level and will not 
have made a similar level of personal investment in the company as is common with senior managers. 
In addition it is unlikely that they will be sharing in the success of the business to the same degree as 
that of senior managers (e. g. bonuses or stock options). 
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7.2.2 Ethics 
An effective ethics policy is arguably a key component of a system of internal control 
which complies with the Turnbull guidelines. Companies exhibiting unethical 
behaviour, perceived or real, face an increasing financial and reputation risk that can 
lead to declining market share, lower profits and government regulation (Gagne, 
Gavin and Tully, 2005: 181) having an immediate effect on the financial position of a 
company and / or its reputation. Both can negatively affect the value of a 
shareholder's investment in a company in the worst instance completely eliminating it 
should a company be forced into bankruptcy. 
Excelsior places a greater emphasis on its ethical and social responsibility policies 
than Landmark giving them a high profile in it communications with the public and 
shareholders. In its annual report it describes its ethical policy as a key element in its 
internal control system, implicitly acknowledging that failures in its policy would 
increase the risk profile of the company with potentially negative implications for 
shareholders. Landmark is increasing its commitment in this area including a 
corporate and social responsibility statement for the first time in its 2003 annual 
report while preparing to launch a corporate and social responsibility website in 2005 
that will provide detailed information about the topic. 
Company procedures require that all Excelsior employees are given two booklets 
upon joining the company that explain the company's purpose and values, its business 
principles and what they mean to everybody connected with the company. Senior 
managers are required to sign a document that acknowledges they have read the 
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booklets when they receive their annual performance review. Landmark staff are also 
made aware of the company's ethical policy "hen they join the company and this is 
reinforced through conferences, intranet technology, discussion groups, staff briefings 
and bulletins, and the quarterly staff magazine. 
Although both Excelsior and Landmark have clearly articulated ethical and social 
responsibility policies the extent of the awareness of these policies among the 
employees of both companies differed considerably. Overall, these data show that, 
for different reasons, both companies' ethical policies have not been fully 
institutionalised. 
The Excelsior General Manager for Risk was confident that "the company 's ethical 
values are high, clearly communicated and relevant to the operating environment. " 
This view was supported by the Finance Director of Excelsior's Australian subsidiary, 
who in common with the General Manager for Risk, had seen both of the booklets 
explaining the company's ethical policy. In Excelsior's Thailand business both of the 
managers had seen the two booklets and were confident that everybody who worked 
in the subsidiary had also received them and understood their role and importance. 
The Managing Director believed that the business's awareness of the importance of a 
good ethical policy was a legacy of the strong ethical stance taken by its previous 
owners. 
The Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian business also believed the company's 
ethical values were clearly communicated at the managerial level but went on to say 
that although they were relevant to senior employees, especially those in the Finance 
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function, they were not understood by lower level employees. One inconsistency was 
apparent when the Finance Manager said that he had no recollection of having seen 
the two booklets setting out the company's ethical standards but as Evas the case with 
all senior management he had signed the company code of conduct that required him 
to acknowledge that he had read both booklets. 
Both of the managers of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary had seen the two booklets. 
The General Manager Finance considered them to be of less value than the Finance 
Manager commenting "It is a mechanical practice that is just done and not 
internalised. There is not enough 'real' communication throughout the company. " 
While the Finance Manager claimed that Excelsior's ethical values are ' i'crn" clearly 
communicated internally and to third parties ". However, he appeared to regard the 
company's ethical policy from a rather limited perspective principally forbidding the 
paying of bribes. A similar disagreement occurred between the two Excelsior 
managers in Hong Kong both had seen the two booklets but had a very different 
attitude to the importance of the company's ethical policy. The General Manager 
described it as the best he had experienced and relevant to Hong Kong while the 
Accountant admitted she was barely aware of its role in the organisation. The 
General Manager added that although the policy was regularly communicated he 
would like more `people to people' explanation of the guidelines. 
In Excelsior's Singaporean subsidiary the General Manager and Administration 
Manager had seen both of the booklets while the Finance Manager had not seen either 
booklet. The General Manager remarked that she had distributed the booklets 
throughout the business without any follow-up or instructions as to ho« they should 
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be presented to employees. She believes it is up to the General Manager to promote 
the company's ethical standards, but was not given any guidelines as to how this 
should be achieved. 
Awareness of the company's ethical policies was lowest in Excelsior's Japanese 
subsidiary the Legal Manager, Finance Director and Operations Director all said they 
had not seen the two booklets and wondered if they were available in Japanese. The 
Legal Manager added that the definition of unethical behaviour would be very 
different in the Japanese context. He gave the example of how a successful Excelsior 
product was copied by a Korean company and then introduced into the Japanese 
market with an almost identical name and packaging. This blatant copying of an idea 
was not regarded as unethical. 
Landmark had adopted a markedly different approach to developing an ethical policy 
in its Taiwanese joint venture. The Director of International Market Development 
explained that Landmark had concentrated on transferring those ethical values that it 
regards as `reasonable' given the Taiwanese political, financial and cultural 
environment. Particular emphasis has been paid to the importance of health and 
safety in the workplace while responsibility to many other stakeholders e. g. those 
concerned with environmental issues had not yet been addressed. The Managing 
Director (Landmark) said that Landmark's ethical values had only been 
communicated at the top of the joint venture but went on to say that the joint venture 
has come up with its own ethical policy that he felt was reasonable and reflected 
`Asian Values'. The Marketing Manager commented that local staff had no previous 
experience of an ethical values policy, which is a rarely discussed concept in 
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Taiwanese companies., and consequently found the idea hard to comprehend. The 
Managing Director (Marco Polo) expressed his concern that the institutionalisation of 
an ethical policy, that was part of a RBSIC, could damage morale as employees felt 
they were not seen as trustworthy. 
At the newly established Landmark Hong Kong joint venture the Managing Director 
said that Landmark's ethical values will be introduced to the business but this will not 
be accomplished in the short term. However, the joint venture was operating an 
ethical sourcing policy to be used in all its dealings with suppliers who will be 
subjected to an ethical audit. The Quality Assurance Manager explained that 
presently Landmark does not visit suppliers in China and the audit process is 
undertaken by completing forms and sending samples. The joint venture will visit all 
of the plants of the suppliers it uses and will undertake a full quality, ethical and 
environmental audit. 
The likelihood that an ethical policy will be institutionalised will be affected by both 
the cognitive and normative components of a country's CIP that represent employee's 
shared knowledge, and their beliefs, values, social norms and assumptions about 
ethical policies, respectively. The relevance of an ethics policy that originated from 
the UK and reflects the values of that country was questioned by a number of 
managers who felt that it might not be appropriate to their operating environment and 
/ or understood by local employees where there was a considerable difference in what 
was regarded. as ethical in the UK and the country where they were operating. Two of 
Hofstede's (1980,2005) dimensions of cultures suggest that the institutionalisation of 
5 See 3. S. 14 
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an ethics policy among the Asian countries included in this study will be difficult. 
The uncertainty avoidance dimension suggests that countries with high uncertainty 
avoidance, only Japan in this research, will be more likely to welcome an ethical 
policy as the rules and procedures it brings to the governance of the organisation N N-111 
create a structure that reduces the uncertainty regarding ethical dilemmas. While the 
Individualism - Collectivism dimension suggests that the collectivist nature of all of 
the countries, with the exception of the UK and Australia, may increase the likelihood 
of preferential treatment to group members at the expense of others even if this does 
not seem economically justified or by Western standards `ethical'. A relevant 
example would be the Chinese practice of Guanxi. It refers to an intricate, pervasive 
network of personal relations based on mutual obligation, through the exchange of 
favours (Deresky, 1997: 200), and is common in China and countries with a large 
ethnic Chinese population. Membership of a network is normally beneficial for its 
members but may not necessarily be so for the companies who employ them. It is 
particularly relevant to this research because ethnic Chinese play an important role in 
the business communities of a number of the countries represented in this study. 6 
Examples would include hiring procedures where preferences are frequently shown to 
family and friends, the awarding of contracts on a relationship basis and a lack of 
respect for the rights of workers who are not part of the group. All of which were 
listed among the reasons for the 1997 Asian economic crisis by the ADB (2000). 
Landmark adopted a different approach to developing an ethical policy in its 
Taiwanese joint venture instead of transferring its entire policy from the UK to 
Taiwan it attempted to make its ethical policy more relevant in two ways. First, for 
This would include China, Hong Konýý. Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand 
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senior managers, it only transferred parts of its ethical policy that it thought were 
`reasonable', meaning more likely to be accepted, given the political, financial and 
cultural environment in Taiwan. The decision on whether a policy was reasonable 
was taken by the Managing Director (Landmark) and his immediate superior the 
Director for International Market Development and appeared to be based on the their 
understanding of the operating environment in Taiwan. Second, for the remaining 
staff a series of workshops were organised where local employees decided on the 
content of an ethical policy which reflected local values, and agreed to its 
implementation, thereby, increasing the likelihood that it would be understood and 
internalised. This may make the policy easier to institutionalise but does leave open 
the possibility that it will lose some of its original intent and fail to achieve all of the 
objectives originally intended by the corporate ethical policy. 
7.2.3 Whistle Blowing 
If the RBSIC is to work effectively both companies will need to establish channels of 
communication for individuals to report suspected breaches of laws or regulations or 
other improprieties (Turnbull, Appendix: 3). This includes concerns over potential 
risks to the business's objectives that could be of an ethical or operational nature. 
They will also need to ensure that individuals feel able to report their concerns 
without fear that they will be discriminated against in the future. Excelsior has put in 
place such a mechanism throughout its Asia-Pacific operations while Landmark is in 
the process of implementing its own system. 
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Considerable differences existed throughout the region, at both the national and intra- 
office level, as to the likelihood of the successful institutionalisation of a whistle 
blowing policy7. Excelsior's Regional Finance Director said that throughout the 
region the reporting of breeches in the company's ethical values and business 
principles by staff at all levels is supported and encouraged. This was confirmed by 
the Excelsior General Manager for Risk who is the point of contact for anybody in the 
region who wishes to report their concerns regarding operational or ethical breaches 
and feel unable to discuss the matter with the local management or have done so but 
have not received a satisfactory response. He commented: "Attempts are made to 
spread the message through the group...... all staff have a responsibility for the 
behaviour of the company. " He was especially keen to provide examples of how 
successful the company's whistle blowing policy had been in Australia. This was 
supported by the Finance Director of Excelsior's Australian subsidiary who lauded 
Excelsior's Australian employee's record of speaking up when they had concerns. 
However, he noted that this varies from area to area, person to person. 
The only other Excelsior subsidiary where all of the managers were confident that 
Excelsior's policy of encouraging whistle blowing was entirely appropriate was 
Singapore where managers believed the practice was facilitated, without individuals 
feeling unduly restrained or guilty, by the business's flat management structure. 
Whistle blowing refers to a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto record and is 
made by a person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organization, about 
operational or non-ethical breaches whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is 
under the control of that organization. to an external entity having potential to rectify the «Tongdoing" 
(Based on Jubb, 1999, p. 83). 
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Differences of opinion existed in a number of Excelsior's businesses. In Japan the 
Legal Manager insisted that the attitude to whistle blowing is very positive, with 
employees protected by government regulations. This was in sharp contrast to the 
views of the British Managing Director who said he had never really thought about 
whistle blowing in Japan regarding it as something that would probably not happen 
due to the hierarchical nature of Japanese society. In China, once again the Finance 
Manager demonstrated a more positive attitude to the company's policies than the 
General Manager Finance, using an example to support his position, he explained that 
employees are encouraged to report their concerns and are very keen to do so 
confident that such behaviour will not result in punitive action being taken against 
them if the allegation is proved to be incorrect. However, he did acknowledge this 
may not be the case with factory workers. Taking the opposite view the General 
Manager Finance believed that whistle blowing is unlikely "as an employee it'ould 
not want to break the harmony in the company. " In Thailand, the Managing Director 
believed the company's whistle blowing policy was suitable for the top three tiers of 
management, however, below this level the educational standard of employees, their 
general behaviour and culture makes it unlikely that they would be prepared to "blow 
thc whistle ". The Senior Finance Director demonstrated greater confidence in the 
practice saying that he felt whistle blowing was unlikely in a local company but more 
likely in an MNE such as Excelsior where efforts are made to get all of the employees 
to take responsibility and feel able to report matters of concern. 
The remaining Excelsior subsidiaries and joint venture and the two Landmark joint 
ventures all believed that the successful institutionalisation of a whistle blowing 
policy would be difficult. Both managers of Excelsior' s Hong Kong joint venture 
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felt, that despite moves to encourage whistle blowing, it was unlikely because of the 
mindset generated by the national culture; however, they did believe this could be 
overridden if the organisational culture is appropriate. The Finance Manager at 
Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary said that the company's policy of encouraging 
whistle blowers was likely to be effective in the Finance Team while lower down the 
company hierarchy it is less likely that employees would be willing to report their 
concerns because they are "more afraid of losing their rice bowls or just can 't be 
bothered seeing the problem as being outside the scope of their responsibilities ". The 
three British managers at Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture were of the opinion 
that the concept of whistle blowing was unsuited to the Taiwanese business 
environment regarding it as "completeli. i alien to the Taiwanese and highly unlikely to 
happen ". The Operations Manager commented that staff generally considered 
reporting risks only if they were "very important and affected them directly" adding 
".... the issue is always looked at as how it affects the member of staff not the 
compan. i' ". This was supported by the Managing Director (Marco Polo) who said that 
"Taiwanese tend to think primarily of protecting their own risk. " While the 
Managing Director of Landmark's Hong Kong joint venture commented that the 
likelihood of Landmark's whistle blowing policy being accepted and understood by 
local employees was remote. He described the locals as too relaxed and unlikely to 
speak up because it is a new company and they are frightened of losing there job. He 
added that all issues regarding ethics would "need strong expatriate leadership " 
The likelihood of the success of a whistle blowing policy will be related to the 
normative component of a country's CIP. This refers to the beliefs, values, social 
norms and assumptions of the employees of the subsidiary or joint venture, with 
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regard to the concept of whistle blowing, which are reflected in their national culture. 
and to the cognitive component through which employee's attitudes to whistle 
blowing are formed. 
Differences in national culture can be considered to explain why the majority of the 
managers, with the exception of those in Australia and Singapore, felt a whistle 
blowing policy, which is enshrined largely in Western values and is a reflection of the 
national culture of the UK, would be unlikely to be institutionalised in their business. 
Four of Hofstede's (1980,2005) dimensions of culture 8 can be used to consider why 
this may be the case. First, the uncertainty avoidance dimension suggests that 
countries with high uncertainty avoidance, only Japan in this study, will be more 
likely to perceive an impropriety (ethical or operational) as severe since established 
rules would be violated (Tavakoli et al, 2003: 56) and would be more likely to blow 
the whistle. Second the individualism - collectivism dimension suggests that in 
collectivist countries loyalty to the group may reduce the likelihood of an employee 
becoming a whistle blower, possibly bringing `shame' on the group in turn leading to 
the individuals' expulsion. Tavakoli et al. (2003: 56) adopt a contrary position 
suggesting that employees in collectivist countries are more likely to become whistle 
blowers because by alerting the relevant authorities to a situation they perceive 
requiring action they are looking out for the larger group. However, the data gathered 
in this research suggests that whistle blowing would be perceived as disturbing the 
See 3.6.1. -1 9 Hofstede's fourth dimension 1lascidinih' - Femininnty would suggest that in feminine cultures 
employees would be less willing confront conflict situations and thus be less willing to blow the 
whistle (Tavakoli et al, 2003: 56). : among the countries in this study the UK. Australia, Japan, China 
and Hong Kong have a high masculinity index. Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan were middle ranked 
and Thailand \Nas the only country ranked as a feminine country. This research found little correlation 
between the masculinity - feminin 1t\ ranking of the countries in the study and the likelihood of 
employees becoming whistle blowers. 
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harmony of the group where `the personal relationship prevails o'er the task' 
(Hofstede, 2005: 103). The third dimension Power Distance suggests employees in 
high Power distance countries, all of the countries in this research except the UK and 
Australia, are less likely to feel comfortable approaching and/or contradicting their 
managers than would nationals from low power distance cultures. This implies that 
Australians would be more likely to alert senior managers to a situation that they 
perceive as requiring action increasing the probability of the successful 
institutionalisation of a whistle blowing policy in their business unit. This is 
supported by Hofstede's Long-Term Orientation versus Short-Term Orientation 
dimension that suggests all of the countries10, except Australia, emphasis social 
harmony and a stable hierarchy making employees less likely to challenge their 
managers. 
The situation at Excelsior's Singaporean subsidiary was very different. Hofstede 
suggests that Singaporean work-related values would not be supportive of whistle 
blowing, however, in this case specific factors may increase the probability of its 
institutionalisation - the small size of the office, its flat management structure, the 
ease of informal communication and length of time the management team had worked 
together which was far longer than any other group included in this research. On a 
negative note the `tight knit' nature of the team, although increasing the likelihood 
that concerns will be reported to the General Manager, may reduce the likelihood of 
concerns being raised with management outside of the business unit. 
10 Malaysia ww as not included in the study. 
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Managers in China, Thailand and \lalaysia commented that whistle blowing is less 
likely to be institutionalised at the lower levels of the organisation. This may be due 
to a combination of culture traits and the level of education which is generally lm« er 
than it is in the other countries in this study. Low levels of education may make it 
more difficult for employees to comprehend a practice that is not consistent with their 
own cultural values. 
The view expressed by the Legal Manager of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary, that 
whistle blowing was more likely to be institutionalised because whistle blowers were 
protected by government legislation, provides an interesting example of how through 
the introduction of a regulatory framework an attempt can be made to introduce 
organisational values, that although in conflict with national culture, are expected to 
influence the behaviour of employees in a desired fashion. Of note in this case is the 
opinion of an `outsider' - the British Managing Director - that the objectives of the 
legislation are unlikely to be achieved because the values underlying Japan's national 
culture are too strong. 
The two previous sub-sections have considered how the cognitive and normative 
components of a country's CIP, that are conceptually close to culture (Kostova, 1999: 
314), influence the national context into which the RBSIC is being transferred. The 
next section will consider how the third component of the CIP - regulatory - 
influences the national context. 
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7.3.0 Regulatory Environment 
This section will discuss the differences in local corporate governance practices 
between the source of the RBSIC (UK) and the recipient business units. The 
regulatory institutions of a country's CIP are reflected in its local corporate 
governance regulations. If the RBSIC is perceived by employees at local business 
units to be in conflict with their national corporate governance regulations it will 
increase the institutional distance between parent and host making the transfer of the 
practice more difficult. 
Corporate governance in the Asia-Pacific region has received much attention in recent 
years partly due to the 1997 economic crisis in Asia (Claessens and Fan, 2002: 71) 
when failures in corporate governance were identified as one of the main factors 
behind the crisis by the ADB (2000). Since the crisis new corporate governance 
regulations" have been introduced throughout the region. However, in all cases, with 
the exception of Australia, the standard12 remains well below that of the UK. 
Inside the region national corporate governance standards were found to differ 
substantially with Australia closest to those found in the UK followed by Singapore 
and Hong Kong. While acknowledging the weaknesses of local corporate 
governance, opinions often differed between managers in the same office, as to the 
actual standard. Many of the managers interviewed acknowledged that corporate 
" These include stronger regulatory structures, changes in foreign ownership rules, improved minority 
shareholder rights, improved transparency, the introduction of more independent directors and an 
improved market for corporate control. 
12 l aamples include ineffective boards, -, \eak internal controls, lack of adequate disclosure, low levels 
of transparency leading to agency problems, lack of protection for minority investors and legal and 
regulatory frameworks characterised by poor compliance and enforcement (see Chapter 2). 
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governance was becoming more important in the country where they were working; 
however, this had not necessarily led to any meaningful improvement, although a 
number of managers felt that it would eventually. All of the managers, except the 
Accountant of Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture, who described them as 
`different' (and therefore not necessarily of a higher level) to local standards, were 
confident that the level of corporate governance in their business unit was higher than 
the norm in that country. 
Excelsior's Australian managers regarded their corporate governance standards to be 
very similar to those of the UK with a strong emphasis on internal controls. In Hong 
Kong Excelsior's General Manager and the Accountant differed in their opinions. 
The General Manager felt the standards were similar; a legacy of British rule, while 
the Accountant disagreed believing locally there was less of an appreciation of the 
importance of corporate governance. The Managing Director of Landmark's Hong 
Kong based joint venture also regarded the corporate governance environment as 
similar to the UK adding that was the principal reason for headquartering what is 
primarily a Chinese business in Hong Kong. 
In Singapore all three managers felt the Singapore corporate governance system was 
similar to the UK. This was seen as both a legacy of Singapore's colonial experience 
and Singapore's belief in strong regulation. However, there was a disagreement 
whether the subsidiary's corporate governance standards were typical of local 
companies. The General Manager thought they were very close whereas the other 
two managers felt they were typical of an MNE but were very different to small and 
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medium size Singaporean companies With whom they shared a number of similarities 
including turnover and employee numbers. 
Both the Finance Manager and the Senior Finance Director of Excelsior's Malaysian 
and Thai subsidiaries respectively acknowledged the increased importance of 
corporate governance in their countries with the Finance Manager of the Malaysian 
subsidiary noting: "There is a growing level of awareness of corporate governance 
and internal control in Malaysia. Even the local share market is pushing the 
importance of corporate governance. " They also stated that standards were 
considerably behind those of the UK. This was supported by the Managing Director 
of Excelsior's Thai operations who described Thai corporate governance as 9 vern, 
basic'. He was of the opinion that although problems had been identified and 
discussed in detail very little action had been taken to correct deficiencies in the local 
regulations. He believed this was because the majority of Thai companies placed 
greater emphasis on the short term cost advantages that could be achieved by 
choosing not to adopt comprehensive corporate governance practices ignoring the 
long term advantages offered by such procedures. The Senior Finance Director felt 
that standards were higher in Thailand than the Managing Director believed them to 
be while acknowledging they still had a long way to go. 
In China, Excelsior's two managers acknowledged that with the exception of other 
MNEs operating in the country corporate governance standards were very low and 
corruption was widespread. The General Manager Finance questioned Excelsior's 
approach to corporate governance in China which he felt made too many assumptions 
and lacked the required understanding of the complexities of the operating 
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environment. He also added that he did not feel corporate governance issues were a 
priority to the company. 
In Japan Excelsior's Legal Manager felt the degree of transparency required for a 
RBSIC was inconsistent with the Japanese corporate governance environment which 
was characterised by "poor disclosure and a lack of regulations that force companies 
to reveal information ". He felt this was due in part to the close relationship between 
business and government which reduces the pressure on companies to adopt high 
levels of corporate governance and the associated levels of transparency. However, 
he did feel that the situation was changing, especially with regard to younger 
managers, and that in time the general standards of corporate governance would move 
towards those of Excelsior. 
The three British managers of Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture were adamant that 
the standard of corporate governance in Taiwan was far below that of the UK and was 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The Managing Director (Landmark) 
commented: "It is years behind" 
These data show that the majority of managers (ex-Australia) believe that local 
corporate governance standards are, to varying degrees, below those found in the UK. 
If corporate governance codes and regulations are to be effective, a country needs the 
capacity to inspect companies to ensure they are conforming to them, and, as 
necessary, be able to invoke sanctions - rewards or punishments - in an attempt to 
influence a company's future behaviour. This, with the exception of Australia, is not 
yet the case in the Asia-Pacific countries included in this study. In addition 
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employees need to be made aware of relevant regulations and codes. A failure to 
achieve this may explain why even in the same business unit employee's 
understanding of corporate governance can differ considerably. 
The past two to three years have seen a steady growth in new or amended rules 
around the Asia-Pacific region both in areas such as accounting and auditing 
standards, and in corporate governance regulations more generally. This is in part a 
response to new regulations in the United States13 and a reflection that a large amount 
of rule changes still need to be done in each country. Recent reforms in many Asian 
countries have improved non-financial disclosure. For example, certain jurisdictions 
now require disclosure of corporate-governance structures and practices, and 
directors' remuneration. The stock exchanges in some Asian markets, such as China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan require disclosure of deviations from a 
code of conduct (OECD, 2003: 38). However, in general, when comparing the rules 
that have and have not changed, it becomes apparent that regulators and governments 
are far more comfortable about demanding high standards of accounting, auditing and 
financial reporting than they are about asking companies to build strong internal 
controls and accountability structures (CLSA, 2004: 5). The overall impression is that 
large numbers of new rules have been promulgated in recent years without sufficient 
thought as to whether they will, in practice, contribute to real improvements in 
corporate transparency and accountability over time (CLSA, 2004: 4). 
Given that all of the countries in this study now have a substantial body of corporate 
governance rules and regulations, albeit of varying quality and with different levels of 
1' Primarily the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that changed corporate governance, including the 
responsibilities of directors and officers, the regulation of accounting firms that audit public companies, 
corporate reporting. and enforcement in United States listed companies (Lander, 2004.1) 
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awareness, the emphasis should now move to enforcement (CLSA, 2004: 4). Roche 
(2005: 38) states that corporate governance in much of the region (excluding 
Australia) is more a matter of form over substance, with enforcement of legislation 
raising doubts as to how serious local governments really are about raising 
governance standards. Enforcement has been made difficult by strong vested interests 
trying to impede further corporate governance reform in every market (excluding 
Australia) and a lack of institutional mechanisms designed to encourage compliance. 
Only in Japan and Australia have institutional investors formed private corporate 
governance activist groups. Although, some retail investors groups have been formed 
to promote corporate governance in Singapore and to some extent in Malaysia and 
professional associations are seen promoting corporate governance training and 
awareness in all of the markets, if somewhat less so in China (CLSA, 2004: 13). The 
institutionalisation of codes and regulations are further hampered by the belief of 
many managers that corporate governance is a compliance issue and not in the best 
interests of the company. 
With the exception of Australia the national contexts of the recipient countries in this 
study are characterized by a general lack of awareness of corporate governance codes 
and regulations, and poor compliance with new and existing codes and regulations. 
There is also, once again with the exception of Australia, a lack of support for strong 
corporate governance from both the national government and local companies who do 
not appreciate the potential benefits of good corporate governance regarding it as a 
costly compliance issue rather than a source of value. Given this environment 
Excelsior and Landmark are likely to find understanding of the importance of 
corporate governance among the majority of their local employees to be general],., 
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low. Its significance is likely to be further diminished if employees do not expect 
regulations to be enforced. Furthermore the absence of codes and regulations 
promoting internal controls and risk management (the exception being Australia). 
similar to the Turnbull Guidelines in the UK, suggest that in most cases Excelsior and 
Landmark will find institutionalising the RBSIC to be more difficult than it was when 
introduced in the UK (a country with many years experience of strong corporate 
governance regulation). 
7.4.0 Conclusion 
The most favourable environment for the transfer of the RBSIC appeared to be 
Australia where the differences in the cognitive, normative and regulative components 
of the CIP compared to the UK were less than any of the other countries in this 
research. The findings suggested by the data regarding the similarity of the 
underlying cultural values of the UK and Australia are supported by Hofstede's 
(1980; 1988) dimensions of culture that show the overall cultural values in Australia 
to be closer to the UK than any other country (see Appendix Al). This was most 
apparent when comparing Power Difference and Individualism / Collectivism where 
the scores were almost identical. This, in part, could explain the willingness of the 
Australian subsidiary to adopt Excelsior's ethics and whistle blowing policies. The 
corporate governance regulatory environment was also very similar with Australia the 
only country to provide detailed guidance on the implementation of a risk 
management process. 
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In the remaining subsidiaries and joint ventures the cognitive, normative and 
regulatory components of institutional distance, although varying considerable. 
differed to a much greater degree, with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan 
appearing to offer the least favourable environment for the transfer of the RBSIC. 
This chapter has discussed the influence of national context on the institutionalisation 
of the RBSIC. National context is one of the contexts within which the transfer 
occurs. Inside the national context there is an organisational context at the individual 
business unit that will also influence the degree of institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
and this will discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
8.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter will consider the role of organisational context in the transfer and 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC. Organisational context refers to the role of 
organisational factors in the institutionalisation of the practice. Even if the national 
context is supportive of the RBSIC the organisational context may not be favourable. 
This can lead to difficulties in transferring the RBSIC. 
This research identified two sub-factors as having an important role in shaping the 
organisational context within which the transfer occurs. Each one is considered in a 
separate section in this chapter: The first - support for new practices - discusses the 
general level of support for new practices at recipient business units; and the second - 
organisational differences - considers managers perceptions on the availability of 
resources to institutionalise the RBSIC at their business unit, the level of intra- 
business unit communication and other organisational differences that are relevant to 
the institutionalisation of the RBSIC in individual business units. 
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8.1.0 Support for New Practices 
The degree to which a business unit is supportive of new practices will be positively 
related to its ability to institutionalise the RBSIC. This sub-section discusses the 
general level of support for learning, change and innovation at individual business 
units. 
This data has revealed that three quarters of the managers believed their business unit 
was supportive of learning, change and innovation although the reasons for this 
differed considerably and were often related to unique circumstances. Only two 
managers - the General Manager of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary and the Managing 
Director of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary - felt their business unit was unsupportive. In 
both cases the other manager in the same business adopted a more positive attitude. 
The number of new initiatives that managers had been asked to implement differed 
considerably with the largest number identified at the regional headquarters level and 
among those business units that had been entirely or partly acquired the previous year. 
Only the Excelsior Regional Finance Director felt that the region was suffering from 
an `initiatives overload' and none of the managers suggested that the number of 
initiatives they had been required to implement would negatively affect their attitude 
towards the RBSIC. 
While acknowledging that their business unit's were generally supportive of the 
introduction of new practices managers in Australia and China did qualify their 
remarks, acknowledging that directives from headquarters depended to a certain 
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degree on the level of local management support that may not always be given 
enthusiastically. In addition the managers at Excelsior's Singaporean subsidiary were 
concerned about lack of appropriate resources to effectively operate any new practices 
introduced to the business. 
In general the existence of the not-invented-here syndrome (NIH) defined by Katz and 
Allen (1982: 7) as `the tendency of a project group of stable composition to believe it 
possesses a monopoly of knowledge in its field, which leads it to reject new ideas from 
outsiders to the detriment of its performance', which may also be applied to 
individuals, did not appear to be particularly prevalent with only the Excelsior 
General Manager for Risk commenting on different attitudes to adopting new 
practices if they were driven from outside the business. 
Having considered the general level of support for new business practices the 
following sub-section considers specific differences between individual organisations 
that will impact on the institutionalisation of the RBSIC in individual business units. 
8.2.0 Organisational Differences 
A number of organisational differences that will impact upon the institutionalisation 
of the RBSIC were identified. This section will begin with a discussion on the 
availability of sufficient resources and the level of intra-business unit communication 
before going on to look at other important organisational differences that will have an 
influence on the institutionalisation of the practice. 
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8.2.1 Resources 
The institutionalisation of the RBSIC will require the expenditure of sufficient 
resources by the respective business unit. Despite assurance by senior Excelsior 
corporate headquarters managers' that all of the businesses had sufficient resources to 
institutionalise the RBSIC if the were prepared to make enough effort. Opinions 
differed among Excelsior managers2 regarding the availability of adequate resources 
in their business unit to institutionalise the practice. Both the General Manager for 
Risk and the Regional Finance Director believed sufficient resources had been 
dedicated to the transfer of the practice with the General Manager for Risk 
emphasising that the Business Continuity Manager had been employed specifically to 
work on the RBSIC; however the Regional Finance Director did add that "..... more 
resources would be necessary to get buy-in to the practice. " Regarding Excelsior's 
Australian subsidiary the Finance Director disagreed commenting that in his opinion 
the RBSIC was under resourced. 
Similar views were held by the Legal Manager of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary, 
General Manager Finance of Excelsior's Chinese Subsidiary and the managers of 
Excelsior's Singaporean subsidiary. In Japan the Legal Manager said that "no extra 
staff have been hired yet and a request to do so would not be looked upon 
favourably,. " The same views were expressed in Singapore where the General 
Manager said the business was overstretched with "too many practices and not 
enough people ". She was supported by the Finance and Administration Managers 
who added that it was `fortunate' that the RBSIC was only an annual process. The 
I The Director of Group Risk and Head of Group Audit 
2 Data was limited to Excelsior informants as the RBSIC had not been implemented in the two 
L andniark business units. 
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General Manager Finance of Excelsior's Chinese Subsidiary was particularl\ 
concerned about the scarcity of knowledge resources commenting: ".... the business 
lacks the time and the knowledge of how to identi, f, risks. " 
All of the managers in Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture and its Thai subsidiary, 
and the Finance Manager of its Malaysian subsidiary were confident that for the 
immediate future they had sufficient resources to implement the RBSIC. However, 
the General Manager of the Hong Kong joint venture commented: "We probable' 
should spend more time on the practice" and the Finance Manager of the Malaysian 
subsidiary expressed an opinion that suggested a lack of understanding of the practice 
and the resources required saying: "Resources should Trot be an issue. It is more 
about the ideas of the senior management team; it is not really an administrative 
task. " The two Thai managers may have been more inclined to ensure that resources 
were made available for the RBSIC based on their previous experience when they 
worked for the subsidiary of a United States MNE, acquired by Excelsior in 2002, 
where managers in general placed a greater emphasis on non-financial controls. 
A lack of resources dedicated to the RBSIC could have a number of negative 
implications for the practice specific absorptive capacity of a business unit. A 
business unit may be unable to develop the technical core required to institutionalise 
the RBSIC because it is unable to adequately train its employees. A lack of resources 
means that managers will not have the time to undertake the RBSIC properly possibly 
leading to ceremonial adoption of the practice and the provision of insufficient and 
possibly inaccurate data for the RBSIC database. Furthermore, employees may 
regard the lack of resources provided as an indication that the task is not seen as a 
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priority by headquarters and / or that the institutionalisation of the RBSIC will require 
resources that were intended for other projects regarded as more important by the 
local managers reducing their motivation to institutionalise the practice. 
8.2.2 Intra-Business Unit Communication 
The absorptive capacity of an organisation does not simply depend on the 
organisation's direct interface with the external environment it also depends on 
transfers of knowledge across and within subunits that may be quite removed from the 
original point of entry (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 131). Intra-business unit 
communication can play an important role in facilitating this transfer through the 
provision of a medium for the explanation of the practice at the recipient business 
unit. This is particularly important regarding the RBSIC a practice that contains many 
features that need to be carefully communicated to local employees who in nearly all 
cases lack experience of similar practices. 
Intra-business unit communication, although differing considerably among business 
units, was generally regarded positively and seen as improving, adding to the 
absorptive capacity of the individual business unit and, thereby, increasing the 
likelihood of the successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC. 
Intra-business unit communications plays a key role in the successful 
institutionalisation of change programmes3 (Murdoch, 1997, Daly et al., 2003: 161). 
One manager interviewed by Daly et al (2003: 160) described the connection simply 
The comparison with change programmes is appropriate as the transfer of an organisational practice is 
frequently the catalyst for organisational change. 
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as `you can't have one without the other. " -' With the exception of notices posted 
throughout their respective buildings intra-business unit communication in the 
Excelsior and Landmark business units was to a large extent contingent on the nature 
of the business unit. Intra-business unit communication in joint ventures was 
generally more complex than in wholly owned subsidiaries. Difficulties can develop 
when employees seconded from partners with different organisational cultures and 
objectives are expected to communicate with each other. Such difficulties were faced 
by Excelsior in its Hong Kong joint venture. Its partner was a family controlled Hong 
Kong based company where decision making was more centralised and information 
less likely to be shared. To improve information flow and develop trust between both 
parties weekly meetings (lunch followed by business) were introduced improving the 
relationship and communication between the two parties. Landmark's Taiwanese 
joint venture also found cultural differences between employees difficult to overcome 
with Taiwanese employees less likely to voice an opinion. However, through the 
adoption of a flat management structure, and the patient building of individual 
relationships and levels of trust, Taiwanese employees at the management level 
became more forthcoming with their opinions. 
Language difficulties were also identified as a barrier to internal communication not 
only in joint ventures but also in offices where information was sometimes not 
translated into the local language (see page 236). In addition problems could also 
occur when senior managers responsible for transmitting information inside a 
business unit have difficultly speaking the local language fluently. It was inferred that 
this, on occasions, may have been the case at Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary and 
4 Taken from semi-structured interviews with senior executives at 10 of Northern Islands top 20 
companies (as compiled by the Belfast Telegraph and published on 23 February, 2000). 
Derek Condon 200 04'1 2! 200 7 
Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture, however, in both business units there was a 
general view among managers that overall intra-business unit communication was 
good. 
Approaches to intra-business unit communication were influenced by the number of 
employees and geographical dispersion of a business. The smaller the size of the 
business the easier it was for personnel to communicate both formally and informally. 
Communication with a large number of employees, especially when separated by 
large distances e. g. Excelsior's Chinese and Australian subsidiaries, was normally 
through more formal methods of communication including periodic bulletins and 
large meetings. In addition greater management effort was required to gather 
information from the workforce. An example of this would be the quarterly 
downtime meetings at Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary where large numbers of staff 
could meet and discuss recent developments and matters of concern. Businesses with 
a small number of employees were able to develop less formal modes of intra- 
business unit communication as was the case at Excelsior's Singaporean subsidiary 
where all of the employees5 worked in the same building and managers operated an 
`open-door' policy. 
8.2.3 Other Organisational Differences 
A number of other organisational differences, other than resource availability and 
intra-business unit communication, relevant to the institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
wcre identified. 
Nor hall` around thirty. 
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The business units in this study differed considerably in terms of the size of the 
business, their complexity (number of roles undertaken), power of individual 
managers, available resources (financial and technical), number and type of 
employees (administrative, production, education levels, length of time with the 
business unit, etc. ), the length of time the business unit had been part of the parent 
group, experience of change and the relative importance of institutionalising new 
headquarters mandated initiatives. 
Returning to the three components of absorptive capacity described by Kedia and 
Bhagat (1988: 567 - 568), all of the managers saw their businesses as part of a MNE, 
accepting that although they had considerable operational control over the business, 
its overall priorities and strategy, were determined by corporate headquarters. This 
tended to make them more cosmopolitan in their orientation, adopting a more 
systematic and routine approach to the management of their business, willing to 
follow organisational practices mandated by their corporate headquarters. The 
existence of a sophisticated technical core, that in some business units including 
Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture benefited from having managers who had been 
trained overseas, varied considerably influenced by the number of employees in a 
business unit, their educational standards and previous experience (see below). This 
meant in some business units even when they were supportive of new practices the 
sophisticated technical core necessary for the institutionalisation of a specific practice 
(e. g. the RBSIC) was not present. The General Manager of Excelsior's Singapore 
subsidiary, the smallest business unit in the study, acknowledged this was a potential 
problem adding that it could be rectified through appropriate training. Finally, 
strategic management differences between the recipient unit and the source differed 
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considerably not only in terms of available management skills but also in the 
prioritisation of tasks and objectives and the general level of support given to 
learning, change and innovation by local management. This «as particularly apparent 
at the business units recently acquired by Excelsior, who had been asked to adopt a 
number of new practices, and at the newly established Landmark joint ventures. 
The length of time the business unit or its employees had been part of the parent 
company was cited by Excelsior managers in Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand and 
Singapore as an important factor in the business unit's willingness to learn new 
practices. In Japan, the Excelsior Legal Manager, believed the "strong desire in the 
company to learn from both internal and external sources " was due in part to the 
recent acquisition of a larger business that was required to adopt Excelsior's 
organisational practices. A similar view was expressed by all of the Landmark 
managers interviewed including the corporate headquarters based Landmark Director 
of International Market Development who said that in both recently formed joint 
ventures: "There is a genuine understanding of the importance of most of the 
knowledge that is transferred from the UK. " While agreeing with the other Landmark 
managers the Managing Director of the Hong Kong joint venture was concerned that 
lack of critical discussion by local staff, regarding the adoption of new practices 
transferred from corporate headquarters could prevent them from developing a full 
appreciation of the value of these practices. 
This data suggests that a newly acquired business unit is more likely to be prepared to 
learn new practices, such as the RBSIC, if there is a requirement to bring them in line 
with rest of the company Also at the individual level employees who have not been 
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with the company for very long are less likely to be committed to specific practices 
and will have a more flexible approach to new ideas especially if their value can be 
demonstrated. 
Data gathered from the Thai and Japanese business units suggested there was a 
negative relationship between the length of time that a business unit (or a substantial 
part of it) had been part of the overall MNE and the number of new initiatives it was 
asked to undertake. This was mainly due to the introduction of new practices 
designed to bring the business unit into line with the rest of the company. 
This study includes three joint ventures (Excelsior - Hong Kong, Landmark - Taiwan 
and Hong Kong) all of which have been created to benefit from the knowledge of 
their owners. The data suggests that joint ventures, in most cases, will not have had 
the opportunity to develop their own practices and are more likely to adopt those 
transferred from their two parents. 
Some business units, as a result of the substantial degree of change they had gone 
through recently, also appeared to have developed a culture that was supportive of 
change. E. g. Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary that had had six Managing Directors in 
the previous ten years and regarded continuous, often radical, change as the norm. 
The size of the business was cited by the General Manager of Excelsior's Singapore 
subsidiary as the reason why they had to be prepared to adopt ideas from other parts 
of the company as they lacked the resources to develop new products themselves. 
The Finance Director of Excelsior's Australian subsidiary, by far the largest business 
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unit in this study, had a more negative attitude to adopting new practices and 
procedures than most of the other managers stating that they had to prove their 
relevance to the organisation adding "We tend to devise our own practices. " This 
could also be a reflection of the size of the organisation; in this case the company was 
large enough to believe that it did not need ideas developed outside of the business. 
unless they could clearly demonstrate their value, thereby justifying the large scale 
upheaval that could result from the introduction of a new practice throughout the 
organisation. 
8.3.0 Conclusion 
Overall, the data suggests that at a general level the organisational context at the 
majority of business units is supportive of new practices, although there are 
considerable differences among individual business units. 
Intra-business unit communication was seen positively and improving by most 
managers increasing a business units' ability to implement and internalise the RBSIC, 
however, a number of other organisational differences make the successful transfer of 
the RBSIC less likely. Differences of opinions existed with regard to the availability 
of sufficient resources to institutionalise the practice at individual business units with 
the majority of managers questioning whether they had sufficient resources to 
undertake the process. Furthermore, the existence of a sophisticated technical core 
necessary for the institutionalisation of the RBSIC was absent from a number of the 
smaller business units and differences were also apparent in the prioritisation of tasks. 
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Having considered the two contexts within which the transfer of the RBSIC has 
occurred the next three chapters, beginning with individual business units 
understanding of the RBSIC, will consider the characteristics of the transfer process 
itself. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE PRACTICE 
(RBSIC) 
9.0.0 Introduction 
Having considered the role of the contexts within which the transfer of the RBSIC 
takes place the following three chapters discuss the characteristics of the transfer 
process itself beginning with the practice (RBSIC). Even if the national and corporate 
contexts are supportive of the transfer, should managers lack an understanding of the 
practice, and have insufficient related knowledge, the RBSIC is unlikely to be 
institutionalised. 
This research identified two sub-factors as having an important role in local business 
units understanding of the RBSIC. Each one is considered in a separate section in this 
chapter: The first - awareness of the purpose of the RBSIC discusses business unit 
manager's understanding of the RBSIC, differences in their levels of knowledge and 
the flow of information about the practice from the source; and the second - related 
krnolivledge - discusses the levels of pre-existing knowledge at business units related to 
the RBSIC, including the ability to identify risk, and the degree of training individual 
managers feel they require to maximise the benefits that can be gained through the 
institutionalisation of the practice. 
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9.1.0 Awareness of the Purpose of the RBSIC 
Opinions differed as to whether business units had been given a sufficient explanation 
of the reasons for RBSIC. Among those managers who said they knee- the reason for 
the practice a number of suggestions, sometimes conflicting, were put forward. Only 
the Managing Director of the Japanese subsidiary believed the corporate governance 
reason for the RBSIC had been explained. 
Differences of opinion existed at Excelsior's Regional Headquarters where the Group 
Manager for Risk was confident that enough had been done throughout the region to 
explain the reasons for, and the operation of, the RBSIC. While the Regional Finance 
Director thought more explanation was needed of the reasons for the practice. 
Opinions also differed in Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary where the Legal Manager 
admitted that he had difficulty understanding the reasons for the RBSIC and what was 
expected of him while the Managing Director who had a more positive attitude 
towards the introduction of the RBSIC commented that although the ".... corporate 
governance angle of the RBSIC had been clearly explained" the work he had been 
required to undertake to meet the Sarbanes-Oxley' requirements appeared to be given 
a higher priority than the RBSIC and it was ".... much clearer in defining what risk 
tivas making it easier to produce the necessan' data. " He suggested this was probably 
because it was a legal requirement for a company listed in the United States whereas 
the Turnbull guidelines were not legally enforceable recommendations. The 
subsidiary's Finance and Operations Directors, while believing they understood what 
1 Section 404 of `arbanes-Oxley Act, requires that companies with a stock market listing in the United 
States, in their annual reports, assess the controls they have in place to prevent accounting mistakes or 
fraud and have their external auditor attest to those controls. 
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the RBSIC was trying to achieve, insisted that the reasons for the practice has never 
been fully explained. 
The Finance Director of Excelsior's Australian subsidiary clearly expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the explanation that he had been given for the RBSIC saying: 
"The reasons for the RBSIC are not available or understood bl" people in the 
business. " Similar views were articulated by the General Manager of the Excelsior 
Hong Kong joint venture who said there was a need for further detailed information 
that is more practical and less conceptual. The joint venture's Accountant was more 
confident describing the purpose of the practice as risk identification and mitigation. 
In China the Excelsior Finance Manager was clear on the reasons for the RBSIC - "to 
identify risk and mitigate it ". While the General Manager Finance admitted he had 
not yet become directly involved with the practice and was uncertain of all of its 
objectives. 
The Finance Manager of the company's Malaysian subsidiary was very confident that 
he understood the reasons for the RBSIC describing it as a compliance exercise that 
was a mechanical practice to be undertaken annually. The two managers in Thailand 
were also in no doubt that they understood the reasons for the RBSIC. The Managing 
Director said "It is the management team 's job to identify risks and take action. " 
While the Senior Finance Director said it was part of "protecting shareholder 's 
interests ". When asked further about this statement he admitted that he did not kno« 
that it was a main principle of the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 
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The Singapore management team, while admitting that it had never been formally 
explained to them, claimed to understand the reasons for the RBSIC. 
Although a number of managers claimed to know the reason for the RBSIC, only two 
felt that it had been properly explained, and one of these was the General Manager for 
Risk who had the responsibility for explaining the practice throughout the region. His 
optimism may have been influenced by his closeness to the practice and an 
understandable wish not to be quoted admitting to a lack of understanding of a 
practice he was responsible for introducing throughout the region. The other manager 
was the Managing Director of the Japanese subsidiary who when interviewed 
consistently demonstrated a better understanding of the RBSIC and the issues related 
to it than any of the other managers. This would appear to be because he had made a 
greater effort to learn about the practice than his colleagues. 
The lack of consistency in the reasons for the RBSIC suggested by managers, not only 
between business units but often in the same business unit, indicates that the original 
explanation for the practice was insufficient2. This view was supported by the 
comments of a number of managers who while acknowledging the value of the 
practice wanted a clearer explanation of its purpose and role in the company. The 
General Manager of the Hong Kong joint venture was particularly keen that further 
explanations of the practice would be more detailed, less conceptual and more 
practical. 
At a micro level this was demonstrated by the selective approach some Excelsior managers adopted as 
to what part of the ethical policy they chose to highlight emphasising those parts that were directly 
relevant to their role e. g. health & safety , \-hile ignoring or being oblivious of other aspects of the 
policy. 
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The comment by the Managing Director of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiar\-', that he 
thought the work he had been asked to undertake to meet the requirements of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (that is legally required of all companies with a stock market 
listing in the Unites States) had been given a greater priority and more clearly 
explained than the RBSIC3, suggests that the implementation of the RBSIC, to meet 
the requirement of the UK's Combined Code of Corporate Governance (that consists 
of recommendations not laws), was not accorded the same level of importance in 
Excelsior as meeting the legal requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Later 
conversations with the Group Audit Manager responsible for the international 
implementation of the RBSIC confirmed this to be the case. 
The failure of most managers to understand the reasons for the RBSIC is, in part, a 
reflection of the lack of knowledge of the underlying reasons for the practice. None 
of the managers interviewed had read the Turnbull guidelines and only half had heard 
of them. In Japan only the British Managing Director and the Legal Manager of 
Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary were aware of their existence; neither the General 
Manager Finance or the Finance Manager in Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary had heard 
of them; both of the managers of Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture had heard of 
the guidelines but admitted they did not know what they were; and among the 
Landmark managers only the Managing Director (Landmark) of the company's 
Taiwanese joint venture and the Managing Director of the Hong Kong joint venture 
had any knowledge about them. In Singapore all three Excelsior managers had heard 
of the Turnbull guidelines but only because they had been mentioned during a 
Excelsior heads of business units were required to sign a document stating that they had undertaken 
the work required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. ['his tended to reinforce the perceived importance of 
Sarhancs-Oxley leading a number of managers to comment that it had be accorded a higher priority by 
the mana, -, ement of 
Excelsior than the RBSIC. 
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presentation by the Business Continuity Manager Asia-Pacific who visited the 
business two weeks earlier. 4 
A number of managers expressed their surprise upon being told that the Turnbull 
Report consisted of only eighteen pages of which just thirteen contained the 
guidelines and many questioned why they had not been given a copy of them and two 
of the managers, the Managing Director of Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary and the 
Managing Director of Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture, asked the researcher to 
send them a copy. 5 
The managers understanding regarding the role of the Turnbull guidelines in UK 
corporate governance was even more limited. The Managing Director of Excelsior's 
Japanese subsidiary demonstrated an appreciation of their regulatory significance, as 
in a more limited way, did the Senior Finance Director of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary. 
The Excelsior General Manager for Risk, his deputy, the Regional Finance Director 
and the Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary were aware the 
guidelines had a corporate governance role but did not understand their function in 
UK corporate governance. In Thailand the Senior Finance Director of Excelsior's 
subsidiary had some awareness of their relevance in UK corporate governance but this 
was very limited while the Managing Director added that he was much more familiar 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act6 due to the related work he was required to carry out in 
2003. The Managing Director of Landmark's Hong Kong joint venture's knowledge 
The Turnbull guidelines were probably discussed following questions from the Singapore 
management team regarding the purpose of the researchers' upcoming visit to the office. As mentioned 
previously the General Manager had been rather unsettled by the prospect of the visit feeling there may 
have been an ulterior motive behind it. 
Both were sent a PDF copy by the researcher. 
6 Excelsior is also listed on the US stock market and is required to follow US corporate governance 
regulations of \\ hic h the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a key component. 
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of the guidelines' corporate governance role was limited to having read the statement 
in the annual report that referred to compliance with Turnbull. 
Four managers misunderstood the purpose of the recommendations contained in the 
Turnbull guidelines. In Singapore the General Manager of Excelsior's subsidiary 
thought that the practice derived from the recommendations was part of the audit 
process as the headquarters Audit Department was responsible for the RBSIC. While 
the Finance and Administration Managers thought that corporate governance "was 
something that is more related to the finance side of the business " and did not 
appreciate the role of corporate governance beyond this limited perspective or its 
connection with the Turnbull guidelines and the RBSIC. The role of the guidelines 
was also misinterpreted by the Finance Director of Excelsior's Australia subsidiary 
who described them as: "Rules relating to internal control that minimise risk and 
directors liability. " 
Although an awareness of the Turnbull guidelines is not essential to carry out the 
RBSIC managers are more likely to be committed to the practice if they have an 
understanding of the reasons why they are being asked to undertake it. This requires 
an explanation of the role of the Turnbull guidelines and why it is necessary for the 
company to comply with them. This was not the case as shown by the limited 
knowledge of the Turnbull guidelines demonstrated by the subsidiary and joint 
venture managers of both companies which in itself was not surprising given the 
minimal effort that has been made to explain the guidelines and their relevance. 
Fxcelsior's explanation of the guidelines appears to have been limited to the original 
presentations made to senior staff throughout the region by the previous Group 
Derek Condon -' 7' 04,12 /2 00 7 
Director of Business Risk Management and the existing Head of Group Audit in 
2002. Since that time large numbers of managers have left the group to be replaced 
by managers who were either hired from other companies or joined Excelsior as an 
employee of a company they acquired. None of these managers upon joining the 
company were given any explanation of the guidelines and their role in the company. 
Managers working in Landmark's joint ventures had not been given any explanation 
about the guidelines or, in the case of British managers, had any experience of them 
prior to their secondment to their respective joint venture. As previously mentioned 
only the British Managing Directors of their two joint ventures, who had read the 
statement that referred to compliance with Turnbull in the Landmark annual report, 
had any knowledge about the guidelines and this was minimal. 
Only the General Manager for Risk and the Senior Finance Director of the Thai 
subsidiary believed that enough had been done to explain the benefits of the RBSIC 
and relate it to the needs of the region. Elsewhere considerable dissatisfaction was 
expressed regarding the explanation of the benefits that could be derived by individual 
businesses. 
The Regional Finance Director felt very little progress had been made since the 
introduction of the RBSIC two years earlier and more work needed to be done to 
explain the benefits offered to individual business units by the practice. The Regional 
Finance Director was supported by the Finance Director of the Australian subsidiary 
who did not believe that anything had been done to relate the RBSJC with the needs 
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of the business or explain the benefits that could be derived from the practice. Similar 
views were expressed by the Finance Director at Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary. 
In China the Finance Manager admitted he had never asked what the benefits were but 
he believed he could identify them himself without being told, while the General 
Manager Finance said he had not been given very much information about the 
RBSIC. In Singapore all of the managers felt that not enough had been done to 
explain the benefits of the RBSIC or relate it to the needs of the business. 
In Hong Kong both of the managers said the benefits of the RBSIC had been 
explained to them by the regional RBSIC team. However, both felt the need for more 
information to gain the maximum from the practice. The General Manager was very 
keen to learn about the adoption of the RBSIC by other offices in the region and said 
lie would welcome the opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences. The 
Accountant added that she thought the business could get more from the RBSIC but 
was not sure how. 
In the Thailand subsidiary there was a difference of opinion between the two 
managers. The Senior Finance Director correctly saw the purpose of the RBSIC as 
identifying key risks to the business and taking appropriate action to mitigate them. 
However, his immediate superior, the Managing Director, questioned how they could 
understand the benefits that could be derived from the practice as they had not 
received a full explanation of the RBSIC. He was particular concerned how managers 
ww ere expected to make judgements about risk when they had not been given a 
framework within which judgements could be made. In this case although the Senior 
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Finance Director understood the purpose of the RBSIC and could relate it to the needs 
of the business it is unlikely that he had the necessary skills to fully appreciate the 
benefits that could be derived from the practice. 
The failure to effectively explain the reasons for the RBSIC, its corporate governance 
role and the potential benefits to a business unit are, in part, a reflection of the flow of 
knowledge relating to the practice from the source of the knowledge? to individual 
business units. Opinions of managers and business units differed considerably about 
this subject. The Excelsior Group Manager for Risk felt that it was quite good with 
the importance of internal control being regularly reinforced. However, he went on 
to say that although the flow of knowledge between corporate headquarters and 
regional headquarters was `two-way' it tended to operate on a fixed schedule. He 
added despite visiting the UK twice a year he had not attended any meetings 
concerning the RBSIC with the majority of discussions about the subject conducted 
via electronic media. 
The Excelsior Regional Finance Director commented that information about the 
RBSIC had not been widely communicated and tended to be limited to the executive 
and senior management. A view shared by the Finance Director of the Excelsior's 
Australian subsidiary who commented: "Most people will have never heard of the 
Turnbull guidelines but will have some insight into the internal control system. " He 
added that more information should be provided from corporate headquarters with the 
objective of raising the profile of the practice 
7 Corporate car regional headquarters 
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Managers in Excelsior's Hong Kong, Chinese, Thai and Japanese subsidiaries all 
spoke positively about the flow of knowledge relating to the RBSIC from the Asia- 
Pacific regional headquarters to their subsidiaries. The Managing Director of 
Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary said: "The group has been yen-v clear in its 
communication regarding internal control. " This view was not shared by the 
subsidiary's Legal Manager who described the flow of knowledge as ` poor " 
commenting: "There is a definite need for more information. There is ven' little 
documentation (none that explains why the practice is being carried out) and there 
have been no training workshops. The language barrier is also venv important. " He 
was also concerned about the lack of feedback from regional and corporate 
headquarters regarding data provided by business units so that modifications can be 
carried out where appropriate. He was supported by the subsidiary's Directors of 
Finance and Operations who felt the general level of communication about the RBSIC 
was unsatisfactory with the exception being information relating to deadlines. 
The two managers of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary described knowledge flows as 
limited to senior management and frequently informal. A similar view was expressed 
by the Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary who went on to say that 
he was not sure if the flow of knowledge regarding the RBSIC was adequate as he 
was 11 .... not sure what is needed. 
" 
The General Manager of Excelsior's Singapore subsidiary remarked on how the 
number of people who had initially been involved with the RBSIC had reduced 
substantially with the flow of information on the subject reduced to yearly updates. 
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The other members of the management team commented that nearly all 
communication regarding the RBSIC occurred at the time of the annual risk review. 
The Finance Manager of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary remarked that awareness 
needed to be raised to improve the level of internal debate about risk management and 
mitigation. While the General Manager of the Excelsior Hong Kong business 
believed most people were aware of the RBSIC even though the consultation process 
only involves senior staff. 
All of the Landmark managers in both Taiwan and Hong Kong believed the flow of 
information relating to the RBSIC from corporate headquarters to be very limited with 
a number of them adding that they were restricted in developing their understanding 
of the practice as they did not have access to the company intranet and the 
information they did receive tended to be related to health and safety issues. 
The Managing Director of the Landmark's Hong Kong joint venture commented that 
he had not received any information about the RBSIC. Given that the business had 
only just been established and was very small this, although not necessarily correct, 
should not be seen as surprising. 
Poor knowledge flows are reflected in the lower than predicted level of awareness of 
Excelsior's ethical policy. The erratic distribution of the company's ethical policy 
booklets meant that it had not been seen by all of the managers interviewed for this 
study. Even among managers who had seen the booklets it was generally felt there 
was a need for a greater explanation of the policy and that the issuing of two booklets 
Derek Condon 278 04 '12/'? 007 
was insufficient for the practice to be fully understood and internalised. The General 
Manager of the Singapore subsidiary questioned the value of a practice that required 
her to simply distribute booklets without any follow up or discussion of their 
relevance to the business. 
Also, a failure to provide businesses with a thorough explanation of the practice and 
its value is likely to increase the probability of it being seen as a mechanical practice, 
whereby, booklets covering ethical policy are given to staff thereby satisfying the 
requirements of corporate headquarters without the practice becoming 
institutionalised in the business. This increases the likelihood of the ceremonial 
adoption of the policy. 
A further barrier to knowledge flows relating to Excelsior's ethical policy was 
highlighted by the managers in its Japanese subsidiary who wanted to know if the 
ethical policy booklets were available in Japanese. The Excelsior General Manager 
for Risk was unsure and went on to say that he was unaware of what language 
versions of the booklet existed. Given the likelihood that many of Excelsior's 
employees are unable to read English the probability of them understanding the 
company's ethical policy if it is not available in their mother tongue will be 
substantially reduced. 
Overall, a small majority of Excelsior managers expressed their satisfaction with the 
quality and quantity of information they received about the RBSIC No clear patterns 
could be identified showing a relationship between the type of business / role of 
managers and the level of satisfaction with the flow of information. However, a 
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number of potential reasons can be suggested for an indi\ idual manager's level of 
satisfaction with the information flow. 
The level of commitment to the RBSIC by individual managers is likely to be 
positively related to their level of engagement with the source of the knowledge. This 
suggests that if the flow of information is inadequate it is more likely to be noticed by 
a manager who is more committed to the RBSIC and wants to know more about the 
practice. An example of this would be the Legal Manager of Excelsior's Japanese 
subsidiary who clearly demonstrated an interest in the RBSIC while pleading for more 
information and additional training so that his business unit could gain the maximum 
benefit from the practice. 
Manager satisfaction with the flow of information could also be related to the length 
of time the business unit has been part of the overall group. If the business unit has 
recently been acquired it may have been identified by the source of the knowledge as 
warranting more attention and is therefore likely to benefit from a greater flow of 
knowledge than may otherwise be the case. An example would be the Excelsior Thai 
subsidiary that was acquired in 2002 and was in a country where Excelsior's previous 
presence had been very limited and did not include any business units. This could be 
the reason why both of the business unit's managers interviewed expressed their 
satisfaction with the flow of knowledge relating to the RBSIC. 
The seniority of a manager could also be a factor in his / her level of satisfaction with 
the flow of knowledge. The more senior a manager the less likely they are to be 
involved in the day to day operation of the RBSIC and the less likely they are to be 
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aware of any shortcomings of the flow of information about the practice. This could 
explain why the Managing Director of the Japanese subsidiary expressed far greater 
satisfaction with the flow of knowledge related to the RBSIC than the Legal Manager. 
Landmark managers were unanimous in expressing their dissatisfaction with the flow 
of information about the RBSIC. In the case of the Taiwanese joint venture this was 
possibly a reflection of the importance attached to the business by headquarters 
personnel who, due to the size of the business, did not believe it warranted the 
expenditure of the resources required to transfer the necessary information. In 
addition as most of the Taiwan based staff were not directly involved in identifying 
the risks that are transmitted to the Risk Management Department corporate 
headquarters may have felt there was little reason to provide the business unit with a 
detailed explanation of the practice despite local staff being responsible for the 
management of risks. 
The lack of awareness about the RBSIC among Excelsior's more junior employees 
suggests that it will be difficult for the company to follow the recommendation in the 
Turnbull guidelines that states: "All employees have some responsibility for internal 
control as part of their accountability for achieving objectives. They, collectively, 
should have the necessary knowledge, skills, information and authority to establish, 
operate and monitor the svsten, of internal control. This will require an 
understanding of the companl, its objectives, the industries and markets in which it 
operates, and the risks it faces. (Turnbull, 1999, Para. 19) 
Derek Condon 281 04 ' 12/2007 
The recommendation in itself is unlikely to sufficiently motivate business units to 
institutionalise the RBSIC. If all of a business units employees are to become 
involved in the practice, albeit to varying degrees, local management will need to 
ensure that all of the business unit's employees are aware of the RBSIC. As the 
Senior Finance Director of the Thai subsidiary commented employees are more likely 
to "appreciate" the RBSIC once they have some understanding of the practice. To 
date understanding and awareness about the RBSIC has been hampered by the 
absence of formal documentation about the practice. 
Inconsistent understanding of the reasons for the RBSIC among the Excelsior and 
Landmark business units is likely to increase the degree of causal ambiguity 
surrounding the RBSIC. This is most likely to occur when the respective corporate 
headquarters are unaware of what aspects of the practice local business units lack a 
complete understanding of In these cases the probability of the successful replication 
of the practice, requiring the re-creation of knowledge in such a way that the 
performance of the RBSIC meets the requirements of corporate headquarters, is likely 
to be reduced. Causal ambiguity signals the absence of knowledge as to why 
something is done including why a given action results in a given outcome (Szulanski, 
2003: 27). If the practice cannot be replicated in the Excelsior and Landmark 
business units because of differing levels of local understanding of the inner workings 
of the RBSIC, difficulties that arise may have to be solved locally, requiring the 
expenditure of costly financial and time resources. 
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9.2.0 Related Knowledge 
Having considered the level of understanding of the reasons for the RBSIC among 
individual business units we will now move on to consider the level of underlying 
knowledge relating to the practice present in each business unit. Knowledge about the 
components of a practice, including the skills required for its effective operations are 
an important component of business units absorptive capacity. Companies invest in 
absorptive capacity when they provide personnel with advanced technical training 
which in turn adds to a business unit's overall absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). 
Less than half of the Excelsior and Landmark managers felt their knowledge of the 
RBSIC was sufficient to enable them to undertake and fully benefit from the practice. 
Dissatisfaction about the level of training and documentation they had received was 
widespread. Only the Excelsior General Manger for Risk was in no doubt that he had 
received sufficient training. A number of Excelsior managers were confident that 
they could rely on the regional RBSIC team for any assistance they required if they 
were unable to undertake the RBSIC by themselves. 
The majority of Excelsior managers were confident that they had adequate knowledge 
of the RBSIC to be able to undertake and benefit from the practice. The General 
Manager for Risk described it as "a simple system to follow ". While both of the 
managers of the Thai subsidiary believed they had the necessary knowledge to 
manage the RBSIC adding that if they encountered any difficulties they knew they 
could get help from the regional RBSIC team. The Finance Manager of the Chinese 
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subsidiary also believed that he had the necessary knowledge to undertake and benefit 
from the practice adding that the documentation that he had been provided with was 
adequate. 8 
The Managing Director of Landmark's Hong Kong joint venture was confident that 
when the time came he would have the necessary skills to operate the RBSIC 
although training would be required for all of his team with regard to the specific 
characteristics of the practice. 
A difference of opinion existed in Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture and its 
Singaporean subsidiary. In Hong Kong the General Manager felt that he had enough 
knowledge of the practice to undertake the RBSIC while the Accountant was 
uncertain of her abilities. While in Singapore the General Manager believed her 
knowledge was sufficient, especially if given proper training, whereas the Finance 
and Administration Managers were adamant that they lacked the necessary skills to 
properly undertake the task. 
Differences of opinion also existed among the managers of Landmark's Taiwanese 
joint venture. The Managing Director (Landmark) was confident that the joint 
venture could institutionalise the RBSIC when asked to by Landmark corporate 
headquarters. The Marketing Manager while less confident felt "all of the staff have 
got di f ferent strengths which can be bought together in the RBSIC ". However, they 
have never had any training concerning risk management. The Operations Manager 
honestly stated that he did not have the skills to do the job. 
8 Flic Finance Manager was referring to the three documents available through Lotus Notes provided 
by the Regional RBSIC team. 
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The Finance Manager of Excelsior Malaysian subsidiary said that he thought he had 
"80% of the knowledge necessary" to undertake the RBSIC but definitely needed 
"advanced training ". Less confident were the Finance Director of the Excelsior 
Australian subsidiary, who felt that he probably did not have sufficient knowledge of 
Turnbull and that he needed to understand more about guidelines and the RBSIC to 
see its relevance to the business, and the Legal Manager of Excelsior's Japanese 
subsidiary who said: "I do not have much idea of what is expected from me and it hat 
the practice can do for our business please give me training. There is vei- , little 
documentation. " 
Absorptive capacity is largely a function of a business unit's pre-existing knowledge 
about a practice, should it be absent or insufficient, it will have difficulty in valuing, 
assimilating and applying the RBSIC successfully (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989: 569; 
1990: 128). Cohen and Levinthal (1988) stated that some portion of prior knowledge 
should be very closely related to the knowledge being transferred to facilitate 
assimilation. This has implications for Excelsior and Landmark because although 
only the Excelsior General Manager for Risk and his deputy the Business Continuity 
Manager Asia-Pacific Region, admitted to having no previous experience of working 
with a system of internal control none of the managers had experience of risk-based 
systems of internal control. 
The limited knowledge of systems of internal control among the managers is not 
unexpected given their previous experience when their responsibilities for internal 
control were in most cases minimal and / or indirect (e. g. Managing Director / 
General Manager with overall responsibility for the business). In addition managers 
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generally associated internal control with financial controls that were normall\ the 
responsibility of the finance function and monitored by the audit department and 
therefore regarded, correctly or not, as outside of their managerial remit. When 
managers operated non-financial controls they tended to be informal based on the tacit 
knowledge that they had acquired over their career working for their present and 
previous companies. Given their different types of experience both in terms of level 
of seniority and roles undertaken the tacit knowledge they had acquired differed 
considerably and was in turn reflected in their attitude and approach to internal 
control. 
Managers who joined Excelsior as a result of the acquisition of their business unit 
from a United States MNE appeared to have a greater appreciation of non-financial 
controls, although this varied considerable. This may have been due to their previous 
employer's adoption of the guidance on internal controls for United States companies, 
published in a report by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) of the 
Treadway Commission (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting) in 
1992, which adopted a broader approach to internal control beyond an exclusive 
reliance on financial measures. 
The limited experience of systems of internal control among the managers working in 
each business suggests that the level of absorptive capacity, relating to systems of 
internal control, will differ considerably between business units and very often may 
not be adequate. Another potential concern relates to the reliance on tacit knowledge, 
by many of the managers, to operate the non-financial components of a system of 
internal control. Assuming that the level of tacit knowledge differs between managers 
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there is a possibility that they will adopt different internal control techniques with 
varying success. 
This data has revealed considerable differences among managers regarding their 
ability to identify risks with two managers openly admitting they did not know how to 
undertake the task. The identification of risks is a basic skill requirement for 
employees involved in the RBSIC. The majority of managers had some experience of 
risk management but most did not have any familiarity with a formal risk 
management system and among those who did the range of experience and expertise 
differed significantly. 
Among the Excelsior managers the General Manager for Risk, Finance Director of the 
Australian subsidiary, Finance Manager of the Chinese subsidiary, Accountant of the 
Hong Kong joint venture, Finance Manager of the Malaysian subsidiary and the 
managers of the Thai and Singaporean subsidiaries admitted that they did not have 
any previous experience of working with a formal risk management system. 
Of the managers who had some experience of a formal risk management system9 the 
Excelsior Regional Finance Director said that he had used a risk management system 
when participating in the preparation of the annual business plan. The Legal Manager 
of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary said his previous experience had been at an 
American company using systems based on their national standards. The Finance and 
Operations Directors of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary commented that the RBSIC 
9 Experience of formal risk management practices came from three sources - previous employment, the 
Excelsior annual planning process and risk management practices with a limited scope e. g. health and 
safety. 
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was not very different from the previous system they had used; 1° howe\ er, it is more 
sensitive. The General Manager of Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture said that the 
RBSIC was far more developed than any systems he had been involved with in any of 
the other companies where he had worked. 
Few of the managers were able to clearly articulate how they identified risks and 
some admitted they lacked the necessary skill to do so. The Excelsior General 
Manager for Risk, Finance Manager of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary, Managing 
Director of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary, Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian 
subsidiary and the Managing Director (Landmark) of Landmark's Taiwan joint 
venture all acknowledged the role of tacit knowledge when they identified risk. 
In addition to applying his tacit knowledge the Finance Manager of Excelsior's 
Chinese subsidiary said that he just copied the instructions given from regional 
headquarters " While the Managing Director of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary, who 
acknowledged that the business needed to develop more expertise in identifying risks 
and use these skills more frequently, said that in addition to tacit knowledge he relied 
on functional leaders and outsiders to bring risks to the attention of the management 
group. He also emphasised the role of good communication and discussion as did the 
Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary. 
All three British Landmark managers admitted there was no formal process in place to 
identify risk with each one adopting a different approach. The Managing Director 
(Landmark) said he did not look specifically for risks but made a study of the overall 
1° When referring to the previous system the Finance and Operations Directors meant the system used 
in the annual business planning process. This was not a risk based system of internal control designed 
to be part of the company's ongoing operations. 
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operating environment from which risks emerged. The Marketing Manager, after a 
long pause, frankly said that he "didn't knotig " how to identify risks while the 
Operations Manager identified risks through "walking the job, using key performance 
indicators and yearly targets ". The Managing Director of Landmark's Hong Kong 
joint venture commented: "My natural way of working is to manage risk 11 and he did 
this by considering product (quality etc. ), financial (risk of loss) and the company (the 
future of the joint venture). 
In Hong Kong both Excelsior managers acknowledged that they were unsure how 
they should go about identifying risk. The General Manager said it is easy if you are 
looking at sales management because the figures are available, however, outside of 
this area he needed more guidance. While the Accountant, honestly, admitted that she 
did not know how to identify risk. In Singapore none of the Excelsior managers gave 
a very clear indication as to how they identified risk. The General Manager said: "In 
our life there is always risk, everything we do involves risk, therefore, risk 
management must be done all the time. " While the Finance and Administration 
Managers were of the view that they did not really anticipate risks but became aware 
of them when they became apparent. 
The RBSIC at Excelsior and Landmark has a far greater scope than any of the 
managers had previously experienced. Although the knowledge they had gained 
operating earlier systems should add to their business unit's absorptive capacity, 
making it easier for the RBSIC knowledge to be successfully transferred, the 
manager's previous experience in itself will not be sufficient to ensure the successful 
transfer of the practice. It is possible that a manager's previous experience of risk 
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management systems could hinder the institutionalisation of the RBSIC if a manager 
is not motivated to learn a new practice believing it adds little value to his / her 
existing knowledge. In addition if the scope of a previous system was limited it may 
be difficult for managers to appreciate the value of the wider view of risk 
recommended in the Turnbull guidelines. This data suggests that the later is the more 
likely to be the case. 
The different methods that managers use to identify risks, and the range of relevant 
skills they have (if they have any), should be of concern to both companies as they are 
likely to have serious implications for the consistency of the data gathered for the 
RBSIC. Managers may view risk based on varied tacit knowledge, that they have 
accumulated throughout their careers, which they frequently have difficulty 
articulating e. g. the Landmark Operations Manager's comment that among the ways 
he identified risk was "walking the job " suggesting that he knew a risk when he saw 
it but wasn't adopting a formal approach to identify it. ' Some managers identified 
risks by comparing performance to key indicators this could be a source of difficulties 
if the same indicators are not used by all of the managers at a company or accorded 
equal importance. 
The level of training about the operation of the RBSIC was a matter of concern for 
nearly all of the managers with the exception of the Excelsior General Manager for 
Risk. The Finance Director of Excelsior's Australian subsidiary commented that he 
had not received sufficient training and was unsure what training would be of value. 
He was also unaware if any documentation was available about the RBSIC. He went 
" I'his approach was consistent with the Operations Manager's emphasis on Health and Safety. 
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on to add that if he needed information about the practice he was sure it would be 
provided by the General Manager for Risk. 
Supporting the Legal Manager's plea for more training the Operations Director of 
Excelsior Japanese subsidiary cynically added: "The only training in this 
organisation is the fire drill ". The Finance Manager of Excelsior's Chinese 
subsidiary also remarked that he would like more training, so as to gain a greater 
understanding of the practice but was unaware of how beneficial it would be - "as 
you don 't know what you don 't know. " He added that if he had any problems he 
could always call on the General Manager for Risk or the Business Continuity 
Manager at regional headquarters for assistance. 
The managers of Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture were both very eager to receive 
additional training on the practice. The General Manager was keen to emphasis that 
the training should not only be technical but more practical in nature. He also thought 
some kind of benchmarking would be useful so that he could compare the output of 
the business with others in the region. The Accountant, who claimed that she had not 
received any training on the RBSIC, was also enthusiastic to learn from the 
experiences of other businesses. Both managers complained about the absences of 
any documentation relating to the practice saying that a procedures manual would be 
very useful. A similar view was expressed by the Finance Manager of Excelsior's 
Malaysian subsidiary who commented that to date he had only received very brief 
training from the regional RBSIC team. This was more than two years earlier and 
mainly dealt with the mechanics of the practice. He also complained that there was 
no documentation available on the RBSIC. He thought this was especially important 
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because he was not involved in handling risk when the RBSIC was introduced and did 
not have any information passed over to him when he took over the task. The 
Regional Finance Director also said that he would find additional training useful as he 
had not received any training since the original presentations two years earlier. 
Both the Managing Director and Senior Finance Director of Excelsior's Thai 
subsidiary were adamant about the need for more training. The Managing Director 
was of the opinion that there was a need for relevant knowledge to be better 
articulated. He also expressed his concern about whether the business had sufficient 
knowledge concerning judgement issues. He stated that there was "a need for afresh 
approach to improve clarity and make people look at things in a different way " he 
added that he would like to see more sharing of information and practices with other 
businesses in the region. The Senior Finance Director was also keen to learn from 
other businesses and wanted more training on how to mitigate risks. He also 
expressed his concern at the lack of documentation available on the RBSIC. 
All three managers of Excelsior's Singapore subsidiary were certain there was a 
definite requirement for more training about the RBSIC and there was a considerable 
need for documentary support such as a procedures manual. The General Manager 
felt that training was necessary to provide more understanding of the practice, 
enabling the whole team to be involved and to allow the RBSIC to move beyond 
being a one-off yearly review. 
The three British managers of Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture agreed that 
training, would be very valuable as would a procedures manual. The \iarkcting 
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Manager remarked: "An'., training is good; opportunities for our staff appear i'en' 
limited. " In Hong Kong the Managing Director of Landmark's joint venture 
acknowledged that training would be required for all of his team with regard to the 
specific characteristics of the practice if it is to be successfully institutionalised. 
The only manager who was confident that he had received enough training was the 
Excelsior General Manager for Risk who said: "The Business Continuity Manager 
Asia-Pacific and I would only require more training if the system changed, it is 
essential to stay current... . my 
deputy provides training throughout the region.... there 
is no manual just the guidelines. " 
However, he did acknowledge that he thought that the managers who had 
responsibility for RBSIC in the region's individual business units would benefit from 
the opportunity of meeting together, perhaps on an annual basis, to be introduced to 
new ways of identifying and mitigating risks while being provided with a forum to 
share best practices. 
Two possible reasons can be identified for the Excelsior General Manager for Risk 
confidence that he did not require additional training: Firstly, he genuinely believed 
he had a full understanding of the practice even if this was not the case; or secondly 
he was not prepared to admit his lack of knowledge about a practice for which he had 
responsibility in the region fearing this would reflect badly upon him. This research 
suggests that the first reason was the most likely explanation. 
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The comment by a number of managers that they had sufficient knowledge of the 
RBSIC for them to undertake and fully benefit from the practice appears to be 
inconsistent with the same manager's insistence that they needed more training about 
the RBSIC. This suggests they consider themselves to be meeting the requirements 
set by headquarters while at the same time believing that they do not have a proper 
understanding of the practice. If this is the situation they are not deriving the 
maximum benefit from the practice even if they claim this is the case. A number of 
Excelsior managers also suggested that if they had difficulties they could rely on the 
General Manager for Risk to assist them. If this is correct his role could provide local 
managers with a disincentive to develop a full understanding of the practice knowing 
he can be relied upon to support them should they need assistance (see 11.4.0). 
However, even if the General Manager for Risk were to provide assistance it would 
probably be limited to ensuring business units provide him with the information 
required for the RBSIC database and is less likely to concentrate on how that data was 
collected and risks were monitored. Once again this suggests the RBSIC will be 
ceremonially adopted by a business unit without it reaping the full benefits offered by 
the practice. 
Among the managers who did request additional training two themes were apparent: 
Firstly, managers knew they required additional training but were unsure of what 
training they needed because they did not know enough about the RBSIC. This in 
itself is a reflection of the lack of training and general awareness about a practice that 
is seen as a `one-off annual task by many of the managers in the region. Secondly, 
there was considerable concern about the absence of documentation about the RBSIC 
with a dumber of managers asking for a procedures manual. Both Excelsior and 
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Landmark provided considerable documentation about the RBSIC via the company 
intranet. However, Landmark employees did not have access to relevant site and 
rather more surprisingly none of the Excelsior employees, including the Excelsior 
General Manager for Risk, were aware of the existence of the website and the 
documentation it contained (see 5.1.2). 
9.3.0 Conclusion 
The institutionalisation of the RBSIC is likely to be impeded by the lack of 
understanding of the reasons for the practice and the potential benefits it could offer a 
business unit. This, in part, is due to poor communication relating to the practice 
reducing awareness in individual business units. An informal understanding of the 
practice that could be summarised as a perception that managing risk is a good thing 
was present in all business units suggesting that the value of the RBSIC would be 
appreciated if the business units had a better understanding of the practice. 
Prior related knowledge identified by Cohen and Levinthal (1988) as knowledge 
closely related to the knowledge being transferred was clearly absent in all of the 
business units, with the possible exception of Excelsior's Thai subsidiary, further 
reducing the level of absorptive capacity increasing the need for effecting training and 
the expenditure of resources allocated to the RBSIC. 
The need for additional training and documentation about the practice was a familiar 
refrain from informants with the data clearly indicating they lacked the necessary 
knowledge to maximise the benefits offered by the RBSIC. An example of this wt as 
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provided by the uncertainty expressed by many managers as to how they should 
identify risk. Additional training would require the provision of additional resources 
for the practice. This appeared unlikely given that the majority of managers 
questioned whether they had sufficient resources to undertake what was currently 
expected of them. 
Furthermore, if the level of knowledge about the RBSIC and the reasons for its 
introduction can be raised to a consistent and high level in all of the business units this 
would reduce the degree of causal ambiguity in the transfer of the practice increasing 
the likelihood of its successful institutionalisation. 
Having discussed the practice itself the next chapter will consider the degree to which 
both the source of the RBSIC and individual recipient units are motivated to 
institutionalise the practice. 
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CHAPTER 10 
MOTIVATION 
10.0.0 Introduction 
Chapters 7 to 9 discussed the two contexts within which the transfer of the RBSIC 
occurs and the practice itself. This chapter discusses the second factor influencing the 
degree of institutionalisation related to the actual transfer process - motivation - and 
is concerned with the motivation for the successful transfer and institutionalisation of 
the RBSIC from the perspectives of both the source of the knowledge and the 
recipient. Even if the other factors in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC (see 6.4.0) 
are supportive of institutionalisation if either, or both, the source and the recipient are 
not motivated to transfer and institutionalise the practice the probability that it will be 
successfully institutionalised will be reduced. 
This research identified two sub-factors as having an important role in determining 
the level of motivation to institutionalise the RBSIC. Each one is considered in a 
separate section in this chapter: The first - the source of the RBSIC - discusses the 
motivation of the source of the practice and how it is perceived by recipient business 
units; and the second - recipient business unit - discusses the motivation of recipient 
business units specifically considering the relationship between the institutionalisation 
of the RBSIC and career advancement, and the degree to which local business 
managers believed the practice added value to their business. It concludes with a brief 
summary of other reasons suggested by managers as to why they were motivated to 
undertake the RBSIC. 
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10.1.0 Source of RBSIC 
The primary motivation for the source of the RBSIC to institutionalise the practice 
was to meet the recommendations contained in the Turnbull guidelines. However, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter (see 9.1.0) awareness of that purpose among 
both the Excelsior and Landmark Asia-Pacific business units was very limited. The 
other benefits predicted by the source including greater understanding of risk and 
improved decision making leading to increased overall performance (see 5.1.2 and 
5.2.2) were emphasised to much lesser degree by headquarters informants in both 
companies and also not fully understood by local business units. 
The greater the perceived importance attached to institutionalisation of the RBSIC by 
headquarters, the greater the motivation at local business units to institutionalise the 
practice. Therefore, if the recipient perceives that the institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC is not a priority at the source it is unlikely to be particularly motivated to 
institutionalise the practice. 
A consensus did not exist among Excelsior managers as to the importance their 
regional and corporate headquarters placed on the successful institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC and the degree to which they were motivated to achieve this. In contrast the 
Landmark managers who were prepared to comment were unanimous in the belief 
that the practice was not seen as important by their corporate headquarters. 
All of the Excelsior managers interviewed at the company's regional headquarters, 
Japanese, Chinese and Thai subsidiaries, and the Hong Kong joint venture believed 
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that the successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC was very important to the source 
of the knowledge which they acknowledged as either, or both. the Asia-Pacific 
regional headquarters and the corporate headquarters. In all of these cases the 
managers cited the assistance provided to them by either corporate or regional 
headquarters' as evidence of the importance attached to the practice. 
This view was not shared by the Finance Director of Excelsior's Australian subsidiary 
who commented: "It is important to the Regional Finance Director but other than 
that its importance varies depending on who ioru talk to. " He added that both 
regional and corporate headquarters "probably believe in getting the bare minimum 
done" suggesting the RBSIC was not important to corporate headquarters and it 
would be satisfied if there was ceremonial adoption of the practice. 
The Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary hesitantly said that he 
thought the institutionalisation of the RBSIC was important to both the Asia-Pacific 
and corporate headquarters. Although he did not see it as priority commenting: 
"There have been lots of changes throughout the region over the last two years, 
including a major acquisition, so management has not focused on the RBSIC. The 
level of awareness about the RBSIC needs to raised inside the business and this 
requires more involvement from senior management who have not really been putting 
a great deal of effort i/ito it. " The Finance Manager's judgement may have been 
clouded by the very high levels of change that had gone on recently at the Malaysian 
subsidiary. 
From corporate headquarters in the case of the Asia-Pacific regional headquarters and from Asia- 
Pacific regional headquarters in all of the other cases. 
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Negative opinions were expressed by the management team of Excelsior's Singapore 
subsidiary and the managers in both of Landmark's joint ventures. In Singapore the 
managers generally felt that headquarters was not particularly motivated to help them 
understand and develop the RBSIC to its full potential. The General Manager 
remarked: "I have not had much communication on the subject and it does not seem 
to be an area where there is much focus. Although this may be because the Singapore 
business is seen as unimportant due to its small size. " While the Administration 
Manager said rather sarcastically: "Headquarters must see it as important or whv 
else would you be here. " 
A number of the Landmark managers concluded that as they had received no formal 
communication regarding the RBSIC from corporate headquarters they must not 
regard it to be of any importance. The Managing Director of the Landmark Hong 
Kong joint venture doubted whether a `risk facilitator' (see 5.2.1) would be resourced 
when required. 
The Excelsior Singapore subsidiary and the two Landmark joint ventures were very 
small businesses and all three admitted that the overall level of communication they 
had with their headquarters was low, therefore, the limited communication they had 
had with headquarters regarding the RBSIC in itself may not be an indicator of the 
importance of the practice to their respective headquarters. 
Those Excelsior managers who thought the institutionalisation of the RBSIC was 
important to the source of the practice tended to base this primarily on the degree of 
effort made by the regional RBSIC team. As they were regional headquarters 
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employees local managers saw their effort and willingness to assist them as an 
indication that regional headquarters believed the institutionalisation of the practice to 
be important. 
The attitude of senior management towards the RBSIC was seen by the majority of 
Excelsior managers to be supportive with the practice regarded as playing an 
important role in the company. The motivation of senior business unit managers to 
institutionalise the RBSIC is likely to be positively related to the importance attached 
to the practice by the Regional Managing Director. The higher the perceived 
importance attached to the RBSIC by the Regional Managing Director the greater the 
motivation to institutionalise the practice for business unit managers who wish to gain 
internal legitimacy with the highest levels of the company. The Excelsior Regional 
Finance Manager commented that "last year the Asia-Pacific CEO was new to his 
position and his approach was reasonably cursory. This is not representative of him 
and it is likely to be different this year. " If this is correct it suggests that senior 
Excelsior managers are more likely to be motivated to institutionalise the RBSIC in 
the future. 
Negative comments were made by the General Manager Finance and Finance 
Manager of the Excelsior Chinese subsidiary who admitted they were uncertain as to 
the amount of senior management support for the RBSIC and the General Manager of 
the Singapore subsidiary who remarked "that senior management seemed to have 
vcrv little to say or support to offer for the RBSIC'. The Finance Manager of the 
Malaysian subsidiary said that he did not have an opinion on the subject. 
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10.2.0 Recipient Business Unit 
10.2.1 National Context 
The cognitive, normative and regulatory components of national context will 
influence the degree to which recipient business units are motivated to institutionalise 
the RBSIC (see Chapter 7). The degree to which a business unit's national culture 
supports and understands the values of the RBSIC will be positively related to the 
motivation of a business unit to institutionalise the practice. 
10.2.2 Career Advancement 
The majority of business unit managers did not regard the institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC as something they needed to achieve to become internally legitimate with 
headquarters, thereby, becoming eligible for the rewards that headquarters could 
choose to bestow upon them. This suggests they do not believe their relationship with 
headquarters was likely to be damaged if they do not give a high priority to the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC. 
None of the Landmark and the minority of the Excelsior managers believed there was 
a link between their career advancement and the successful institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC. In general, the RBSIC was seen as one of a number of tasks that managers 
were required to undertake and upon which their contribution to the company would 
be measured. A number of managers suggested it was not a priority and lacked the 
necessary recognition inside their business unit for it to be seen as a key determinant 
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in an individual's advancement in the organisation. However, it was acknowledged 
by some managers that this position could change as the practice grew in perceived 
importance and value to the business, making it a greater priority for the manager 
charged with institutionalising the RBSIC in the business unit. 
Four Managers believed there was a link between their career advancement and the 
successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC. They were the General Manager of the 
Excelsior Hong Kong joint venture, who described the successful institutionalisation 
of the RBSIC as ".... proving my skills to implement what I am asked to do bi' 
management. It is also a key performance indicator", who was supported by his 
colleague the joint venture's Accountant; the Excelsior Legal Manager in Japan who 
was confident that it was important for his future progress in the company; and the 
General Manager of Excelsior's Singapore subsidiary who acknowledging the value 
of the institutionalisation of the RBSIC said: "A better run business will reflect well 
on nre. 
The Excelsior Group Manager for Risk and his deputy questioned whether the 
importance of the practice had achieved a high enough level of recognition in the 
company for it successful institutionalisation to be regarded as an important factor in 
determining whether an individual warranted promotion. However, both 
acknowledged this situation could change especially if the company was damaged in 
someway by an event that had not been identified as a potential risk resulting in a 
failure to apply appropriate mitigation measures. 
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The Managing Director of Excelsior's Thailand subsidiary was also uncertain of the 
relationship between the RBSIC and advancement in the company saying: "It is a 
very critical practice and risk management is something that I have always taken 
seriously, long before I had heard of the RBSIC. If things go wrong it tit ill defilllte/v 
effect my position. Therefore, I need to be sure the RBSIC is done properly. " His 
colleague the Senior Finance Director was far more certain stating that the RBSIC 
would not directly affect his advancement as he had many other more important 
responsibilities. However, he did acknowledge that the practice would continue to 
assume a greater importance inside Excelsior. 
The Finance Manager of Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary had no doubt that the 
successful implementation of the RBSIC was not relevant to his advancement in the 
company adding ".... there are lots of other important things to do. " Similar views 
were expressed by the Finance and Administration Managers of Excelsior's Singapore 
subsidiary who, disagreeing with the General Manager, saw the RBSIC as a once a 
year practice which was one of many tasks they were required to undertake and was 
very unlikely to play a role in their advancement in the company. 
In Taiwan the Managing Director (Landmark) of Landmark's joint venture when 
asked whether the successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC would positively affect 
his advancement at Landmark responded with a number of abrupt statements: "Too 
curb' to say, but no!... my natural way of working is to manage risk.... putting in a 
formal system is just one of my many tasks.... success is judged in financial terms. 'A 
similar vew was expressed by the Managing Director of Landmark's Hong Kong 
joint venture. 
Derek Condon 304 0412/2007 
Adopting a different approach, the Finance Director of Excelsior's Chinese 
subsidiary, while admitting that he did not feel successfully implementing the RBSIC 
would benefit his career at Excelsior, did say "... it would be a very good skill to have 
if I was to join another company and it would help me to find another job more 
easily. " 
10.2.3 Value of the RBSIC 
Given that the RBSIC had only been implemented at Excelsior responses about the 
value of the practice were limited to Excelsior personnel. The value of the RBSIC 
was appreciated to different degrees by most of the managers, however, only the 
managers of the Hong Kong joint venture believed it was enabling the company to 
function in a more effective manner and this was qualified with the remark that "a lot 
more needs to be done " 
The General Manager for Risk characteristically was more upbeat than his colleagues 
when discussing the RBSIC stating that "the value (of the RBSIC) is increasingly 
appreciated as the number of cycles increases; however, this value is probably only 
recognised at the top of the business unit ". He went on to say that his was motivated 
to undertake the RBSIC because it led to the `provision of information for other 
initiatiives.... it has enabled us to know more about the business than we did before. " 
The Finance Manager of the Chinese subsidiary also regarded the value of the 
practice as proven because ".... it improves the level of thinking in the business " 
adding that he vas motivated to undertake the practice because "it is a task that needs 
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to be done to benefit the company. " However, he felt it was too early to tell if it was 
enabling the business to operate in a more effective manner. 
The managers of the Hong Kong joint venture had a generally positive view of the 
RBSIC. The General Manager, who was keen to emphasis that risk management is a 
normal part of business, said of the RBSIC: "In the sense of getting the team more 
9 alert ' to the importance of risk management its value has been proven. However, it 
has not been tested. " The Accountant was more positive saying that it had proved to 
be effective although she was reluctant to give specific examples. They both believed 
it enabled the company to function in a more effective manner, however, the General 
Manager concluded "there is still a lot more that needs to be done especially in 
increasing awareness of the practice and a better definition of risk is required along 
with cross regional training ". The Accountant added that she also found the practice 
to be very useful but added "to truly benefit from the system I want more information 
about the practice and training. " 
The managers of the Thai subsidiary gave clear examples of how the RBSIC was 
adding value to their business. In 2003 the RBSIC identified a purchasing risk related 
to the likelihood of an increase in import duties. Working with a trade association 
negotiations were undertaken with the government with the objective of mitigating 
the risk. Subsequently the duty did not change. In addition the Senior Finance 
Director provided a more obvious example where the RBSIC brought the lack of fire 
protection at the plant to the attention of senior management leading to the 
introduction of a ncNN sprinkler system. Despite these examples the Managing 
Director did not feel the RBSIC was allowing the company to function more 
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effectively at the operational level although he thought this may change as the 
practice becomes increasingly institutionalised. He was supported in this view by the 
Senior Finance Director. He went on to add that he was motivated to undertake the 
practice because "to improve products and manage the business more effective/' it is 
essential to understand the operating environment and its inherent risks. " While the 
Senior Finance Director commented that his motivation came from the need to protect 
against "risks to the health of customers and shareholder losses. " 
Other managers were not so optimistic. The Regional Finance Director felt that while 
the RBSIC had already provided some value, not least because it increased awareness 
of risk, more value could and should be gained from the practice. He was also 
concerned that the potential existed for a risk to be overlooked or as he put it `fall 
through the cracks ". The Finance Director of the Australian subsidiary, Legal 
Manager of the Japanese subsidiary and the Finance Manager of the Malaysian 
subsidiary all thought it was "too early " to tell if the value of the RBSIC was proven, 
although the Finance Manager of the Malaysian subsidiary did say "it is better than 
nothing. " He went on to say that the initial motivation for undertaking the practice 
was because it was a "compliance2 issue " but as "time goes on it makes you consider 
risks and their impact. " The Legal Manager of the Japanese subsidiary said he was 
motivated to undertake the practice because "it is essential to have such a tool in the 
modern business environment. " The subsidiary's Finance Director strongly disagreed 
with him saying when asked whether the RBSIC had added value to the business: 
"No, not i dt, in fact tii'c do not care about it, it provides no additional value. Normal 
business practices involve the consideration of risk and that provides sufficient 
By compliancce the Finance Manager meant at the request of the Group Audit Department. 
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information and value. The practice is seen us more related to quality and health and 
safety. " 
In Singapore, the General Manager thought it was too early to differentiate between 
the value added by the RBSIC and the "normal ongoing approach to risk outside of 
the RBSIC that is very important to the management of the business ". The 
Administration Manager, supported by the Finance Manager added: "It does help by 
identifying mitigation actions that can be taken. e. g. The business recently bought a 
fire proof cabinet because of concerns over a fire destroying important documents, 
this risk was identified during the RBSIC. 
Only one manager the Finance Director of the Japanese subsidiary believed that the 
RBSIC did not provide any value to his business unit basing his opinion on the 
conviction that risk was adequately dealt with by the business unit's existing 
practices. He then went on to demonstrate his lack of understanding of the practice 
commenting that the RBSIC was associated with quality control and health and 
safety. Given the poor opinion the Finance Director had of the RBSIC it is not 
surprising that he said that "he did not care about it ". In this case his lack of 
motivation to institutionalise the RBSIC seems to stem from a lack of understanding 
about the practice and its objectives. His comments contrasted dramatically with 
those of his colleague the Legal Manager who said of the RBSIC that "it was 
essential to have such a tool in the modern business environment ". His appreciation 
of the value of the practice. even though he admitted that presently he did not feel that 
it added to the effectiveness of the business, motivated him to undertake the RBSIC 
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and try to understand more about it and ho\t he could maximise the benefits that 
could he derived from the practice. 
Although other managers agreed with the Finance Director of the Japanese subsidiary 
that the consideration of risk was normal operating practice for a business they also 
felt that the RBSIC complemented existing risk management practices they may have 
adopted. Potential and actual benefits identified by managers that could be derived 
from the institutionalisation of the RBSIC included increased awareness of risk in a 
business unit, developing a better understanding of the operating environment through 
the provision of data that was previously unavailable and better protection for 
customers and shareholders. Once again the appreciation of the extra value that could 
be gained from the institutionalisation of the RBSIC was primarily a function of the 
relevant manager's understanding of the practice which was often reflected in the 
degree to which the manager was motivated to institutionalise the practice. 
10.2.4 Other Reasons 
Numerous other reasons were given as to why managers were motivated to undertake 
the RBSIC these included reduction of personal risk, requirements of the job, valuable 
business tool, compliance, protect customers and shareholders, and to improve the 
performance of the business. Most common was requirements of the job. Examples 
included the Finance Director of the Australian subsidiary who said: it was ".... to 
m ec! the requirements set by the Regional Finance Director (to whom he reports) " 
and the General Manager of the Singapore subsidiary who commented she was 
motivated to undertake the RBSIC because ".... I am a professional emplol'ccl hi the 
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company and must follow the rules. I have a personal interest because the risks 
identified could affect my position, because if something goes wrong the responsibility 
falls on the General Manager, and in Singapore this means I could go to prison. " If 
the manager is carrying out the RBSIC for this reason the probability of ceremonial 
adoption of the practice is greater as internalisation is unlikely to occur if the value of 
the practice is not acknowledged. 
10.3.0 Conclusion 
With the exception of the Finance Director of Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary, all of 
the Excelsior managers identified some value, albeit difficult to quantify, to be gained 
from the operation of the RBSIC. Furthermore, to different degrees and in different 
ways they appreciated the potential for the RBSIC to add value to their business unit 
but were not yet sure of the extent, if any, that the practice would enable them to 
increase the effectiveness of their business unit. To date only the managers of 
Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture believed the RBSIC was enabling their business 
unit to function more effectively. 
A minority of managers, all at Excelsior's business units (Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Japan), associated the institutionalisation of the RBSIC with career advancement and 
in only one business unit - Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture - was this opinion 
unanimous. 
Opinions were mixed among Excelsior managers concerning the degree to which the 
practice was perceived as important, and therefore a priority, by their corporate 
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headquarters While Landmark managers were unanimous in their belief that the 
RBSIC was not important to their company. 
Overall, the data suggest that levels of motivation to undertake the RBSIC are quite 
low increasing the likelihood of ceremonial adoption of the practice. 
The next chapter considers the fifth and final factor in the institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC - the transfer process. 
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CHAPTER 11 
TRANSFER PROCESS 
11.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the fifth and final factor in the institutionalisation of the 
RBSIC the transfer process itself The previous four chapters have discussed the 
contexts within which the transfer of the practice occurs, the practice, and the 
motivation of the source and the recipient to institutionalise the RBSIC. As 
previously stated, even if all of these factors are supportive of the institutionalisation 
of the RBSIC, if the transfer process is not undertaken effectively the practice is 
unlikely to be successfully institutionalised. 
This research identified three sub-factors as having a key role in the transfer process. 
Each one is considered in a separate section in this chapter: The first - relationship 
with headquarters - discusses individual business unit's relationship with their 
respective headquarters; the second - role of the gatekeeper - discusses the key role 
of the gatekeeper in facilitating (or not) the transfer process; and the third - 
knowledge retention - considers the degree to which business units are able to retain 
knowledge about the RBSIC once it has been transferred. 
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11.1.0 Relationship with Headquarters 
Landmark and Excelsior need to ensure that the level of contact with the source of the 
RBSIC is sufficient, not only in terms of quantity but also quality, to strengthen ties 
between parent and practice recipient, and increase understanding of the local 
operating environment by headquarters, thereby, decreasing the likelihood of causal 
ambiguity occurring. They should also aim to promote shared values and beliefs 
which in turn should reduce the likelihood of the `not-invented-here' syndrome 
developing as new practices will be seen to a lesser extent as coming from outside the 
business unit increasing the likelihood of individual business units institutionalising 
the RBSIC. 
The two companies differed considerably in the level of contact their Asia-Pacific 
businesses had with their respective headquarters. ' In most cases, the exception being 
Japan, the Excelsior senior managers frequently visited their regional headquarters (or 
sub-regional headquarters) and in many cases had visited the company's corporate 
headquarters. Less senior managers had normally visited the regional and / or sub- 
regional headquarters on a number of occasions. All of the Excelsior business units 
were regularly visited by regional headquarters personnel including the General 
Manager for Risk who normally visited the businesses more than once a year. While 
managers at Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture commented that little was done to 
encourae Taiwan-based staff to visit corporate headquarters either for training 
purposes or to develop useful relationships that would enable them to function more 
effectively when they returned to the region. None of the local employees of 
Corporate and regional for Excelsior and corporate only for Landmark. 
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Landmark's Hong Kong joint venture had visited corporate headquarters; however, 
corporate headquarters personnel were frequent visitors to Hong Kong. 
The degree of contact that employees of a business unit had with headquarters 
personnel was a reflection of a number of factors. The presence of a regional 
headquarters, even though in some cases (Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) it was 
only three to four hours less flying time away than Excelsior's UK based corporate 
headquarters, meant that for most managers in the region it was relative easy to visit 
corporate managers to whom they reported, either directly or indirectly, and not 
particularly costly in terms of financial or time resources. In addition it was equally 
easy for regional headquarters based managers to visit business units in the region. 
The Excelsior General Manager for Risk in particular was a frequent visitor to all of 
the businesses in this study demonstrating his belief in the importance of personal 
contact with local employees. 
Another factor was the relative importance of the region to the company. Excelsior's 
business in the Asia-Pacific region was considerably more important2 to the overall 
company than was the case with Landmark. Two possible reasons why Landmark's 
Taiwanese joint venture manager's are not encouraged to visit the company's 
corporate headquarters are first, it is a large expense for a small business and second 
the business is not seen as important enough to warrant the expenditure of 
headquarters resources on meeting and offering training to managers. A third 
possibility is that due to the size of the business its profile is not high enough at 
corporate headquarters for it to be considered by most of the managers based there. 
2 In 2004 over 10% of Excelsior's operating profit came from the Asia-Pacific region. Landmark's 
Asia-Pacific operations are yet to make a profit (Source: 2004 Annual Reports) 
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Excelsior's Japanese subsidiary reported the worst record for managers visiting 
regional and corporate headquarters. This was probably due to the short time most of 
the managers had been employed by Excelsior (most of the business was newly 
acquired) and other management priorities principally integrating the business with 
the rest of the company. 
Although headquarters managers tend to be very knowledgeable about the practice 
they are responsible for transferring their knowledge does not normally extend to the 
operating environments where it will function. This lack of understanding of the 
operating environment was a reflection of their training about and actual experience 
of these environments. For example, the Excelsior General Manager for Risk, in his 
role as gatekeeper, made a particular effort to develop personal relationships with the 
staff responsible for the risk functions at local business units but his actual knowledge 
of the environment they worked in was limited due to lack of training and the small 
amount of time he generally spent in most countries. The majority of other Excelsior 
headquarters managers spent even less time visiting the countries where the 
company's subsidiaries and joint ventures were based communicating most frequently 
by Email. 
This lack of understanding of the features of the context into which the RBSIC was 
being transferred by both headquarters and the gatekeeper increased the likelihood of 
casual ambiguity occurring making it more difficult for them to identify difficulties in 
the practice transfer. 
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On occasions when business unit managers disagreed about the level of understanding 
of the local operating environment by headquarters this was normally as a result of 
their relationships with individual headquarters managers. If the headquarters 
manager they most frequently dealt with had demonstrated an understanding of the 
local operating environment, and communicated this to them, they were more likely to 
view overall headquarters understanding of the operating environment positively. 
Relationship building is particularly important in Asian countries with their emphasis 
on high context communication that requires the development of relatively long 
lasting relationships (Hall, 1976) that will enable local managers to effectively 
communicate with headquarters based managers. The opposite was often the case, a 
number of managers stated that communication tended to be brief, impersonal, 
lacking explanation or an understanding of the local environment making the transfer 
of a practice more difficult. 
The number of businesses newly acquired by Excelsior also meant that in many cases 
headquarters managers had not yet had time to develop an appreciation of the 
business and its operating environment. 
11.2.0 Role of the Gatekeeper 
The transfer of new practices frequently requires a gatekeeper, who stands between 
the source of the knowledge and the recipient unit, to supply the recipient with the 
knowledge regarding the practice. The gatekeeper role is to ensure that knowledge is 
transferred in an understandable form and to monitor its institutionalisation (Cohen & 
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Levinthal, 1990: 132) The effectiveness of the gatekeeper influences the ease or 
difficulty of intra-company communication and, in turn. the level of a business unit's 
absorptive capacity. However, even though the role of the gatekeeper can be very 
important, his, her or their, absorptive capacity does not constitute the absorptive 
capacity of the recipient business unit (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 132) it should 
complement and add to the existing absorptive capacity that is derived from the 
absorptive capacity of the business unit's individual members. 
The role of the gatekeeper at Excelsior is undertaken by the regional RBSIC team and 
especially the General Manager for Risk. A similar position does not exist at 
Landmark where the majority of work relating to the RBSIC is undertaken at 
corporate headquarters. 
An effective gatekeeper should be able to reduce the tensions that develop between 
the source of the knowledge and recipient units relating to the transfer and 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC. The regional RBSIC team's position as gatekeeper 
was regarded positively and accepted by all of the business units. 
The Regional Finance Director described his relationship with the regional RBSIC 
team as "I have a good positive relationship with them ... they own the practice and 
do 
their job 'yell.... they clearly have a passion for what they are doing. " Similar 
positive comments were made by a number of other managers including the Finance 
Manager of Excelsior's China subsidiary who said that he had always found the 
rcional RBSIC team to be a reliable and credible source of information who 
"demonstrated considerable patience with the business when it has problems ". This 
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view was shared by the managers of Excelsior's Hong Kong joint venture who added 
that the RBSIC team were very approachable and responsive to their needs. Although 
the General Manager did add that he would find it useful if he were able to get a more 
regional perspective on the practice. The Senior Finance Director of Excelsior's Thai 
subsidiary said that he worked closely with the regional RBSIC team and appreciated 
the interest they showed in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC in the Thai business 
adding that the relationship had improved considerably, following the subsidiary's 
acquisition, as the two sides had got to know "who is who ". The Finance Manager of 
Excelsior's Malaysian subsidiary also acknowledged the assistance he had received 
from the regional RBSIC team commenting on the high quality of the information 
they had provided. 
The only comments with slightly negative connotations were by the Finance Director 
of Excelsior's Australia subsidiary who remarked: "I have a good relationship cis 
much as anything due to my proximity to the risk team3. However, it would be better 
if I was able to make some time for it (the RBSIC) " and the Finance Manager of 
Excelsior's Singapore subsidiary who remarked that sometimes there are problems 
caused by a general lack of understanding, although a recent presentation by the 
Business Continuity Manager had helped. 
The principal source of knowledge relating to the RBSIC for the regional RBSIC 
team was corporate headquarters with whom they believed they had a good 
relationship. Both managers said that if they had any problems with the practice they 
would know who to approach at corporate headquarters and would expect to receive 
l he Finance Director and the Asia-Pacific RBSIC are based on the same floor. 
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assistance whenever it was required. The General Manager for Risk added the he had 
always found corporate headquarters to be a knowledgeable and trustworthy source of 
knowledge regarding the RBSIC although he would find more information on the 
measures that should be taken to mitigate risk useful. This was supported by his 
deputy who had more experience of regularly contacting UK based personnel. 
The only other source of knowledge mentioned by managers was the Finance 
Manager of Excelsior's Chinese subsidiary who had provided information about the 
RBSIC to the Hong Kong joint venture's Accountant`. 
Although the positive relationship between the regional RBSIC team and local 
business units should encourage the development of trust between the two parties, 
facilitating the transfer of knowledge between them, the heavy reliance on the RBSIC 
team, especially the General Manager for Risk, given his limited knowledge of the 
features of the local context to which the RBSIC was being transferred, could have 
some negative implications for the institutionalisation of the practice. 
Firstly, business units may become over reliant on the regional team expecting 
assistance to be available at all times. This could reduce the motivation of business 
units to develop the necessary understanding of the RBSIC required for the 
institutionalisation of the practice 
Secondly, although perceiving the RBSIC team as a credible source of knowledge has 
positive implications for the transfer it could also result in business units 
4 The Excelsior China subsidiary is also the Greater China sub-regional headquarters with whom the 
Accountant has a reporting line. 
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unquestioningly accepting everything they are told by the RBSIC team, thereby, 
discouraging them from critical thinking about the practice with the possibility that 
they will fail to develop an appreciation of its full potential. 
Thirdly, the RBSIC team are in a very powerful position regarding the transfer of the 
RBSIC as they, to a large extent, are able to determine the type of knowledge 
transferred. This power could be misused, either intentionally or unintentionally, if 
the RBSIC team only transfer knowledge that they deem to be suitable for the 
business units. This may be because the RBSIC team fears losing ownership of the 
practice to the business units, thereby, reducing its importance and status as the sole 
source of knowledge of the RBSIC or that they believe the business units lack the 
ability to fully understand the practice. In either case it could retard the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC. 
This research suggests that the first scenario has occurred and there is a possibility 
that the other two could occur. Given that Excelsior has a stated objective of 
devolving ownership of the risk database to individual business units5 it needs to take 
action to rectify this situation. While ensuring that the relationship between the 
regional RBSIC team and the individual business units remains strong, measures 
should be put in place, to encourage business units to reduce their dependency on the 
RBSIC team. This could be done by making the institutionalisation of the RBSIC one 
of the business unit manager's key objectives. This would have the added benefit of 
increasing the profile of the RBSIC throughout the business increasing awareness 
among all employees of the practice. 
Source: Intervie\\ \N ith the Director Business Risk Management. 
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11.3.0 Knowledge Retention 
Should managers fail to retain knowledge about the RBSIC it will only be possible for 
business units to institutionalise the practice if the rely on continued assistance from 
outside the business, and even then, the absence of internal retention process will 
make the institutionalisation of the RBSIC extremely difficult. 
Differences of opinion existed among the Excelsior managers regarding the ability of 
business units to retain the knowledge transferred about the RBSIC. The General 
Manager for Risk was confident the business could retain the knowledge without 
support from the UK unless the RBSIC changed when further transfers of knowledge 
would be necessary. The majority of business unit level managers, while believing it 
would be possible to retain the knowledge, regarded ongoing support from the 
regional RBSIC team as essential. In addition the Legal Manager of the Japanese 
subsidiary emphasised the importance of internal documentation to retain knowledge 
about the practice. Similar comments were made by the Singapore subsidiary 
management team and the Hong Kong joint venture management team who went on 
to complain about the absence of a RBSIC procedures manual that they believed 
would make knowledge retention much easier. The Managing Director of the Thai 
subsidiary was clear that continued support from the regional RBSIC team would be 
welcome. While the Senior Finance Director was more optimistic saying: "Once itc 
understand the practice we will not need ongoing support " 
The Finance Director of the Australian subsidiary said that he did not do a lot to retain 
knowledge of the RBSIC as it was always possible to draw on the expertise of the 
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regional RBSIC team who were also responsible for the RBSIC in Australia. The 
Finance Manager of the Chinese subsidiary did not believe retention of knowledge 
would provide any difficulties as "there was not much knowledge to retain " 
However, he did acknowledge that more training would make it easier to replicate. 
The Finance Manager of the Malaysian subsidiary was concerned that high staff 
turnover and a lack of documentation would make knowledge retention difficult. 
Although, this should be mitigated by his continuing responsibility for the practice 
and ongoing support from the regional RBSIC team. 
Most of the Excelsior businesses were keen, whenever possible, for the same people 
to be involved with the RBSIC over a lengthy period. The majority of managers also 
thought it was important for each business to appoint a manager with special 
responsibility for the RBSIC (this had already been done in most cases). The 
exception being the Regional Finance Director, who was opposed to the idea, 
believing that individuals should be encouraged to take responsibility for their own 
parts of the business and the Finance Director of the Australian subsidiary who 
admitted he had not given very much consideration to appointing an individual to be 
responsible for the practice over the long term especially as this task was presently 
being undertaken by the General Manager for Risk who was likely to remain in that 
position for sometime. 
In Taiwan the Managing Director (Landmark) admitted that he had not given very 
much thought to the mechanics of institutionalising the RBSIC and had not decided if 
a single member of staff would be responsible for the practice or departmental heads. 
He did acknowledge that ultimately the responsibility would be his. 
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11.4.0 Conclusion 
The perception of the majority of Excelsior and Landmark business unit managers 
that headquarters managers lack an understanding of local operating environments 
(see Chapter 5) has a number of implications for their respective companies. In 
particular the gap in understanding between the two sides is likely to increase the 
level of causal ambiguity and the probability of an arduous relationship developing as 
both parties perceive the operations of local businesses in a different fashion. 
Business unit managers may find it hard to trust the headquarters' managers asking 
them to institutionalise a new practice, if they feel they do not understand the local 
operating environment. 
All of the Excelsior business units expressed their satisfaction with the regional 
RBSIC team. The three most likely reasons for this were that the regional RBSIC 
team was seen as both reliable and knowledgeable; they (especially the General 
Manager for Risk) were willing to make themselves available to assist local managers 
and were generally sympathetic towards any problems they had; and their assistance 
reduced the call on scarce resources at the business unit that may be required if the 
RBSIC team could not provide them with support. 
This research questions the effectiveness of the support provided. Business unit 
managers commented that it would be possible to retain the knowledge transferred 
only if they continued to receive ongoing support from the regional RBSIC team. 
Reliance on the regional RBSIC team seems in most cases to be regarded as a 
substitute for retaining knowledge about the RBSIC. Rather than developing the 
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capacity to undertake the practice and retain the knowledge most business units 
appear to believe that they will be able to rely on the regional RBSIC team to pros ide 
them with whatever assistance they require whenever they need it. As long as the 
regional RBSIC team is seen as a resource, that can be called upon to assist business 
units in the identification and preparation of data for the RBSIC database, local 
business units are less likely to be motivated to develop the capacity to retain this 
knowledge. 
Furthermore, if the practice is only undertaken annually there is a lower probability 
retentive capacity will be developed than when a practice is used on a regular basis 
becoming one of the business unit's normal management practices. In addition the 
failure to provide business units with sufficient documentation regarding the RBSIC 
is likely to further restrict the development of retentive capacity. 
The next chapter, the conclusion, will summarise the research and discuss the key 
themes that have emerged from this study. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS 
12.0.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to develop an understanding of the transfer of a 
corporate governance practice, the RBSIC, from two UK MNEs to their subsidiaries 
and joint ventures in the Asia-Pacific region. Research was guided by the following 
four questions: 
1. To what extent has a risk based system of internal control that follows the 
recommendations contained in the Turnbull guidelines been institutionalised in 
the Asia-Pacific based subsidiaries and joint ventures of two UK listed 
companies? 
2. What are the main difficulties, if any, encountered during the transfer of the 
practice? 
3. If so, what are the key variables influencing the successful transfer of the practice? 
4. What are the practical implications of this research? 
This chapter commences with a summary of the research, followed by a discussion of 
the key themes emerging from the study. The next section considers the practical 
implications of the findings both at the firm level and from the perspective of the 
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convergence of national corporate governance systems. It goes on to discuss the 
contribution of the research to the study of corporate governance. The final sections 
review the limitations of the study, make suggestions for future research and end the 
thesis with some concluding comments. 
12.1.0 Summary of Research Study 
This research uses the theoretical framework described in Chapter 3 to identify the 
key variables in the implementation, internalisation and institutionalisation of a 
RBSIC in the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures of two UK companies. It 
considers the practice to be transferred - the RBSIC, the context in which the transfer 
occurs and the factors that are likely to influence the difficulty / or ease of practice 
transfer. 
The research initially took place at the UK corporate headquarters of three companies 
- Excelsior, Landmark and Peninsula. Following Peninsula's withdrawal from the 
project, data collection in the Asia-Pacific region was limited to Excelsior and 
Landmark personnel, and the Bangkok based Finance Director of the Thai division of 
a UK company who shared his experiences relating to corporate governance issues 
and ethical behaviour with the researcher. Upon his return to the UK, in addition to 
follow-up interviews with Excelsior and Landmark personnel, the researcher 
interviewed the European Head of Corporate Governance for a leading United States 
based international bank and Nigel Turnbull, Chairman of the ICAEW who were 
responsible for publishing Guidance on Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on 
the Combined Code more commonly known as the Turnbull Report or guidelines. 
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Semi-structured interviews were used as the principle method of data collection with 
41 informants interviewed on 38 separate occasions in the UK and Asia-Pacific region 
using questions developed around the central themes of the theoretical framework 
introduced in Chapter 3. 
Through the combination of the interviews and documentation provided by the 
companies two case studies were developed - one main case study, consisting of eight 
embedded case studies (Yin, 2003: 39 - 46) - Excelsior; and a supporting case study 
consisting of two embedded case studies - Landmark. Each case begins with a brief 
description of the company followed by a review of the operation of the RBSIC in the 
company. The remainder of the case describes each of the Asia-Pacific business units 
that make up the embedded case studies including data relating to non-practice 
specific learning, change and innovation, certain aspects of its relationship' with 
headquarters2 and the operation of the RBSIC in the business unit. 
A cross case analysis of the data, overlaid with data collected at the Excelsior and 
Landmark corporate headquarters, the two meetings at Peninsula's corporate 
headquarters and individual interviews with people not directly connected with the 
case studies, was then undertaken with the objective of discovering any patterns and 
emergent issues (Ritchie & Spencer, 1993: 179 - 180). This led to the identification 
of five key variables in the implementation, internalisation and institutionalisation of 
the RBSIC in individual business units. Following a broad statement of the findings 
of this research, and an introductory discussion of how these variables relate to the 
Primarily degree of dependence and headquarters understanding of the local operating environment 
2 Corporate headquarters for both Landmark and Excelsior Asia-Pacific headquarters and corporate and 
regional headquarters for the other Excelsior business units. 
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theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 3, the five variables were analysed and 
discussed in separate chapters. 
Although the RBSIC for Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture was undertaken by a 
risk facilitator based in the UK with limited local involvement by senior managers, 
and the Hong Kong based joint venture had been recently established, data relating to 
the context within which the transfer of the RBSIC would occur was comparable to 
the contextual data provided by the Excelsior business units. In addition data was 
also available from the Landmark business units concerning many of the variables 
that were likely to influence the difficulty of the practice transfer, that were related to 
the practice itself3. 
12.2.0 Discussion of Main Findings 
The over-arching conclusion of this research is that the transfer of the RBSIC seems 
beset by difficulties and a consequent lack of institutionalisation at the business unit 
level. As described in Chapter 6, the RBSIC has failed to become part of the `normal' 
operating practices of the business unit. The term ceremonial adoption (with lower 
levels of implementation than suggested by Kostova and Roth, 2002) is used to 
characterise this process and the key variables which underpin this are described in 
the following sections. Here, we reflect upon the findings of this study in the wider 
context of organisation theory. We do this because the current findings resonate with 
a number of key themes in organisation theory, which may indicate that the transfer of 
corporate governance practices seem little different from more general features of 
In these cases Landmark managers were able to express their opinions regarding the variables likely 
to influence the degree of difficulty invok ed in the implementation of the RBSIC despite not yet 
implementing the practice in their business unit. 
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knowledge transfer in organisational and inter-organisational relations. Two 
theoretical constructs stand out -- inertia on the part of the business unit coupled with 
embedded routines which preclude the institutionalization of the RBSIC. 
Inertia concerns the problems of communicating and transferring knowledge (and 
capabilities) both within and between organisations (Teece, 1997; Zander and Kogut, 
1995). Inertia acts as a barrier to transfer. Miller (1990) argues that there are a 
number of ways in which inertia can arise, ranging from power and politics to deeply 
embedded organisational routines which resist change over time (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1988). In many respects, this range of actions (and inactions) can be seen in 
the present study. For example, the perceived lack of dependency of the business 
unit on corporate headquarters resulted in a degree of autonomy for the business unit, 
allowing its managers choices over the extent to which they implemented and 
internalised the RBSIC. Whether this is a function of business units exercising their 
power base, or is a result of the complexity of the RBSIC is not known, although 
Zander and Kogut (1995) in a study of Swedish organisations conclude that only 
easily understood knowledge lent itself to rapid and easy transfer within and between 
organisations. This would lead us to conclude that the transfer of complex 
knowledge, such as the RBSIC is likely to result in inertia. However, Todorova and 
Durisin (2007) point out that the inability of an organisation to institutionalize (or 
assimilate) new knowledge and processes is primarily a function of its existing 
cognitive and normative structures which conforms to the Greenwood and Hinings 
(1988) idea of embedded and unchanging routines. 
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Yet the `weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973) which are evident between business units and 
corporate headquarters also seem to predispose managers in the business units to keep 
the transfer at least at arm's length and (at most) as a power base from which to resist 
corporate headquarters decisions. In this respect, the `strength of weak ties' (to quote 
Granovetter4) lies not in the social linkages between different groups (such as between 
corporate headquarters and the business unit) but as a basis for the exercise of power 
by business unit managers. These are indeed `weak ties' but not in the sense implied 
by Granovetter. How does this power base accrue to the business units? 
The data would indicate that business unit managers build their power base by key 
actions (or dispositions) and that these, in turn, hinder the transfer of the RBSIC. 
Primarily, they treat the RBSIC as an operational, rather than a strategic construct. 
From the data in this research, it seems that such a decision is a conscious one and, as 
a result, the RBSIC is put on the `back burner' as arguably more strategic decisions 
gain managerial attention. Whilst this may not be a direct influence over the non- 
institutionalisation of the practice, treating the RBSIC as operational has important 
consequences which in turn preclude its adoption. It creates a cognitive and 
normative context in the business unit whereby the RBSIC is viewed as relatively 
unimportant and is something imposed at arm's length by corporate headquarters. 
This creates what Feldman (2000) calls embedded routines. These are actions (or 
inactions) which develop in an organisation in a context of selective pressures. These 
become learned responses over time and act as powerful barriers to the adoption of 
4 Oranov cttcr (1973: 1376) found that \\ eak ties are more likely to link members of different groups 
(e. g. Headquarters and subsidiaries) than are strong ones which tend to be concentrated within 
particular groups. They are relationships that transcend local relationship boundaries both socially and 
geographically. 
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new practices (or the development of new knowledge). Routines can act as 
constraining influences since they are the inherited decision rules which accrue over 
time and are perceived to underlie the survival of the organisation in a changing and 
sometimes hostile environment. They are sources of stability but also inflexibility . 
The RBSIC, perceived as both imposed (by corporate headquarters) and novel (to the 
business unit) had little chance of being adopted from the perspective of embedded 
routines. 
Unlike Granovetter's social weak ties, there is no reciprocity between corporate 
headquarters and the business unit. Corporate headquarters demands the business unit 
implement the RBSIC, but they receive nothing or little in return for doing so. The 
incentive is one-way traffic. So the potential strength of weak ties is lost (Granovetter 
argued that reciprocity is key to strength in inter-organisational relationships). 
Reciprocity is precluded by a number of factors apparent from the data. There is 
multiple ambiguity illustrated by, for example, the failure to understand the specific 
characteristics of the recipient business unit (on the part of corporate headquarters) 
coupled with different understandings of the RBSIC at the business unit level of 
analysis (each displaying a varying degree of understanding). Neither the business 
unit nor corporate headquarters seems to be working to the same base of codified 
knowledge. 
Finally, the data reveal what Cyert and March (1963) regarded as something of a 
general organisational pathology - namely `sequential attention' to goals and 
`problemistic' search. What Cyert and March argued to be general features of 
organisation, are revealed in the current data as specifically also being, the case in 
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dealing with the transfer of the RBSIC. Managers in business units routinely 
relegated the RBSIC to being an annual reporting exercise and they only paid 
attention to RBSIC related issues when they became important (as in the need to 
report annually to corporate headquarters). As Weick (1995) argued, managers only 
pay attention to an issue once it becomes a problem. Managers `enact' their 
environment and, to a large extent, what becomes viewed as important is precisely 
that (and only that) which is perceived as important at the time. A clear finding from 
the current data was that the RBSIC became an important issue at annual reporting 
time and was relegated to backstage once the annual reporting season was over. 
The above discussion shows that what began here as a specific investigation into the 
transfer of practices, reflects very strongly more general features of behaviour within 
and between organisations. Even ceremonial adoption itself has been argued to be a 
general feature in many aspects of organisational life (including such factors as token 
democracy and participation alongside token involvement and influence in key 
decisions and organisational activities). However, some aspects of the current 
research do seem relatively more specific. In the next section we discuss the 
theoretical framework sub-variables that played an important role in the ceremonial 
adoption of the RBSIC. 
12.3.0 Key Theoretical Framework Sub-Variables 
The transnational transfer of the RBSIC from a UK based corporate headquarters to 
its Asia-Pacific business units inevitably means that country level factors as well as 
organisational and individual factors will play an important role in the transfer of the 
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practice. The RBSIC was developed by a UK based corporate headquarters heavily 
influenced by the regulatory, cognitive and normative institutions that make up its 
country institutional profile (CIP) (Kostova (1999) (see 3.5.1). The RBSIC reflects 
the Turnbull guidelines and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (regulatory 
institutions), the shared social knowledge that people have regarding risk based 
systems of internal control (cognitive institutions) and the beliefs, values and social 
norms related to risk based systems of internal control (normative institutions). This 
research has found, as proposed by Kostova (1999: 316), that the successful transfer 
of the practice is negatively associated with the differences in the CIP of the recipient 
and source of the RBSIC. These differences (e. g. perceptions of risk and attitudes to 
risk management at the local business unit) to varying degrees affect the three practice 
specific sub-variables - causal ambiguity, practice specific absorptive capacity and 
motivation sub-variable of characteristics of the practice recipient - that were 
identified as relatively more important than the others included in the framework for 
the analysis of the implementation and internalisation of a Turnbull based system of 
internal control in the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries and joint ventures of UK listed 
companies (see 6.4.0). On a number of occasions these sub-variables interacted with 
other less important sub-variables of the theoretical framework. 
Causal ambiguity is a measure of depth (Szulanski, 2003: 37) or completeness (Bohn, 
1994) of understanding about the RBSIC and the context in which it is to be 
institutionalised. This research has found that when Excelsior introduced the RBSIC 
into its Asia-Pacific business units it did not function as expected by corporate 
headquarters. This in part was a consequence of the source of the knowledge's lack 
of an understanding of the idiosyncratic features of the new context in which the 
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RBSIC was being transferred and how they interact. This was particularly evident 
regarding local attitudes to risk, identification of risk and risk management. Possible 
reasons for this were the limited amount of time spent at local business units by 
source managers whose main medium of communication with local mangers was 
Email and that when they did spend time in recipient countries their efforts stiere 
directed towards specific issues that precluded the development of a more general 
understanding of the local operating environment. This suggests the possibility of an 
arduous relationship (a sub-variable of relational context) between the source and the 
recipient making the transfer of the RBSIC and its institutionalisation more difficult. 
Causal ambiguity also existed among recipient business units who lacked a consistent 
understanding of the purpose and operation of the RBSIC, and its role in the corporate 
governance of the company. This in part was a reflection of limited training and the 
absence of documentation (e. g. a procedures manual) about the practice. 
In both cases causal ambiguity will have been increased by differences in the CIP of 
the source and recipient business unit. 
Absorpthvc capacity exists at two levels - general and RBSIC specific. Business units 
were found to be generally supportive of learning, change and innovation with little 
evidence of the existence of the not-invented-here syndrome suggesting high levels of 
general non-specific absorptive capacity. However, practice specific absorptive 
capacity relating to the RBSIC was clearly lacking this was a due to a number of 
factors: 
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A business unit's absorptive capacity is conceptualised and measured not only in 
terms of the recipient's ability to apply new knowledge but also to draw on outside 
expertise (Szulanski, 2003: 70). The inadequate explanation of the practice by the 
source reduced the RBSIC specific absorptive capacity of the recipient unit 
decreasing the likelihood of the successful transfer of the practice. 
Although there was some disagreement among business units about the availability of 
sufficient resources to institutionalise the RBSIC, thereby decreasing practice specific 
absorptive capacity, absorptive capacity is largely a function of prior related 
knowledge. In the majority of business units knowledge about systems of internal 
control and specifically risk based systems of internal control was largely absent 
increasing the need to build-up awareness and develop understanding about the 
RBSIC. The absence of documentation and training about the practice played a key 
role retarding the development of RBSIC specific absorptive capacity. In addition, 
reflected in the regulatory institutions of a country's CIP, the importance of risk 
management in corporate governance is generally not appreciated by the Asia-Pacific 
countries included in this study (Roche, 2005: 14) 5 rarely playing a role in the 
operating practices and procedures of local companies. Given that the majority of 
local business unit employees had previously worked for local companies prior 
related knowledge about risk-based systems of internal control among employees was 
limited further reducing a business unit's RBSIC specific absorptive capacity. 
Business unit's RBSIC specific absorptive capacity was also reduced by the 
inconsistency between the values and norms associated with RBSIC that were 
The exception being, Australia 
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representative of a UK based MNE and the norms and values of the recipient business 
units6 that were a reflection of the cognitive and normative institutions of their 
respective CIPs. The greater the differences in the cognitive and normative 
institutions of the source and the recipient country the harder it will be for recipient 
unit employees to understand the practice and relate it to their values and norms, 
thereby, reducing a business unit's absorptive capacity. If this is the case, the need 
will be greater for support from the source in the form of resources, training and 
appropriate documentation. As discussed above this was lacking at both Excelsior 
and Landmark. 
Motivation levels at the practice recipient to institutionalise the RBSIC were reduced 
by the perceived lack of importance attached to the institutionalisation of the practice 
by the source of the RBSIC. The higher the perceived importance attached to transfer 
of a practice by headquarters, the greater the motivation at the recipient and the more 
likely a new practice will be successfully implemented (Björkman, Barner- 
Rasmussen, and Li, 2004: 450). 
Another de-motivating factor among Excelsior business units, that had not been 
discussed in the theoretical framework, involved the gatekeeper role of the Excelsior 
General Manager for Risk (see 12.4.0). Rather than developing the capacity to 
institutionalise the RBSIC most managers were content to rely upon the General 
Manager for Risk to provide them with assistance whenever it was required. In this 
case a business unit's motivation was reduced because it did not see the need to 
develop the necessary understanding and skills required to institutionalise the RBSIC. 
The exception being Australia 
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The sub-variables trust and perceived credibility were important when considering the 
role to the gatekeeper in the motivation of the recipient business unit and the eventual 
ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC and will be discussed in next section. 
Other RBSIC specific sub-variables that were related to the motivation of the 
recipient unit to institutionalise the RBSIC were dependency and unprovenness. 
Overall, business unit employees did not feel their advancement in their respective 
organisations was dependent on the institutionalisation of the RBSIC nor were they 
convinced that the practice enabled their business to operate more effectively. 
Once again differences in the CIP between the recipient and the source played a role 
in the extent to which a business unit was motivated to institutionalise the RBSIC. If 
it was perceived as inconsistent with the local CIP it was likely to de-motivate the 
recipient unit. 
Two sub-variables were not identified by informants as playing an important role in 
the ceremonial adoption of the RBSIC - organisational compatibility and 
identlflcation with the parent. Organisational compatibility, reflecting the structures 
of the parent and recipient, were not highlighted by any of the respondents. This is 
probably because the operating structures of local business units with regard to 
relating to the parent are largely imposed upon them by their parent and generally 
accepted as necessary for the effective management of a MNE. The need to identify 
with parent was not expressed by any informant supporting the viewti- that business 
units believed they operated in a largely autonomous fashion. 
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The successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC resides primarily in the individual 
employees at the recipient business unit. However, the transfer is embedded inside a 
specific national context consisting of the three components of a country's CPI which 
interact, to differing degrees depending on the distance between the source and the 
recipient's CPI, with the three practice specific sub-variables identified above as the 
most important in the ceremonial adoption of the practice. The individual employee 
needs to both implement and internalise the RBSIC if it is to be successfully 
institutionalised and this can be achieved only by overcoming the barriers to 
institutionalisation represented by the national context and the three practice specific 
variables embedded within it. To summarise, the following figure (Figure 12.0) can 
be drawn to represent the key variables in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC. 
Figure 12.0 
Key Variables in the Institutionalisation of the RBSIC 
Causal 
Ambiguity 
National 
Practice 
Specific 
Absorptive 
Capacity, 
Context 
Motivation 
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12.4.0 Role of the Gatekeeper 
An unexpected finding of this research involves the Excelsior General Manager for 
Risk and his role as the gatekeeper standing between the source of the knowledge 
(corporate headquarters) and the recipient (Asia-Pacific business units) facilitating the 
transfer of knowledge from the source to the recipient. 
Knowledge exploitation requires the sharing of relevant knowledge among members 
of the company (Spender, 1996) in order to promote mutual understanding and 
comprehension (Garvin, 1993). The gatekeeper can provide a formal mechanism to 
facilitate the sharing and eventual exploitation of knowledge (Zahra and George, 
2002) by distributing information within the company, in this case from the parent 
company to its Asia-Pacific business units, as well as gathering information about the 
practice being transferred and the degree to which it has been institutionalised. 
The Excelsior General Manager for Risk, in his role of gatekeeper, had a prominent 
role in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC at the company's Asia-Pacific business 
units. His skill at building and sustaining relationships with managers at individual 
business units was clearly evident. Demonstrating the importance of the trust sub- 
variable of the relational context and the perceived credibility sub-variable of the 
characteristics of the source of the practice. He was uniformly seen as a 
knowledgeable and trustworthy figure that could be relied upon to provide any 
assistance that a business unit may require relating to the RBSIC. In this respect he 
clearly played a positive role in the institutionalisation of the practice. Ho« ever, an 
unintended consequence of the level of support he was prepared to provide to 
Derek Condon 3 39 04/12,, -100- 
business units was their over reliance on his services to a degree that it reduced their 
levels of motivation to institutionalise the practice in their business unit. Rather than 
developing the capacity to undertake the practice, and retain the knowledge, most 
business units appear to believe that they will be able to rely on the regional RBSIC 
team to provide them with whatever assistance they require whenever they need it. 
The role of Excelsior General Manager for Risk and his deputy has played a crucial 
role in the introduction of the RBSIC in the region. He has served as a valuable 
conduit for the transfer of information about the practice. This has been especially 
important given the lack of documentation about the RBSIC that was believed to be 
available to business units. However, this research has found that he is now an 
impediment to the institutionalisation of the practice, unintentionally retarding the 
development and retention of knowledge relating to the RBSIC in individual business 
units, discouraging local managers from increasing their involvement in the practice 
and taking more responsibility for the RBSIC. 
The emergence of the gatekeeper role as central reflects a number of studies which 
provide empirical support for its centrality (e. g. Pettigrew, 1973). In Pettigrew's 
study of a retail store undergoing the purchase of information systems technology, 
Kenny is the gatekeeper. He liaises with suppliers of the technology and 
simultaneously provides information about the technology to the rest of the 
organisation. This role has an inbuilt duality of information supply and information 
restriction, since Kenny was able to persuade key decision makers in the retail store to 
purchase the system he favoured himself, rather than the best value or even the most 
7 Neither the regional RBSIC team or any of the individual business units were aware of the existence 
of the company's ýN ebsite dedicated to the RBSIC. 
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effective system. In a similar vein, the Excelsior General Manager for Risk 
facilitated both knowledge transfer and its restriction across the organisation. The 
organisation became dependent upon his knowledge. Built in to that dependence 
there exists a power relationship in which the gatekeeper can intentionally restrict 
knowledge flows (Pettigrew, 1973), or unintentionally restrict them (as in the current 
case). One key implication from this finding is that the role of the gatekeeper has 
been under-explored in knowledge or practice transfer processes. It is, of course, seen 
as a critical role more generally in organisation theory but has not been specifically 
examined as a key influence in knowledge or practice transfer. The results of the 
current research suggest the centrality of gatekeeper roles - at least in this particular 
case. 
12.5.0 Practical Implications 
12.5.1 Firm Level 
The UK Combined Code requires the boards of UK listed companies to disclose that 
there is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluating and managing the significant 
risks faced by the company, that it has been in place for the year under review and up 
to the date of approval of the annual report and accounts, that it is regularly reviewed 
by the board and accords with the guidance in the Turnbull guidelines (Turnbull, para. 
35). This disclosure appears in the company's annual report. Both Excelsior and 
Landmark are able to make this claim. However, the findings of the research suggest 
that although a Turnbull based system of internal control has been partially 
implemented in both companies it has not been institutionalized and neither company 
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are deriving the maximum benefit from the practice. This may have implications for 
the companies in the future given remarks by the Financial Services Authority, the 
UK's financial regulator, who suggested that auditors should be required to review a 
company's internal risk controls (Financial Times, 24/5/04). Depending on the 
expectations of the auditors, both companies may have difficulties reaching the 
required standard, leading to potentially embarrassing disclosures that may undermine 
their respective share prices. 
The RBSIC is based on the core assumption that a business unit understands the type 
and extent of its key risks in sufficient detail to be able to identify, assess and manage 
them effectively. This research has revealed two important inconsistencies regarding 
this assumption. First, there are considerable variations in informants' attitudes to 
risk, not only between national business units but also on an intra office basis. Less 
senior managers' generally view risk from their own local rationality and do not 
consider risks beyond their immediate area of responsibility. This has led to 
considerable differences in manager's perceptions of risk. 
Secondly, this research has found a number of managers lacked the skills to identify 
risks, and those that claimed to have the necessary skills did not undertake the 
function in a consistent manner. This was very much a reflection of the lack of 
training managers had received relating to the RBSIC. This is of considerable 
importance because the first stage of the RBSIC is the identification and prioritisation 
of risk. Should this task be undertaken. in a suboptimal fashion then the whole 
practice will be devalued and possibly rendered valueless. 
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Overall, Asia-Pacific based informants understanding of the RBSIC is insufficient for 
them to maximise the benefits the practice could provide to their business unit. 
Both companies will need to take action to raise awareness of the practice inside their 
companies if they intend to embed risk management systems at all levels of a 
company's hierarchy. In Excelsior's case the perception of the RBSIC needs to be 
changed so that it is no longer regarded as an annual task, that is not ongoing, making 
embedding very difficult. While, Landmark needs to ensure that a similar message is 
imparted to its Asia-Pacific business units when the responsibility for the RBSIC is 
passed to local personnel. This will require both companies to make a far greater 
commitment to training employees than is presently the case. Training should clearly 
explain how to undertake the RBSIC, the reasons business units are being asked to 
undertake the task and the benefits that can be derived from it. Specific attention 
should be paid to explaining how to identify risks, and what is meant by risks so as to 
counter local differences in the appreciation and identification of risk (see 2.6.0). The 
training should be accompanied by procedures manuals that can provide business 
units with a comprehensive reference source relating to the RBSIC. Furthermore, 
business units will need to be provided with sufficient resources to undertake the task, 
especially if it is to be embedded in the day-to-day operations of the business. A 
greater effort is also required to explain and communicate ethical values. The failure 
to institutionalise an effective ethics policy leaves a company open to reputational 
risk. In addition if such a policy is adapted for local market, as in the case of 
Landmark's Taiwanese joint venture, it must still meet expectations of UK regulators 
and investors. 
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As well as providing training more will need to be done by both companies to 
motivate business units to institutionalise the RBSIC. As commented by Nigel 
Tumbul]8 if the practice is owned by the CEO it sends a message about its 
importance. Managers are more likely to be motivated if they regard the 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC as a priority. This could be signalled by the 
appointment of a board level executive as the `Champion' for the practice. An 
example of this approach can be found at Bank of America, where Ken Lewis, the 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, became the 'Champion' for the 
institutionalisation of the Six Sigma method, a customer-focused data-driven process, 
used to reduce errors throughout the company's operations (Financial Times, 1/3/05). 
His presence at training courses targeted at relatively junior managers, as a participant 
not a speaker, demonstrated to all employees the importance the bank was attaching to 
the practice. Another advantage of appointing a high profile `Champion' for the 
RBSIC should be the increased awareness of the practice throughout the company. 
This was supported by the Excelsior Group Audit Manager responsible for the 
international implementation of the RBSIC who commented that there was not 
enough high level support from the company's senior management for the practice 
and the main board had not issued a direct command to all of the business units to 
comply with the RBSIC. Furthermore there was no requirement for a business unit's 
Chief Executive / Managing Director and Finance Directors to sign off that they have 
carried out the practice as part of the annual business plan they agree with group. 
Similar comments regarding senior management support for the practice were made 
by Landmark informants. 
8 Interviewed on 25/2 05. 
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Other methods that could be introduced to motivate employees include linkinU 
institutionalisation with some kind of reward structure - career advancement, 
additional resources for the business units, financial rewards, etc. However, as stated 
above there is the potential for such an initiative to encourage ceremonial adoption. 
The degree to which a business unit is able to retain knowledge is also likely to be 
negatively related to the degree of support provided by headquarters. Business units 
are more likely to retain knowledge if they develop an understanding of the practice 
through regular use, regard it as value adding and do not look for headquarters based 
personnel to constantly advise them or undertake the required work on their behalf. 
This final point is particularly evident among Excelsior's business units, where over 
reliance on the regional RBSIC team, who among other tasks enter risks identified by 
individual business units into the company's risk database, has reduced local 
responsibility for the RBSIC to a level that discourages business units from taking the 
measures necessary to institutionalise the practice. 
A failure to institutionalize the RBSIC could have a number of practical implications 
for a company. If it is expanding rapidly, especially into markets where it has limited 
experience, it will need to monitor and control the risks it is taking and be able to 
transmit this information, where appropriate, to the board of directors. A failure to 
identify risks could result in serious financial or reputational losses to the company 
leading a substantial drop in shareholder value and possible changes in both 
management and ownership. 
Derek Condon 345 04 1 ?, 2007 
In addition should a company be identified as having insufficient internal controls it 
may be reflected in a lower stock price than would be expected given its earnings, it 
may find it harder to list the company on other stock exchanges and / or raise funds on 
the international capital markets. Once again this could leave the company open to a 
change in ownership and / or result in pressure for a change in senior management. 
12.5.2 Convergence of National Corporate Governance Systems 
The findings of this research, although considering a specific aspect of corporate 
governance, suggest that the convergence of national corporate governance practices 
is unlikely in the near term and that such a shift would require considerable effort at 
both the firm and government level. The reform of corporate governance is largely a 
domestic matter, linked to democratic reform and institutional change at the widest 
level (Kang, forthcoming) and although pressures to improve corporate governance 
standards (see 2.5.0) were found throughout the region, in most cases, change has 
been slow and, with the exception of Australia, standards are still behind those found 
in the UK. 
The divergence in attitudes to risk has already been discussed earlier (see 12.3.0). 
Another important area of divergence concerns whistleblowers. As discussed in 
section 7.2.3, most Asian societies display an aversion to expressing views or 
attitudes which are not in line with often unwritten, social codes. Loyalty and 
obedience are valued, authority flows down the organisation. There is a tendency to 
follow orders rather than assume responsibility. Employees are frequently acutely 
aýý are Of their position in the corporate hierarchy and have no wish to stand out or 
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disrupt the organisation's harmony. This will make the task of establishing a system 
to encourage whistleblowers, a key component of the RBSIC far more difficult. even 
if some form of protection is written into legislation. 
Ethics are another area of divergence. In the US and Europe, if a business practice is 
legal it is generally considered to be ethical in business terms. In Asia, the concept of 
`face' can take the place of law. Face is based on largely informal communal values 
and mutual respect and in simple terms operates on the basis that colleagues should 
not let each other down. Face can cause enormous problems. It leads to cover ups 
and lies as everyone tries to preserve face rather then admit to a mistake or concede 
there is a problem. This can lead to communications difficulties inside an 
organisation with `bad' news not reaching senior managers as managers, lower in the 
hierarchy, fail to acknowledge or report unethical activities in their organisation 
because by doing so they will lose `face' or cause other managers to do so. 
The ethics policies of Excelsior and Landmark reflect the norms and values of the 
UK. These differ to varying degrees with the norms and values prevalent in the Asia- 
Pacific countries in the study (see Chapter 7). In line with findings of Sethi (2003) 
this research has found that managers often do not understand relevant ethical policies 
or take them seriously. As long as this remains the case the likelihood of a single 
ethics policy becoming institutionalised across the company remains remote. If a 
business unit that is subordinate to its parent company fails to institutionalise an ethics 
policy, mandated by its headquarters, it suggests that the likelihood of a single 
approach to ethics being adopted across national borders, that NN-ill become an 
important part an international code of corporate governance, is also unlikely. 
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A fourth issue is that of transparency. The countries in this study. with the exception 
of Australia, do not have a culture of transparency. There is no natural inclination 
towards openness either in government or the corporate sector. Corporate governance 
by its very nature is adversarial - it is about challenge and accountability. If everyone 
is to preserve face then harmony has to be maintained, open criticism is best avoided 
making proper investigation very difficult. Furthermore, because of the hierarchical 
nature of their organisations with their clearly defined levels of responsibility, Asian 
managers are more likely than their Western equivalents to regard externally imposed 
checks and balances as an affront that is a challenge to their authority. This is 
particularly the case when a company is family owned and managed. In this case a 
manger may adopt the approach - `it is mY compani' and how I manage it is none of 
your business'- even when a large part of the company is owned by outsiders. If 
managers have this mindset it is highly unlikely that they will feel comfortable 
acknowledging risks and providing information to shareholders and regulators about a 
company's performance. 
Fifthly, as discussed in section 2.4.2 enforcement of corporate governance regulations 
is rarely seen as a priority by local governments (once again the exception is 
Australia). Only the wealthiest of Asia's governments can afford to enforce 
compliance by local companies and in these cases, while the resources may exist, the 
will may not. Government and business leaders are often closely linked reducing the 
likelihood of a legal dispute, at least in public. Throughout this study informants 
regularly questioned whether there was a real desire among companies and 
government to see the enforcement of a strong corporate governance regulatory 
environment. 
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Returning to the potential outcomes of convergence suggested by Guillen (2000) this 
study has found that it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that corporate governance 
in the countries that make up this study, with the exception of Australia, will converge 
on the outsider dominated Anglo-Saxon model. As suggested by Branson (2001) the 
`one size fits all' approach to corporate governance does not allow for the value 
systems present in the recipient countries and this combined with the perceived lack 
of political will to change makes the adoption of an Anglo-Saxon system of corporate 
governance, and therefore convergence with the UK and USA, unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. There is a greater possibility of a hybrid model that combines 
features of both the outsider and insider models being adopted. Whether such a 
system would find favour in countries that presently operate an Anglo-Saxon model 
of corporate governance is outside the remit of this research. However, based on 
recent trends in corporate governance in both the UK and USA, this seems unlikely. 
As discussed in section 2.5.0, local companies, with an overseas stock market listing 
in countries that have adopted an Anglo-Saxon approach to corporate governance, 
will be required to move towards the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model and 
pressures for similar action are likely to influence companies hoping to borrow money 
on the international capital markets. However, these pressures are unlikely to 
influence the majority of local companies, who are unlikely to require the services of 
these markets, once again reducing the likelihood of convergence towards one global 
corporate governance system. 
Given the specific nature of this research it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
regarding attempts to reform corporate governance in the Asia-Pacific region 
generally. However, despite all of the countries in this study, with the exception of 
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Japan, referring to the importance of risk management in their corporate governance 
guidelines, these findings suggest that institutionalisation of risk management 
practices in companies throughout the region, with the exception of Australia, will be 
difficult to achieve. 
12.6.0 Contributions of the Current Research to the Study of Governance 
The main contributions of the current research are three-fold. Specifically they focus 
on corporate governance practices below board level; the transfer of corporate 
governance practices across international borders; and the role of managerial agency. 
Despite catastrophic failures that have resulted from the actions of employees below 
the senior management level, e. g. Nick Leeson at Barings Bank, to-date corporate 
governance research has been concentrated almost exclusively on top management 
teams, CEOs and boards of directors (Alvarez and Svejenova, 2005: 3). This research 
broadens the debate to consider the institutionalisation of corporate governance 
practices below the top management level. It reveals the important roles played by 
senior managers as facilitators or as blockages to policy made at board level. Hence, 
implementation rather than formulation gains primacy. For example, the board and 
the senior management team may decide on how the company is going undertake the 
corporate governance practices expected by its regulatory authority but it is the 
enactment of these practices that will ultimately determine their institutionalisation (or 
not). 
9 Only Australia prop ides detailed guidance on the implementation of a risk management process 
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The transfer of corporate governance practices from UK listed companies to their 
business units and joint ventures has had (to date) little theoretical and empirical work 
to inform organisational theory. There are isolated studies (Buck & Tull, 2000: Buck 
& Shahrim, 2005) concerning the transfer of corporate governance practices from one 
country to another. However, they do not consider the internal transfer of a corporate 
governance practice from a company's headquarters to its international subsidiaries 
and joint ventures. This research suggests key factors that enable research to focus on 
the implementation, internalisation and institutionalisation of a corporate governance 
practice in overseas business units. 
By combining context, which includes the regulatory component of social context 
relating to corporate governance, and practice into the same theoretical framework the 
current research provides a more comprehensive understanding of the factors 
influencing the transfer of a corporate governance practice, which should be useful to 
both academics and practitioners. The data have highlighted the importance of 
voluntarism in practice transfer. Transfer depends to a great extent on the 
willingness, ability and motivation of managers rather than the influences of external 
forces (determinism). Practice transfer is certainly regarded as a strategic choice by 
business unit managers, but this is modified by factors such as trade offs and 
judgements over whether or not (or to what extent) to adopt the practice across the 
business unit. Decision makers are exercising voluntaristic choices which impact 
with immediacy and potency upon implementation. The theoretical implications of 
these findings emphasise both the importance of strategic decision making in practice 
transfer, but also the centrality of organisational context in shaping and influencing 
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the scope and extent of any transfer. Human agency and organisational context are 
inter-woven in ways which shape and influence the process. 
The role of double and multiple agency also impacts on the institutionalisation of a 
corporate governance practice. A key assumption of governance literature is that the 
board of directors, who have been appointed by the company's owners, have the 
capacity to ensure that managers function in the best interests of shareholders (Child 
& Rodrigues, 2003: 339). This relationship is complicated when the management of a 
company involves two sets or more of control relationships - double / multiple 
agency. In this research this occurs at the corporate headquarters and at the Asia- 
Pacific business unit levels. 
These key findings raise two important points for discussion. The first concerns the 
relative power of managerial agency with regard to context in any explanation of 
knowledge transfer when the findings indicate both context and managerial agency 
act as influences. In the broadest terms, of course, this discussion re-visits the well 
worn tracks of the voluntarism-determinism debates. Taking the more focused lens of 
the current research, however, reveals managerial agency to be a more powerful 
influence over practice transfer than context (national or organizational). That is not 
to say that context bears little influence - it does - but the key stumbling blocks in 
transfer and the key drivers of ceremonial adoption emanate from managers 
themselves. Agency matters most. As many organization theorists have highlighted, 
this research also emphasizes that it is what managers do (or don't do) that matters 
and is what impacts greatly on the characteristics and extent of adoption processes. 
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In this respect, the current findings mirror the theoretical approach of enactment 
proposed by Weick (1995). 
Yet the data also suggest some elements of structuration may also be at play 
(Giddens, 1991). Giddens's theory of structuration argues that organized life is more 
than individual enactment, but is also not merely determined by social forces. 
Instead, Giddens suggests, human agency and context (social structure) are in a 
relationship with each other, and it is the repetition of the acts of individual agents 
which reproduces the structure. This means that there is a social structure - 
comprising traditions, institutions, moral codes, and established ways of doing things; 
but it also means that these can be changed if individuals start to ignore them, replace 
them, or reproduce them differently. There is a duality of structures in organizations 
- on one side there are situated actors who undertake social action and interaction, 
and enter into knowledgeable activities in various situations. At the same time, social 
systems and structures (context) form the rules, resources, and social relationships 
that actors produce and reproduce through social interaction. Structuration means 
studying the ways in which these social systems are produced and reproduced in 
social interaction. In the current research, we see the potency of agency in 
maintaining the social system of the business unit. Such maintenance was embodied 
in managerial practices of (for example) treating the RBSIC as operational and as 
only important when annual reporting time came around. The context this produced 
created a powerful influence against both change and practice transfer despite the 
apparent power of HQ to impose the RBSIC on the business unit. 
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12.7.0 Limitations of the Study 
The research design, methods and methodology for this research are not without 
limitations. The difficulties that can arise when using semi-structured interviews have 
been identified in section 4.4.1. A number of criticisms of case studies have also been 
made. They have been described as subjective because the case report1° is a 
representation of the case and is dependent on the information volunteered, and the 
researcher decides what to include in the case study which almost certainly be less 
than was learned. However, it is this subjectivity which is an essential element of 
understanding and without it the case would lack the necessary focus. 
Concerns have also been voiced about their lack of external validity and 
generalisability. This problem has been addressed in this research through the use of 
one main case study, containing eight embedded case studies and one smaller 
supporting cases containing two embedded cases. However, the generalisability of 
findings to sectors and countries other than those Excelsior and Landmark are 
operating in, should be taken with caution. The context-specific perceptions of 
informants may not be directly applicable to other companies. 
Research involving corporate governance presents a unique set of problems that are 
unlikely to be present when analysing the transfer of other organisational practices. 
Subjectivity could not be avoided as the reasons for the RBSIC and its overall 
position in a company's corporate governance framework had to be explained by the 
researcher to nearly all of the interviewees. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1 
10 A case study is both a process of inquiry about the case and the product of the inquiry which is 
known as the case report. 
Derek Condon 354 04 12'2007 
the choice of the RBSIC as the focus of this research potentially biases the thesis in 
two ways: Firstly, business units are located in national contexts and have different 
cognitive, normative and regulatory institutions regarding corporate governance than 
the source of the practice increasing the likelihood of the rejection of the RBSIC. 
These are reflected, to varying degrees, in the lower priority attached to corporate 
governance in recipient countries, and particularly relevant to this research, the lack of 
emphasis on risk management". Secondly, as discussed in pages 3-5 the RBSIC 
could be argued to be costly, leading to unnecessary `red-tape', that reduces a 
company's ability to act quickly and that the `market' is the best regulator of a 
company and a managers' behaviour. This study embraces a voluntaristic perspective 
in which governance structures and processes (including the RBSIC) are argued to 
make a difference to the effectiveness and survival of all parts of the organisation and 
is a value adding practice (see page 5). Given this assumption the potential for bias 
exists due to the researcher imposing his own reference on the interviews when 
questions are asked and answers are interpreted (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 93). 
However, despite the potential biases discussed above interviews were in depth and 
rich enough to allow informants to reveal and develop data which indicated that bias 
appeared not to be a dominant factor. Furthermore, the data indicated informants 
were self-aware of a potential bias in the research and interviews were conducted 
within this context. 
Cross-cultural differences were also apparent with some informants more reluctant to 
discuss the practice openly in case they revealed their lack of knowledge possibly 
`losing face'. Similarly, some informants may have been more likely to criticise the 
The exception being : Australia 
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practice than others who may have seen criticism as an indication of disloyalty, or 
lack of faith in their immediate superiors, business unit or the company as a whole. 
However, constant reassurance that the objective of the research was not to reveal the 
interviewees shortcomings, combined with a promise of anonymity, enabled these 
issues to be largely overcome. The length of the interviews also provided the 
opportunity for the researcher to develop more of a relationship with the interviewees 
than may have been the case otherwise. 
Managers may not have been prepared to admit to the researcher, who they had not 
met previously, their concerns that the local culture would inhibit the successful 
institutionalisation of the RBSIC fearing this may give a negative impression of their 
managerial ability and, despite promises of confidentiality regarding individual 
responses, be reported back to corporate headquarters' based senior management 
potentially damaging their career prospects. 
Two relationships that warrant consideration are the size of the MNE and the level of 
institutionalisation achieved and the business sector the MNE operates in and the level 
of institutionalisation achieved. Given the scope of this project this was not possible 
in this thesis. 
12.8.0 Suggestions for Future Research 
Gummesson (2000: 25) described gaining access as the researcher's number one 
problem. This is certainly the case with research that considers the extent to which a 
company is complying \vith the relevant corporate governance frameworks. 
Companies are very reluctant to share any information relating to their corporate 
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governance practices beyond the limited statements made in their annual reports and 
this may hinder further research which is needed to consider the role of corporate 
governance practices below board level. However, hopefully this research will offer a 
theoretical framework that can be used to consider the international transfer of 
corporate governance practices beyond a risk based system of internal control. Of 
particular interest would be the introduction of practices relating to the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act in non-United States companies. This differs from the transfer of a 
Turnbull based internal control system in that it is mandated by United States law 
therefore increasing the importance of the regulatory component of the theoretical 
framework. 
Also related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act valuable research could be undertaken to 
consider differences in the institutionalisation of the features of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Turnbull guidelines in companies with dual stock market listings that are 
required to institutionalise both US and UK systems of corporate governance. This 
could also provide an opportunity to research into differences in institutionalisation 
patterns between practices that are required by law or recommended in codes. 
This research identified a number of practice and non-practice factors in the transfer 
of a practice that are worthy of further investigation these included the transfer of 
ethics policies across international borders, approaches to training employees in 
national settings that are different from the country where a practice was designed, the 
role of `gatekeepers' in the international transfer of a strategic practice and methods 
of communicating organisational practices, such as the RBSIC, from the headquarters 
of a NINE to it international business units. 
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Further research is also needed into the degree that variables identified as playing a 
role in the institutionalisation of a corporate governance practice interact with each 
other. 
Regarding ceremonial adoption research into the relative importance of practice 
specific and national context factors, and how it differs depending on the practice 
being transferred, would also offer a valuable insight into the reasons for ceremonial 
adoption. 
The emphasis of the research was on corporate governance practices below the board 
level. Building on the findings of this research it would be of interest to develop an 
understanding of how the board uses the data gathered through the RBSIC in a 
strategic decision making context. Another area of interest, outside of the immediate 
issues discussed in this thesis, would be an investigation into how the attitudes to risk 
and risk management practices will influence corporate governance reform in the 
region and the likelihood of a global convergence of corporate governance systems. 
Briefly, some other research questions raised by this research that warrant further 
investigation include: Can an unfavourable context be overcome by extensive 
practice specific training and if so how should this be undertaken? To what extent 
does the practice being transferred affect the model? Would this framework provide 
useful data if the practice had little or no regulatory role? Does it make a difference if 
the practice being introduced is new to the business unit or replacing an existing 
practice that was designed for a similar purpose? This may be particularly relevant if 
the practice being replaced \,, -as designed by the local business and is being replaced 
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by a practice designed at the corporate headquarters reflecting the national culture of 
that country. 
12.9.0 Concluding Comments 
This thesis has contributed to our understanding of the institutionalisation of a 
corporate governance practice, in the Asia-Pacific subsidiaries of a UK headquartered 
MNE, through the analysis of difficult to obtain unique data about a topic that has 
previously received little academic attention. Through a theoretical framework, that 
combines both context and practice, it has found that the RBSIC has been formally 
adopted by local business units, without their believing in its real value to the 
organisation. The practice has been implemented (to a relatively low level) but not 
internalised and, therefore, not institutionalised. This has led to the ceremonial 
adoption of the practice by individual business units and the failure of the RBSIC to 
become part of their normal management and governance processes and be embedded 
in the operations of the company, forming part of its culture, as recommended by the 
Turnbull guidelines (1999: para. 22). In addition to findings that are specific to the 
international transfer of corporate governance practices (See 12.3.0) the findings 
resonate with a number of key themes found in organisational theory (See 12.2.0) 
reflecting very strongly more general features of behaviour within and between 
organisations. 
Although, as presumed in Chapter 1, context, especially national context, played a key 
role in the institutionalisation of the RBSIC this research found that factors likely to 
influence the difficulty of the institutionalisation of the knowledge related to the 
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practice were more important, particularly causal ambiguity, practice specific 
absorptive capacity and the motivation of the recipient business unit. However. it 
should be noted, as stated in section 3.4.0, context and practice are interrelated and 
cannot be considered in isolation when seeking a complete understanding of the 
factors influencing the likelihood of the successful institutionalisation of a practice. 
As always in studies of this nature the data revealed factors, which while important, 
did not appear to fit with the theoretical framework or assumed a greater importance 
than expected. In this particular study the major factor that fits this description was 
the role of the gatekeeper (see 12.4.0) in which practice transfer can simultaneously 
be facilitated and restricted (intentionally or unintentionally). 
To conclude, in June 2005 the Turnbull Review Group, who had been tasked with 
updating the Turnbull guidelines, published Review of the Turnbull Guidance on 
Internal Control: Proposals for Updating the Guidance. The report based on 
evidence gathered12 found a strong degree of consistency of opinion on main issues, 
with the overwhelming view of respondents being that the Turnbull guidance had 
been a notable success. The evidence suggested that the guidance had contributed to 
a better understanding of risk and improvement in internal control (Para. 1.4). One of 
the respondents, the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators said that the 
guidance is largely considered as "the most effective piece of corporate governance 
guidance to have appeared in the UK ol'cr the last 10 years or so " (Turnbull Review 
Group, 2005(b): 2). 
12 Evidence was gathered from listed companies representing 56°o of the London 
Stock Exchange's 
main market, from institutional investors that between them were responsible 
for funds under 
management in excess of £2,350 billion, from representative bodies and from most of the major 
accounting firms. 
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This research while acknowledging the role of the Turnbull guidance in raising the 
profile of risk management in companies' questions whether the practice has been as 
successful as suggested above, especially with regard to the international 
institutionalisation of the guidelines. The Turnbull Review Group based on the 
supporting documents released, appeared to pay little attention to this topic with the 
only comment referring to international institutionalisation in the 83 page Evidence 
Paper saying: 
"A number of respondents noted that implementing the guidance is not an overnight 
exercise, particularly in complex international groups. Cultural issues need to be 
addressed as well as technical problems. " 
(Turnbull Review Group, 2005(b): 15) 
This raises the possibility of complacency developing among regulators and 
companies regarding standards of risk management and internal control. 
Furthermore, the lack of comment regarding companies' international business units 
is also somewhat surprising given the prominent role of UK companies in the global 
business environment where only the USA and Japan have more companies 
represented in the list of 500 largest companies in the world measured in both 
revenues (Fortune 500,200613) and stock market capitalisation (Financial Times, 
9/5/2006). 
13 Fortune 500 \\'ebsite http: '/mone} . cnn. com/niagazines 
fortune/global500 
22006- 
full list 
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Appendix I 
HOFSTEDE'S FIVE DIMENSIONS 
Table Al 
Power 
Distance 
Index 
Individualism 
Index 
Masculinity 
Index 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Index 
Long- 
Term 
Orientation 
Great Britain 35 (63)* 89(3) 66(11) 35 (66) 25 (32) 
Australia 36(62) 90(2) 61 (20) 51 (55) 31 (25) ý' 
Japan 54(49) 46(33) 95(2) 92(11) 80(4) 
Peoples Republic of 
China 
80(12) 20(56) 66(11) 30(68) 1180) 
Hong Kong 68(27) 25 (53) 57(25) 29(70) 96(2) 
Taiwan 58 (43) 17 (64) 45 (43) 69 (39) 87 (3) 
Thailand 64 (34) 20 (56) 34 (64) 64 (44) 56 (9) 
Malaysia 104(l) 26 (52) 50 (34) 36 (65) N/A 
Singapore 74(19) 20(56) 48(38) 8(74) 48(11) 
Number of countries 74 74 74 74 39 
*Actual score (ranking against other countries) 
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Appendix 2 
DOCUMENTS GIVEN TO THE RESEARCHER DURING THE 
FIRST UK MEETING WITH EXCELSIORS HEAD OF GROUP 
AUDIT 
1. An overview of Excelsior's business risk policy 
2. A number of presentation documents used to explain the RBSIC when it was 
introduced. 
3. An outline of the types of risk the business may confront (also given to business 
units when introducing the RBSIC). 
4. An example of the output from the computer based system that records all of the 
risks once they have been identified. 
5. A copy of the company's ethical policy that he believed had been given to all 
employees worldwide. 
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Appendix 3 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
(Unseen by Interviewee) 
Social Context 
What do you mean by risk? Is it a good or bad thing? 
2. Do you feel the Turnbull guidelines are consistent with the assumptions and 
cultural values of your own country? Are they appropriate for your national 
setting? 
3. How close is your own regulatory environment to that of the UK? 
4. How sensitive to cultural differences was the implementation process? 
5. Is your business unit's approach to management and corporate governance 
consistent with the national environment? 
6. What do you feel are the company's ethical values? Have they been clearly 
communicated to you and are they relevant to your operating environment? 
7. Are the values implied in the Turnbull process consistent with the values of your 
business unit's organisational culture? What would be the local attitude to 
`whistle blowing'? 
Organisational Context 
1. How long has your business unit existed? 
2. Do you feel your organisational culture is supportive of learning, change and 
innovation? Is this still the case if they are driven by forces outside the business 
unit" 
How effective do you feel internal communication is inside your business unit and 
the group'.. 
4. Do you feel you have the opportunity to communicate to senior management any 
concerns you may have? 
How often do you get asked to implement new practices by the regional and 
global HQ? 
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6. How would you describe your business unit's previous system of internal control? 
Relational Context 
1. How would you describe your business unit's organisational structure? Do you 
feel you are part of one organisation or relatively independent? To ww hat extent 
are you dependent on HQ? Do you or your colleagues spend very much time at 
your global / regional HQs? 
2. Do you believe that HQ understands the differences in your operating 
environment and their own? 
3. How would you describe your relationship with HQ? 
4. Do you feel the successful implementation of the RBSIC is important to your 
advancement in the company? 
Practice Transferred 
1. Have you ever heard of the Turnbull guidelines? Are you aware of the regulatory 
importance of the practice? 
2. Do you feel that you understand the reasons for the RBSIC and what is expected 
of you? 
3. Do you feel enough was done to relate the RBSIC with your needs and explain the 
benefits to you? 
4. Do you feel that the formal description of what you are expected to do differs 
from what actually happens? 
5. Do you find the RBSIC of value in identifying opportunities? 
Source of Practice 
1. How effective is the flow of information concerning the RBSIC from HQ? 
2. What type of relationship have you had with the team involved with the 
introduction of the RBSIC? 
3. Do you know who can help you if you have a problem and who are the right 
people inside your business unit to be involved in the RBSIC'? 
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4. How important do you believe the successful institutionalisation of the RBSIC is 
to your regional HQ and global HQ? 
5. Do you feel HQ is sufficiently motivated to assist you in undertaking the RBSIC? 
6. Do you feel the source of the knowledge is credible, knowledgeable and 
trustworthy? 
Practice Recipient 
1. Do you feel you have the necessary knowledge to undertake and benefit from the 
RBSIC? 
2. Have you received sufficient training and what additional training would you find 
of value? To what extent was the RBSIC documented? 
3. Do you feel sufficient resources have been devoted to the transfer of the RBSIC 
(funding and time)? Have you needed to take on extra staff? To what extent are 
`ex-pats' used? 
4. Do you find the requirements onerous? Has it been a time consuming process? 
5. How do you go about identifying risk? 
6. What do you consider has been the most difficult part of implementing 
(transferring) the RBSIC to your BU? Is it related to the task itself or the 
environment it is being undertaken in? 
7. How effective is internal communication with regard to the RBSIC? 
8. How similar is the RBSIC to previous risk management systems you have used? 
9. Do you feel the value of the RBSIC has been proven? 
10. What motivates you to undertake the RBSIC? 
1 1. Do you know who is accountable for risk identification and management? 
12. Do you see the RBSIC as ongoing or something to be done periodically? Does 
the periodic nature of the RBSIC make embedding difficult? 
1 3. Are the same staff involved in the RBSIC each time it is undertaken, what is done 
to retain knowledge of the practice within your business unit? 
14. Do you feel able to retain the knowledge or will you need continuing support from 
HQ? 
15. Will you have an individual responsible for the RBSIC over the long term? 
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1 6. Do you expect the RBSIC to become embedded in your business unit? How 
deeply embedded is it now? What has been done to achieve this? 
17. How do you feel most members of staff regard the RBSIC? Is eý ery member of 
the business unit aware they have a responsibility for risk management? How deep 
does the consultation process go when identifying risks? 
18. How great has senior management support been for the task? 
19. What is done to ensure the RBSIC is working effectively? 
20. How often is the system `formally' reviewed and how do you review the risks 
identified? 
21. Who has responsibility for monitoring and making sure the system is working 
effectively? How quickly do you feel it identifies risk and how quickly are they 
reported to management and action taken? 
22. What is the value of the RBSIC or is it just a bureaucratic exercise'? 
23. Is the company operating in a more effective manner? 
Additional Comments 
1. Is there anything else you would like to say about the RBSIC? 
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Appendix 4 
EMAIL FROM THE RESEARCHER TO THE EXCELSIOR HEAD 
OF GROUP AUDIT 
Hi **** 
I am sorry if I was a bit `bleary-eyed' during our conversation last night I had already 
been asleep for an hour when you called. 
As requested I have enclosed below a copy of the Email I sent to **** (General 
Manager of Risk for Asia-Pacific) on 27/1/04 concerning my visits to Excelsior's 
Asia-Pacific operations. I have also attached two of the documents that were with the 
Email: 
1. The outline of my research project 
2. Research Objectives (includes the list of offices I would like to visit and the 
nature of the research I wish to undertake) 
In addition I have attached the letter I wrote to **** (Finance Director) after he 
agreed to help me with my research. This is the document you had when wve first met 
that was also sent to **** (General Manager of Risk for Asia-Pacific) on the 7 12/03. 
I have not attach a copy of the separate CV I sent to **** (General Manager of Risk 
for Asia-Pacific) on 27/1 04 as this is the same as the one included in the letter to 
**** (Finance Director). 
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With regard to the Research Objectives document, on reflection I appreciate I may 
have caused some confusion. In the sentence: 
Where possible my intention would be to meet with 3-6 individuals (or more if 
deemed appropriate) in each office...... 
I should have written if deemed appropriate by the local office. By this I mean if they 
feel it is important for me to meet with more than six people so that I can get a greater 
understanding of the local risk management process then I will. However, for the 
purposes of valid research, it should not be necessary to go beyond 3-6 interviews, 
and I do not intend to unless requested to do so. 
With regard to the offices to be visited this list was taken from the document headed 
Asia-Pacific Regional Leadership Team that you gave to me when we met on 9/9/03. 
You kindly marked on the document the offices covered by my research. As I 
mentioned last night I hope to make my visits during the March - May period. When 
I originally discussed my research plans with **** (General Manager of Risk for 
Asia-Pacific), just before Christmas, the plan was for me to visit Melbourne at the 
beginning of February (that is why I arrived in Singapore during the second week of 
January), however, two weeks ago **** (General Manager of Risk for Asia-Pacific) 
told me this was no longer possible as he would be out of the office for almost the 
whole month and we agreed to move the date to March. My proposed timetable for 
office visits, to be agreed with **** (General Manager of Risk for Asia-Pacific) when 
Nve met in March, is the following: 
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March - Australia & Japan 
April -- Hong Kong & China 
May - Thailand & Malaysia 
The visit to the Singapore office, for obvious reasons, can be done at any time that is 
mutually convenient. Finally, I would like to visit one other office (listed as to be 
discussed). Ideally this would be either the Philippines to be visited in April (as part 
of the Hong Kong & China Trip) or Indonesia to be visited in May (direct from 
Singapore). I am largely self funded and getting to Singapore, accommodation (a five 
month contract) and National University of Singapore fees have already cost me a 
substantial sum. For this reason I would like to travel in the most cost (and time) 
effective manner and believe this is achieved by the above schedule. A visit to India 
would be a last resort only if other offices were not possible. 
The Research Objectives document states that interviews will be about two hours in 
length. Please change this to a maximum of two hours to allay any fears about me 
taking up too much time. I do not expect to need to speak to anybody more than once. 
Also I am not expecting interviewees to undertake substantial preparation for the 
meeting. These kinds of interviews tend to be more useful if they are not `over- 
structured'. In general, I would not expect a visit to an office to exceed two days 
with the possible exception of Australia where I may need more time. 
The only other help I would probably want from the local office is with regard to 
accommodation. In most cases I would ask them to book me into a local reasonably 
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priced hotel, hopefully, one where they can get me a corporate rate. Of course I 
would pay for the hotel out of my own funds. 
Finally, my request to meet **** (Chief Executive Asia-Pacific) is related to the 
conversation I had with **** (General Manager of Risk for Asia-Pacific), where I 
said if possible I would like the opportunity to discuss the risk management process 
with him, I then said if this is not an option, and I appreciate he is a very busy man, I 
would like to briefly meet him to thank him for his assistance with my research and 
also because he mentioned in his Email dated 22/10/03, when he agreed I could carry 
out my research, that he would welcome the chance to meet with me. 
I hope this information is helpful. If you have any more questions do not hesitate to 
call me, even if it means waking me up! 
Many thanks for your help with what is the key part of my PhD. 
Regards 
Derek 
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Appendix 5 
EXCELSIOR BUSINESS RISK PRESENTATION 
1. Nature of Risk 
This section of the presentation provided a number of definitions of risk, considered 
the general risk environment, the importance of accurate financial reporting and 
emphasised the benefits of early risk identification and its role in protecting the 
company's existing values. 
2. Corporate Governance 
This part of the presentation contained a brief explanation of the UK corporate 
governance framework for listed companies and a description of the Turnbull 
guidelines and how they fitted into this framework. It also outlined the Director's 
obligations' with regard to the Turnbull guidelines which included: 
0 Set appropriate policies for internal controls 
The internal control statement in Excelsior's annual report stated that the Directors have 
responsibility for the Group's system of internal control that covers all aspects of the 
business. In recognition of that responsibility the Directors set policies and seek regular 
assurance that the system of internal control is operating effectively. Strategic, commercial, 
operational and financial areas are all within the scope of these activities which also include 
the management of risks therein. In October. a consolidated summary of the most significant 
risks for the Group as a whole is reviewed by the Board of Director,,. 
Accordingly the Directors confirm that the system of internal control for the year has been 
reviewed in line with the criteria set out in the Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code 
"Internal control" issued in ticptember 1999. 
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" Obtain regular assurance of the effectiveness of the system of internal control 
" Report annually on the system of internal control and identify corrective actions in 
the event of material failures. 
3. Review of the Shortcomings of the Existing Risk Management System 
This section of the presentation contained a review of the role of various departments 
(e. g. internal audit) in the existing risk management system and its shortcomings 
which included: 
0 Not all of the risks identified 
0 Lack of co-ordination 
" No common methodology 
0 No standard reporting format / process 
0 Usually driven from the centre, often with an insurance focus 
0 Overall process short of corporate best practice 
4. Review of the RBSIC 
The aims of the RBSIC are: 
0 To assist in risk identification, especially risks that would prevent the business 
unit from achieving its key business objectives. 
" To provide a structured template to record, analyse and collate 
busincss risks 
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0 The creation of a complete record for the region that gives details of the risk 
faced by the business units, their scale, the strategy adopted to control the risk2 
and the assigning of accountability for managing the risk. 
0 Enable the development of business continuity plans should a business units 
operations be disrupted e. g. plant destroyed by fire. 
5. Key Dates 
0 Quarterly - risk review 
0 August - business unit risk profile confirmed 
" September - review and consolidation of risk profiles 
0 October - main board review 
0 December - inclusion in the annual report 
6. Objectives of the RBSIC 
" Provide a clear understanding of all business risks 
" Become a core competence for managers 
0 Become an integral part of the business process 
0 Create a world class process which maximises value opportunities 
2 This could include minimising the risk - reducing the probability of its occurrence; mitigating the risk 
- determining the action to be taken if the risk materialises (this is often used in conjunction with 
minimising the risk); trans/t'rring the risk - commonly achieved by insuring against it mox ing the risk 
to a third party or outsourcing (contracting out) the task to a third party. (Blackburn, 2000: 9) 
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